Essays on Latent Variable Models and Roll Call Scaling by McAlister, Kevin
Essays on Latent Variable Models and Roll Call
Scaling
by
Kevin A. McAlister
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2020
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Walter R. Mebane, Co-Chair
Professor Kevin M. Quinn, Co-Chair
Assistant Professor Christopher J. Fariss
Professor Scott E. Page
Kevin A. McAlister
kamcal@umich.edu
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4797-0384
c© Kevin A. McAlister 2020
For my wife, Dana. Your love and support has given me the energy to complete this
process.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation symbolizes the end of a long and difficult journey. There is no such
thing as a self-made man, and I am no exception. My success is a product of the time
and support of many people throughout my young career.
First, I want to thank the University of Michigan political science department for
providing me with all the tools I needed to succeed in graduate school and beyond.
I thank numerous members of the administrative staff in the department that dealt
with all of the bureaucratic work needed for my advancement through the program.
Special thanks to Lisa Disch and Robert Mickey for ensuring that I had all the
resources I needed to continue my studies at UM.
Second, I want to thank the numerous colleagues and friends that helped me to
reach this point. Thanks to the many people that have listened to my work and
provided feedback throughout this process. Thanks to my collaborators Erin Cikanek,
Hwayong Shin, Diogo Ferrari, and Patrick Wu for your support and invaluable work
in developing a number of wonderful projects. Thanks to Jacob Montgomery for
supporting my interest in latent variable models and helping me to develop my current
research interests.
Third, I want to thank my committee. Each and every member has served as an
important mentor throughout the beginnings of my academic career. Thanks to
Scott Page, who taught me more about careful and conscientious teaching of difficult
iii
topics than any other person. Thanks to Christopher Fariss, who taught me about
the ins and outs of academia and provided thoughtful comments on all of my project
ideas, good and bad. Thanks to Kevin Quinn, whose guidance has been invaluable
and has always ensured that my work meaningfully interacts with Bayesians, old and
new.
A special thanks is warranted for Walter Mebane. From my first day in Ann Arbor,
Walter has been the most supportive mentor and friend one could hope for during the
Ph.D. process. In my five years of working with Walter, I have learned more about
statistics, political science, effective teaching, and academia than I could have ever
imagined coming into the program. Walter gave me a chance when few others would
and I am eternally grateful for his support over the last half-decade. Five sentences
of acknowledgment is nowhere near enough to express how thankful I am for the time
and effort he spent ensuring my academic success.
Lastly, I want to thank my friends and family that have supported me through the
grueling graduate school process. Thanks to my parents, Tony and Vickie, for your
love and support. Thanks to my siblings, Allison and Taylor, for listening to me drone
on and on about my work. Thanks to Bryant and Christine for always encouraging
me to follow my dreams (and hopefully, one day, Artemis can read this and see that
I actually do kind of know what I’m talking about). Thanks to Kiela for the daily
encouragement and helping me realize that my work is often better than I think.
Finally, thanks to my wonderful wife, Dana - I wouldn’t be at this point if not for
you.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Summary of Contributions and Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Extensions and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
II. Disagreement and Dimensionality: A Varying Dimensions
Approach to Roll Call Scaling in the U.S. Congress . . . . . . 18
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 A Roll Call Scaling Model with Varying Dimensions . . . . . 25
2.3.1 A Spatial Model of Voting with Varying Dimensions 25
2.3.2 Estimating the Roll Call Scaling Model with Varying
Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.3 Estimating the Binary Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.4 A Beta Process IRT Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Multidimensionality in the U.S. Congress Over Time . . . . . 32
v
2.4.1 Interpretation of Ideal Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5 U.S. Legislative Voting and Multidimensionality . . . . . . . . 42
2.5.1 A Theory of Pivotal Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5.2 A Theory on Party Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.7 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A The BPIRT Model and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.1 Beta Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.2 BPIRT Full Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.3 MCMC For BPIRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.4 Identification of Structural Parameters in BPIRT . . 67
A.5 Assessing Convergence for the BPIRT Algorithm . . 68
A.6 Methods for Achieving Faster Convergence . . . . . 69
A.7 Simulation Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B Multidimensionality in the U.S. Congress Over Time . . . . . 74
B.1 IBP and Dimensions Observed in the U.S. House . . 75
B.2 More Summaries of Multidimensional Voting in the
U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
B.3 More Summaries for the 107th U.S. House . . . . . 80
C U.S. Legislative Voting and Multidimensionality . . . . . . . . 82
C.1 A Theory of Pivotal Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
C.2 A Theory on Party Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
III. A Bayesian Nonparametric Approach to Estimating Group
Dynamics in Roll Call Scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2 A Model for Roll Call Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 A Model for Roll Call Analysis with Group Influences . . . . 95
3.4 Clustered Beta Process IRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.1 Uncovering Unknown Latent Groups . . . . . . . . . 102
3.4.2 Latent Groups within Ideal Point Estimation . . . . 104
3.4.3 Estimation of the C-BPIRT Model for Binary Out-
comes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Application to Roll Call Scaling in the U.S. Congress . . . . . 113
3.5.1 107th U.S. Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.5.2 88th U.S. Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.7 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A Gibbs Sampling for C-BPIRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
IV. Interval Estimation on the Marginal Likelihood . . . . . . . . 147
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.2 Computing the Marginal Likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
vi
4.2.1 Candidate’s Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.2.2 Naive Monte Carlo Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.2.3 Importance Sampling Estimators . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.2.4 Bridge Sampling Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.2.5 Laplace-Metropolis Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.2.6 Bounds on the Marginal Likelihood via Variational
Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.3 Estimators, Bounds, and Divergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.4 An Interval Estimate for the Marginal Likelihood . . . . . . . 166
4.4.1 Estimation and Performance of JSW Bounds . . . . 171
4.5 Refinements to the JSW Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.5.1 Kappa Bounds on the Marginal Likelihood . . . . . 177
4.5.2 Estimation of Kappa Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.5.3 Performance of Kappa Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.6 Application of Kappa Bounds to Ordered Factor Analysis Models191
4.6.1 Kappa Bounds Applied to Simulated Data . . . . . 191
4.6.2 Kappa Bounds Applied to Racial Resentment in the
U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
4.8 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A Proof for Lemma 4.4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
B Proof for Theorem 4.5.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
C Proof for Lemma 4.5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
2.1 Dimensionality and Corresponding 95% HPD Intervals Estimated by
BPIRT for the 1st - 115th Sessions of the U.S. House and the U.S.
Senate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Proportion of Multidimensional Votes and Proportion of Variance
Explained by the 1st Dimension Estimated by BPIRT in the 1st -
115th Sessions of the U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Geometric Mean Probability of Correct Classification for Unidimen-
sional and Multidimensional Votes in the 1st - 115th Sessions of the
U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Correlation between the 1st Dimension of Ideal Points Estimated by
BPIRT, the Ideal Points from WNOMINATE-1D, and the Proportion
of Majority Party Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Ideal Points and Dimensions Estimated by BPIRT for the 107th Ses-
sion of the U.S. House (2001 - 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Votes and Cutlines for Department of Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 Vote in the 107th Session of the U.S. House (Roll
Call No. 655) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.7 Probability of Cloture Vote Switch by Ideal Point Quartile . . . . . 47
2.8 Results of Final Passage Votes in the 83rd - 115th Sessions of the
U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.9 Probability of Party Rolls as a Function of Distance between the
Party Median and the Floor Median . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.10 Relationship Between Number of Votes, Estimated Number of Di-
mensions, and Prior Number of Dimensions Implied by IBP for each
Session of the U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.11 Number of Unidimensional and Multidimensional Votes Analyzed in
Each Session of the U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.12 Aggregate GMP and Proportion Correctly Classified Votes for the
1st - 115th Sessions of the U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.13 Highest PVE Dimensions and Number of Dimensions For Each Vote
in the 107th U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1 Graphical Representation of Beta Process IRT Model . . . . . . . . 95
viii
3.2 Graphical Representation of C-BPIRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3 Ideal point estimates from NOMINATE and C-BPIRT for the 107th
U.S. House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4 Map of U.S. House districts and group labels for the 107th Session of
the U.S. House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.5 Comparison of first dimension ideal point estimates from NOMI-
NATE, BPIRT, and C-BPIRT for the 107th U.S. House . . . . . . . 120
3.6 Comparison of squared residuals for 239 one dimensional votes in the
107th U.S. House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.7 Ideal point estimates and roll call votes associated with the Shays
Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act presented dur-
ing the 107th session of the U.S. House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.8 Posterior predictive probability distribution that a new legislator
casts a “Yea” vote to approve the Shays amendment to the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act in the 107th session of the U.S. House
given only a C-BPIRT group label. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.9 Ideal Points and Dimensions estimated by C-BPIRT for the 88th ses-
sion of the U.S. House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.10 Map of U.S. House districts for the 88th Session of the U.S. House. . 132
3.11 Two Dimensional NOMINATE Ideal Points for the 88th U.S. House. 133
4.1 Density plots of 500 simulated bridge sampling estimates compared
to the true marginal likelihood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.2 Bridge sampling estimator and JSW intervals for 500 randomly gen-
erated linear regression data sets with varying numbers of covariates
and amounts of posterior skew. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.3 Shrinkage provided by Kappa Bounds compared to JSW Bounds. . 179
4.4 Bridge sampling estimator, JSW intervals, and Kappa intervals for
500 randomly generated linear regression data sets with varying num-
bers of covariates and amounts of posterior skew. . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.5 Comparison of marginal likelihood estimates for ordered factor anal-
ysis models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.6 Comparison of marginal likelihood estimates given by kappa bounds
and bridge sampling for an ordered factor analysis model applied to
questions related to racial resentment in the 1986 ANES. . . . . . . 205
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table
2.1 Logistic Regression Results for Krehbiel’s Cloture Vote Switching Ex-
ample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Logistic Regression Results for Cox and McCubbins’ Final Passage
Vote Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Number of Dimensions Estimated From Simulated Data With Var-
ious Numbers of Voters, Votes, and Known Dimensionalities Using
BPIRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.4 Proportion of Elements in R Correctly Classified From Simulated
Data With Various Numbers of Voters, Votes, and Known Dimen-
sionalities Using BPIRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5 Correlation between Dimensions Estimated for the 107th U.S. House 80
2.6 Summary statistics for cloture vote switches in the 89th - 115th Ses-
sions of the U.S. Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.7 Summary statistics for final passage votes in the 83rd - 115th Sessions
of the U.S. House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.1 Votes on the Shays Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act presented during the 107th session of the U.S. House . . . . . . 124
3.2 Expected number of Yes and No votes on Shays amendment to the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in the 107th session of the U.S.
House given only a C-BPIRT group label. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.3 Proportion of Votes Correctly Classified and Geometric Mean Prob-
ability of Correct Classification for all roll call votes in the 107th U.S.
House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.4 Probability of same vote cast on a roll call vote for each C-BPIRT
group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.1 Factor loading constraints matrix for each model compared on simu-
lated data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.2 Probability each ordered factor analysis model best fits the data. . . 198
4.3 Proportion of times over 500 data replicates that each ordered factor
analysis model best fits the data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
x
4.4 Loadings Matrix Constraint Specification for Models of Racial Re-
sentment (RR), Individualism (I), and Traditional Racism (TR) Sur-
vey Batteries from 1986 ANES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
xi
ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three essays on latent variable models and Bayesian statis-
tical methods for the study of American legislative institutions and the more general
problems of measurement and model comparison. In the first paper, I explore the di-
mensionality of latent variables in the context of roll call scaling. The dimensionality
of ideal points is an aspect of roll call scaling which has received significant atten-
tion due to its impact on both substantive and spatial interpretations of estimates. I
find that previous evidence for unidimensional ideal points is a product of the Scree
procedure. I propose a new varying dimensions model of legislative voting and a cor-
responding Bayesian nonparametric estimation procedure (BPIRT) that allows for
probabilistic inference on the number of dimensions. Using this approach, I show
that there is strong evidence for multidimensional ideal points in the U.S. Congress
and that using only a single dimension misses much of the disagreement that occurs
within parties. I reexamine theories of U.S. legislative voting and find that empirical
evidence for these models is conditional on unidimensionality.
In the second paper, I expand on the varying dimensions model of legislative voting
and explore the role of group dependencies in legislative voting. Assumptions about
independence of observations in the scaling model ignore the possibility that members
of the voting body have shared incentives to vote as a group and lead to problems in
estimating ideal points and corresponding latent dimensions. I propose a new ideal
point model, clustered beta process IRT (C-BPIRT), that explicitly allows for group
contributions in the underlying spatial model of voting. I derive a corresponding
empirical model that uses flexible Bayesian nonparametric priors to estimate group
xii
effects in ideal points and the corresponding dimensionality of the ideal points. I
apply this model to the 107th U.S. House (2001 - 2003) and the 88th U.S. House
(1963 - 1965) and show how modeling group dynamics improves the estimation and
interpretation of ideal points. Similarly, I show that existing methods of ideal point
estimation produce results that are substantively misaligned with historical studies
of the U.S. Congress.
In the third and final paper, I dive into the more general problem of Bayesian model
comparison and marginal likelihood computation. Various methods of computing the
marginal likelihood exist, such as importance sampling or variational methods, but
they frequently provide inaccurate results. I demonstrate that point estimates for the
marginal likelihood achieved using importance sampling are inaccurate in settings
where the joint posterior is skewed. I propose a light extension to the variational
method that treats the marginal likelihood as a random variable and create a set
of intervals on the marginal likelihood which do not share the same inaccuracies. I
show that these new intervals, called kappa bounds, provide a computationally effi-
cient and accurate way to estimate the marginal likelihood under arbitrarily complex
Bayesian model specifications. I show the superiority of kappa bounds estimates of
the marginal likelihood through a series of simulated and real-world data examples,
including comparing measurement models that estimate latent variables from ordered
discrete survey data.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Measurement models and latent variables models, more generally, are tools that are
now common in political science research. While interest in measuring unobserv-
able concepts and understanding relationships between these concepts and real-world
outcomes has always existed in political science, recent methodological and compu-
tational advancements have led to new and exciting applications of these models
to study social phenomena. These new tools provide researchers with a means of
measuring difficult to observe concepts based on events, ratings, or other pieces of
observable information that are assumed to be a result of the underlying unobservable
latent trait (Fariss et al., 2020).1
Latent variable models are built on the idea that a set of observable outcomes are
manifestations of the underlying latent trait - the latent variable model uses a set of
probabilistic assumptions to model the unobservable latent trait as a function of the
observed outcomes. These empirical models have been applied across a number of
areas within political science: political ideology (Barbera, 2015; Bond and Messing,
1A few of the many new innovations in this rich area are presented in Imai et al. (2016); Jackman
(2000, 2001); Martin and Quinn (2002); Carpenter et al. (2016)
1
2015; Martin and Quinn, 2002; Caughey and Warshaw, 2015; Konig et al., 2013; Pan
and Xu., 2018; Treier and Jackman, 2008; Windett et al., 2015), political attitudes,
knowledge, and preferences (Blaydes and Linzer, 2008; Jesse, 2017; Stegmueller, 2013),
human rights abuses (Fariss, 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss, 2014).
In the study of American political institutions, the most famous application of latent
variable models is roll call scaling. Roll call scaling is an attempt to measure the
ideology and preferences of members of a voting body via observable outcomes on
votes (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1987, 1997; Clinton et al., 2004). In the U.S.
legislature, the matrix of binary ”Yea” and ”Nay” votes across a number of roll calls
are scaled according to a latent variable model where different legislators are assumed
to share a common latent variable that dictates their voting behavior. While there
are many instances where researchers treat this uncovered latent variable as ideology,
a more correct and nuanced interpretation of the estimated latent variable is as an
ideal point which encompass a legislator’s most preferred legislative outcome within
the uncovered policy space. With light changes, this procedure can be used to estimate
ideal points in any setting where a set of voters cast a number of distinct votes.
Ideal points estimated by the NOMINATE methodology (Poole and Rosenthal, 1987),
the most common strategy for estimating ideal points, have been used extensively in
the political science literature - a list attempting to cite every instance of usage would
likely be as long as this entire dissertation. The prevalence of this methodology is both
a testament to its ease of use and the relatively simple interpretation of the resulting
ideal points: legislators with similar voting records have similar ideal points while
dissimilar legislators have dissimilar ideal points. The NOMINATE methodology is
also brilliant in its construction that links the empirical scaling model to an underlying
formal model of utility maximizing voters. This clear formal theoretic underpinning
has made NOMINATE a tool that has been useful for decades and has led to many
of the important theories and findings related to the U.S. legislative body.
2
Ideal points estimated by NOMINATE paint a pessimistic picture of U.S. legislative
voting: members vote along party lines on a single dimension. Under these scores,
members of Congress are not complex voters that consider a variety of pressures when
making decisions; legislators do not consider their “concentric circles of constituency”
(Fenno, 1978); legislators do not have pet issues (Sulkin, 2005) - legislators are simply
agenda-setting party loyalists that have few individual preferences and desires when
taking office. When NOMINATE scores are subsequently used to capture legislative
ideology in other models, empirical models inherently bake this simplistic view of
legislative voting into the resulting findings.2 NOMINATE scores have been used to
show that Congress is completely party driven and has led to much of the polarization
that is seen in U.S. politics today (McCarty et al., 2016).
Yet, scholars of the U.S. Congress continue to find that legislators are complex voters
that are responding to many pressures when casting legislative votes (Roberts et al.,
2016). This begs the question - why do in-depth studies of U.S. legislative voting
find complexity when NOMINATE scores do not? In this dissertation, I contend that
this theoretical mismatch is due to a number of simplifying assumptions and estima-
tion problems in the NOMINATE procedure which distort inferences made from the
roll call scaling model and induce the party-driven legislator findings; when roll call
scaling models are allowed to discover complexity, empirical estimates consistently
discover complexity. By correcting for the statistical and formal theoretic problems
present in the NOMINATE methodology, ideal points can be estimated that match
the complexity of the findings from decades of scholarship on the U.S. Congress.
In turn, new scores can be used to provide a better understanding of the political
structures that have led the U.S. political system to where it is today.
While the focus of much of this dissertation is on roll call scaling, the problems out-
2See Cox and McCubbins (2005) and Krehbiel (1992) for two of the most highly cited examples
of this empirical work.
3
lined and proposed solutions are applicable to a wide class of latent variable models
in political science and beyond. Dimensionality is a concern in many different ar-
eas of latent variable estimation (i.e. survey research, human rights measurement,
and interest group behavior just to name a few) and unidimensional assumptions are
prevalent even when there is little empirical evidence in support. Similarly, depen-
dence across observations and group-based incentive structures are prevalent in many
areas where latent variable models are used, such as educational testing assessment,
online behavior and prediction, and modeling of genetic and genomic phenomena.
Lastly, model comparison for latent variable models is a well-known problem that has
generally led scholars to either use fit approximations or forgo the model comparison
step, all together. This dissertation presents solutions for a number of these problems
and provides simple empirical models that can be adapted to any situation where
latent variable models are used.
1.2 Summary of Contributions and Impact
1.2.1 Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, I address the dimensionality of latent variables and the application of
the unidimensional model to the roll call scaling problem. NOMINATE scores have
been used to claim that roll call voting in the U.S. Congress is best described by
a one dimensional policy space (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; McCarty et al., 2016).
The so-called “unidimensional conjecture” is a key result in the study of the U.S.
Congress and provides support for a number of theories related to party power and
issue voting (Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 2010; Krehbiel, 1992; Cox and McCubbins, 2005;
Sulkin, 2005). Scholars note, however, that when votes are examined by issue area
rather than as an aggregated unit, there is evidence for different liberal-conservative
orderings of legislators conditional on the type of policy being considered (Roberts
4
et al., 2016).
While this point may seem purely methodological, the dimensionality of the policy
space has significant substantive implications - a one dimensional policy space guar-
antees predictable outcomes near the median of the legislature (Krehbiel, 1992) while
a multidimensional policy space grants no such guarantee (Schofield, 1978). A similar
conclusion regards the role of party loyalty. Lee (2009) shows that the first dimension
of NOMINATE ideal points corresponds more closely to the party loyalty of a legisla-
tor rather than any notion of ideology, so a unidimensional policy space implies that
a legislator’s allegiance to her party is the only thing that matters when making vote
decisions; a multidimensional policy space implies a more complex calculation when
making vote choices. Given the substantive implications of the dimensionality, it is
important to rigorously nail down the structure of the latent space. However, current
roll call scaling techniques are unequipped to rigorously address this concern.
I address this problem by proposing a formal model of legislative voting that allows
voters to select from a bundle of dimensions on each vote. Where the standard spatial
model that underlies NOMINATE requires that all voters use the same dimensions of
the policy space on all votes, I allow voters to select a vote-specific set of dimensions
from an overall set of dimensions that then influence the calculus of voting. As
pointed out by Lee (2009), Aldrich et al. (2014), and Roberts et al. (2016), policy
issues that create divisions within parties are frequent but fleeting; rarely do the same
sets of divisions arise across all votes in a session of the U.S. Congress. I derive a new
empirical model for roll call votes, beta process IRT (BPIRT), which is an empirical
analogue to the varying-dimensions model of legislative voting. Through the usage
of an Indian Buffet Process prior on the vote dimensions, I am able to both estimate
the total number of dimensions in the policy space and identify which dimensions
each vote requires to best model the observed roll call data. Simulations show that
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this procedure yields the correct answer when enough data is present and successfully
defaults to the unidimensional model of voting when the algorithm is not provided
with enough information, ruling out the possibility that BPIRT is simply discovering
spurious dimensions.
Using the BPIRT model on the roll call voting records for all members of the U.S.
Congress over the entire history of the U.S. legislature reveals a number of important
findings that should alter how scholars use ideal point estimates in future work. First,
I find no evidence that the unidimensional model of voting is an appropriate model
for U.S. legislative voting behavior throughout U.S. history. Across sessions that
have enough voters and votes, I find that there is strong evidence of multifaceted and
complex voting patterns that transcend simple party allegiance. While a legislator’s
party is the biggest determinant of their vote on any single issue, BPIRT finds many
votes, even in modern sessions of the U.S. Congress, that require dimensions beyond
the first to explain voting behavior.
Building upon this result, I reexamine two theories of U.S. legislative voting behav-
ior, the pivotal voter model (Krehbiel, 1992) and the party catel model (Cox and
McCubbins, 2005), and explore their robustness to multidimensional ideal points us-
ing the scores estimated by BPIRT. For votes that were classified as unidimensional
by BPIRT, both results hold and the original outcomes were replicated. However,
for multidimensional votes, these models performed no better than a simple coin
flip. This implies that nearly 70% of all votes by the U.S. Congress do not fit these
highly-cited and generally revered theories of U.S. legislative voting behavior.
The implications of these findings are wide-reaching and generally damning for the
unidimensional model of legislative voting. The results from BPIRT show that using
unidimensional ideal point estimates will frequently yield incorrect inferences about
the way that the U.S. Congress makes decisions. This same incorrectness applies to
6
models that have made conclusions about other aspects of the U.S. political system
using these results; conclusions about how parties work, how the legislative agenda is
set, etc. must be readdressed to account for potential multidimensionality in legisla-
tive voting. While the simple unidimensional model of voting may lead to convenient
results, this does not mean that they are correct. More generally, the BPIRT model
demonstrates that current methods of determining dimensionality are often insuffi-
cient for truly uncovering the conplexity of a latent variable. Across disciplines, it is
important to test the dimensionality of the latent space against other possible models.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, I address the problem of heterogeneous correlation among observations
in latent variable models. The NOMINATE methodology (and latent variable model-
ing techniques, more broadly) assumes that a legislator only uses her ideal point and
a bill specific weight to calculate the utility that she would get for casting a “Yea”
or “Nay” vote. This particular assumption is puzzling since there is a large body
of work that demonstrates that legislators make decisions in groups (Shepsle, 1978).
In particular, parties are well known to distort the relationship between legislative
preferences and vote outcomes (Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 2010). Aldrich et al. (2014)
show that scaling each party separately in modern sessions of the U.S. Congress re-
veals multidimensionality in legislative voting. This outcome is expected since party
loyalty is the first dimension extracted from NOMINATE (Lee, 2009). If party pref-
erence is important, then it should be included in the underlying model and, if it is
not, then it will lead to dependence among errors and, in turn, biased estimates of
the ideal points. Thus, groups must be included in the underlying calculus of voting
if there is any hope to accurately model legislative voting behavior. Again, current
roll call scaling models are unequipped to handle correlation in errors due to group
voting incentives.
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To address this problem, I propose an extension of the varying dimensions model of
legislative voting that allows for voters to make decisions in groups - a legislator’s
choice utility is a combination of both group preferences and individual preferences.
This construction of utility is more in line with the work on party structures presented
by Aldrich (1995) and Rohde (2010). Under this formal model of voting, I derive
a clustered version of the beta process IRT model, C-BPIRT, that estimates ideal
points, dimensions of legislative voting, the bundle of dimensions for each vote, and a
group label for each legislator. Unlike hierarchical latent variable models, this model
requires no a priori assumptions about each legislator’s group (i.e. the model groups
members by party if the data shows that there is correlation in errors among members
of the same party). The model uses a novel Dirichlet process prior to assign members
to groups where errors are independent conditional on group label. Much like the
regression solution presented by Ferrari (2020), C-BPIRT uncovers meaningful groups
under the latent variable framework.
I use the C-BPIRT model to explore ideal points in two sessions of the U.S. House:
the 107th U.S. House (2001 - 2003) and the 88th session of the U.S. House (1963 -
1965). C-BPIRT ideal points demonstrate that there is a direct relationship between
dimensions and groups in the roll call scaling model: dimensions uncovered by C-
BPIRT tend to model group conflict. This fits with the findings of Lee (2009) that
the first dimension of NOMINATE scores corresponds most closely to party loyalty;
since interparty competition is the most prevalent division in the U.S. Congress, it
makes sense that this would be the first conflict dimension extracted via roll call
scaling. However, I show that the first dimension misses much of the interesting
intraparty conflict. For example, in the 107th U.S. House, I find that NOMINATE
poorly explains votes on the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campign Finance Reform
Act because it does not allow the New England Republicans to appear as their own
distinct voting group. C-BPIRT uncovers this group and allows their ideal points to be
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closer to Democrats on issues of finance reform. C-BPIRT also estimates ideal points
that are more historically consistent - in the 88th U.S. House, the first dimension
of NOMINATE says that New England Republicans and Southern Democrats are
essentially the same on all but civil rights issues while C-BPIRT reflects the reality
that they coalesced on very few votes and, in fact, could not be more different.
The implications of these findings are again wide-reaching. C-BPIRT ideal points
improve upon the scores produced by NOMINATE and BPIRT by more accurately
reflecting the calculus of voting in the U.S. Congress. The underlying formal model
fits the many decades of theory about the role of parties in legislative voting and
should be preferred to the simple individual utility maximization model underlying
current roll call scaling procedures. C-BPIRT also improves on other approaches
that attempt to address these correlations by either clustering based on party alone
or simply forgoing the continuous scale latent variable by combining the continuous
scale latent variable with a discrete scale latent variable that prevents projection of
the group membership to its own dimension. Third, C-BPIRT provides a new tool
for quantitative explorations of the development of the U.S. legislature and its group
voting structure - the goal of the model is to estimate groups and their locations
rather than individual ideal points which are later grouped according to researcher
preference.
More generally, the C-BPIRT model is the first latent variable model that jointly mod-
els groups and individual latent variable locations without user assumptions about
group structure. This model has applications across fields in any situation where
correlation among observations may occur due to an omitted variable - educational
research where test outcomes depend on state funding, survey research where re-
sponses are conditional on a hierarchical latent construct, etc. This broad and flexi-
ble model represents a state-of-the-art approach to estimating latent variables under
heterogeneous dependence structures in data.
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1.2.3 Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, I address the broader problem of latent variable model selection.
Though the NOMINATE model is a statistical model, there is no clear way to com-
pare different specifications of the roll call scaling model to determine which model
best fits the data. While the general usage of the NOMINATE model sees researchers
simply assume a one dimensional policy space in which all voters and votes occur,
there are numerous constraints and choices that influence the outcome. More obvious
in the Bayesian implementation of the NOMINATE procedure (Clinton et al., 2004),
researchers can choose to allow different votes to correspond to different dimensions,
allow different voters to use different dimensions, change the prior distribution over
the latent variable, etc.
Yet, there exists no statistical approach to compare these choices. Researchers are
left with two choices: post-hoc predictive fit metrics or cross-validation. Post-hoc
predictive fit metrics like the proportion of votes correctly classified and the geometric
mean of correct classification are commonly used to determine how well the model fits
the data, but they incorrectly account for uncertainty and frequently lead to model
selections that underestimate the complexity of voting. Computing the proportion
of correctly classified votes using held out votes through cross-validation is another
possible fitting strategy. This approach requires that votes are truly independent and
identically distributed conditional on the ideal points, but there is significant evidence
that they are not (Aldrich et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2016). Without meaningful
measurements of model evidence, there is no way for scholars to accurately compare
models and test various theories of legislative voting using NOMINATE ideal points.
The more general problem of model selection with latent variable models is a well-
known and long-studied problem. While software allows for users to compute various
fit statistics and information criteria that go along with common factor analysis or
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IRT models, these values are rarely reported. This is due to a number of reasons: 1)
model fit metrics do not provide a consistent answer, 2) when the values do agree,
they often point to the incorrect model, and 3) the fit statistics cannot distinguish
between finely tuned differences in models like altered constraints. Bayesian methods
of model selection, particularly marginal likelihood computation, are one area where
scholars have found a consistent metric for comparing models (Lopes and West, 2004)
- the marginal likelihood for each candidate model is computed and the models are
either averaged or the model with the highest marginal likelihood is selected. While
this approach shows good results in some cases, the marginal likelihood for latent
variable models is difficult to compute and approximations to the marginal likelihood
come with no measure of accuracy.
To address this problem, I propose a new interval estimator of the marginal likeli-
hood. While various methods of computing the marginal likelihood exist, such as
importance sampling or variational methods, they frequently provide inaccurate re-
sults. I demonstrate that point estimates for the marginal likelihood achieved using
importance sampling are inaccurate in settings where the joint posterior is skewed,
like many latent variable models. I propose a light extension to the variational method
that treats the marginal likelihood as a random variable and create a set of intervals
on the marginal likelihood which do not share the same inaccuracies. I show that these
new intervals, called kappa bounds, provide a computationally efficient and accurate
way to estimate the marginal likelihood under arbitrarily complex Bayesian model
specifications. I show the superiority of kappa bounds estimates of the marginal likeli-
hood through a series of simulated and real-world data examples, including comparing
measurement models that estimate latent variables from ordered discrete survey data.
The method of model selection presented in this section provides a meaningful way
for scholars to compare different latent variable model specifications when assessing
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multiple theories. Too often in the political science, scholars present results from
a factor analysis or IRT model that aligns with their theories without providing
any comparison to competing theories. This is, in part, due to a lack of available
and easily implementable model comparison metrics for these models. The methods
outlined in this chapter have applications across disciplines and can be used in many
settings where other model comparison metrics are not considered feasible due to
its relatively low computational cost. This chapter should serve as a starting point
for discussions in the social sciences about model comparison and applying the same
level of statistical rigor that is desired of regression models and other standard applied
statistical models to latent variable models.
1.3 Extensions and Future Work
This dissertation presents a number of improvements to methods of roll call scaling
and latent variable estimation. This work serves as the starting point for a larger
exploration of how latent variable models can be used more effectively for modeling
social phenomena. In particular, I seek to improve these methods to better model and
understand the structure of U.S. legislative voting in the past, present, and future.
The BPIRT model uncovers the dimensions that dictate U.S. Congressional roll call
voting. Currently, these dimensions are given names by looking at the content of
the bills that are associated with each vote. Though the relationship between bill
topic and dimension is not perfect, bills that consider similar topics tend to require
similar dimensions in the BPIRT policy space. This implies that joint modeling of bill
topics and legislative vote outcomes will provide more information about the meaning
of dimensions and provide more information for the scaling procedure to estimate
legislators’ ideal points. Beyond bill topics, there are other pieces of “metadata” that
can give more information about the vote and, in turn, improve estimation of the ideal
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points. These pieces include committee path through the legislature, sponsorship
information, and legislative bill episodes that contain many subsequent votes on the
same bill. This information can be introduced into the roll call scaling model through
a hierarchical version of the Indian Buffet Process to include information about which
bills should cluster; just as errors across legislators are correlated due to party, errors
across votes should also be correlated due to common vote topics. Future work will
see this relationship included in the model of roll call voting.
A further extension in this vein involves more general estimation of multiple related
latent spaces. Like ideal points, bill topics are a latent variable. The ideal point
space and the bill topic space contain shared information - knowing which voters
were close to the indecision point on a specific vote provides information about which
topics the bill contained and where on each issue dimension each bill existed. Just
as simultaneous regression models can be run to model shared information about
each outcome, simultaneous latent variable models can model the joint information
between latent spaces. This model, which is based on joining BPIRT to a text-based
topic model, would jointly scale these two pieces of information in hopes of creating a
link that would allow translation from one space to another. This model would then
be capable of credibly estimating status quo and alternative positions. The nuts and
bolts of this model are similar to those presented in this dissertation, so the methods
used to address questions of dimensionality and correlation would directly apply to
this future model and should serve as a starting point for the work on simultaneous
latent variable models.
A final extension to these models involves dynamic modeling of ideal points, policy
dimensions, and legislative voting groups. C-BPIRT currently operates under the
assumption that each session of the U.S. Congress is a distinct entity; new information
about a legislator’s preferences starts at the beginning of each sessions and ends at the
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session’s conclusion. Just like DW-NOMINATE, a dynamic variant of the C-BPIRT
model would see estimation of groups and dimensions over time. Modeling dimensions
over time can be achieved by finding votes that are similar across sessions of the
U.S. Congress and inducing a common dimension using the Indian Buffet Process
prior. With greater computational power, all sessions of the U.S. Congress can be
jointly scaled to see which issue dimensions exist in a given time period and how those
dimensions have changed over time. On the other end, allowing groups to dynamically
“walk” through the latent space over time would provide information about different
legislative coalitions have evolved. Beyond an examination of how the groups have
changed, linkages between groups can be established to show how cleavages form and
disappear, over time. This model would have significant implications for the study of
American political development and assist in understanding how legislative coalitions
operate in the complex and ever-evolving U.S. legislature. This analysis would also
provide valuable new information on how legislative compromise occurs. All in all,
the C-BPIRT model presents a powerful new tool for understanding how U.S. political
institutions work and evolve.
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CHAPTER II
Disagreement and Dimensionality: A Varying
Dimensions Approach to Roll Call Scaling in the
U.S. Congress
2.1 Introduction
Studies of legislative behavior focus on the relationships between legislative prefer-
ences, institutional structure, and legislative outcomes. A common method used to
understand these relationships uses scaling models that uncover the ideal points of
legislators. While there are many approaches to uncovering the ideal points of leg-
islators, by far the most common approach uses the outcomes from the various roll
call votes that are cast by members of Congress. Roll call scaling techniques such as
NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and its Bayesian analogue (Clinton et al.,
2004) seek to project roll call data into a low-dimensional policy space that captures
the complexities of how members of Congress make vote decisions. The ideal points
can then be used to make inferences about the behavior of legislative actors, such as
the role of parties (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000; Cox and Poole, 2002; Cox and McCub-
bins, 2005), influences within and between branches of the U.S. government (Binder,
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1999; Krehbiel, 1998), and other features of the legislative institution.1
Ideal point models require assumptions that have implications for the interpretation
of the estimated quantities. One assumption is the dimensionality of the latent space.
Assuming a unidimensional ideal point, legislators behave predictably and rational
choice models can provide simple explanations of how legislators make policy pro-
posals and vote choices under the rules of the institution (Krehbiel, 1998; Cox and
McCubbins, 2005). On the other hand, multidimensional ideal points create an en-
vironment where legislators behave in a more nuanced manner - legislative behavior
is conditional on the context of the vote and there are few guarantees of predictable
outcomes (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978; Shepsle, 1978). The choice of dimension-
ality also has strong substantive implications (Shepsle, 1978; Shepsle and Weingast,
1981; Harbridge, 2015; Lee, 2009).
In most recent studies that leverage unidimensional estimates of ideal points, em-
pirical justification for this assumption is given by referencing the “Unidimensional
Congress” arguments of Poole and Rosenthal (2011) - across issue areas within an an-
alyzed period of the U.S. Congress, little improvement to the overall fit of the roll call
scaling model can be made by including more than one dimension. However, many
works show evidence for multidimensionality in U.S. Congressional roll call voting;
there is strong evidence that certain bundles of votes map to different dimensions
and less aggregated analysis of roll call votes reveals this heterogeneity (Heckman
and Snyder Jr, 1996; Roberts et al., 2016; Smith, 2007; Hurwitz, 2001; Crespin and
Rohde, 2010; Norton, 1999; Bateman et al., 2017).
I argue that while some roll call votes in the U.S. Congress are unidimensional, many
more are not. I introduce technology that not only demonstrates this but allows
1There has been significant work in the area of roll call scaling and ideal point estimation for the
U.S. Congress beyond these two models. Lauderdale and Herzog (2016), Tausanovitch and Warshaw
(2017), Bonica (2014), Ramey (2016), Jessee and Malhotra (2010), and Tahk (2018) are just a few
of the models proposed in recent literature.
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the variability in dimensions to be studied. I present a method of roll call scaling
that allows for aggregate-level summaries of legislative decision making while also
allowing for examinations of multidimensionality at the bill-episode level. Leveraging
work from Aldrich et al. (2014) and Roberts et al. (2016), I contend that evidence for
the low-dimensional conjecture is due to the statistical tests used to assess inclusion
of new dimensions. To address this problem, I present a new spatial model in which a
voter makes vote decisions using both the positions of alternatives within the policy
space and a vote-specific bundle of dimensions in which those policy positions exist.
The corresponding empirical model allows for rigorous statistical inference related to
the overall dimensionality of the ideal points and identification of the dimensions of
the policy space associated with each vote. Unlike previous approaches, this method
accurately estimates the dimensionality of the ideal point space even under high
levels of party bloc voting. Similarly, the ideal points and vote-level estimates of
dimensionality allow for new tests related to theories of legislative behavior that
properly take vote-level dimensionality into account. Given that the vast majority of
empirical tests related to legislative decision making use unidimensional NOMINATE
scores, the estimates achieved from this new model allow for a finer examination of
the role of dimensionality in many important theories of U.S. legislative behavior.
Overall, I make several important contributions to the literature in this article.
Methodologically, I present a new spatial model of voting that has an explicit em-
pirical analogue under assumptions about utility structures. This model uses novel
advancements in the field of Bayesian nonparametrics related to estimating the infi-
nite latent feature model (Paisley and Carin, 2009; Knowles and Ghahramani, 2011)
to address the question of dimensionality in aggregate sets of roll call votes by simul-
taneously estimating ideal points and dimensionality. Substantively, I analyze the
entire history of the U.S. House and U.S. Senate (1st− 115th sessions) and show that
there is strong evidence of multidimensional voting through the history of the U.S.
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Congress. In line with many of the conclusions by Heckman and Snyder Jr (1996), I
find that votes tend to bundle based on topic and these votes share similar multidi-
mensional vote patterns. In turn, this allows for identification of key issues that split
members of Congress, both within and across parties. This work produces a new set of
ideal points across U.S. Congressional history that should provide a starting point for
further work related to topic-level voting in the U.S. legislative body. Finally, I apply
the estimates from the new roll call scaling method to two specific theories related
to U.S. Congressional voting: the pivotal voter model (Krehbiel, 1998) and the party
cartel model (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). I show that much of the empirical evidence
that exists for these models changes when dimensionality is properly accounted for in
empirical tests of these theories. This analysis is just the starting point for potentially
reassessing many other predictions made by models of U.S. legislative voting under
conditions of multidimensionality.
2.2 A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting
For a legislature, assume there are N voting members that cast P votes over the
course of time analyzed. For any given vote j ∈ (1, P ), legislator i ∈ (1, N) must
choose between two alternatives: to cast a “Yea” vote for the proposed alternative
(ϑj ∈ RK) or to cast a “Nay” vote for the proposed alternative (ϕj ∈ RK).
Behavior in this legislature is assumed to be describable in a K-dimensional policy
space - all votes that are made by legislator i can be described by the K-dimensional
point locations of ϑj and ϕj within the space and a K-dimensional ideal point, ωi,
which encapsulates the policy preferences of legislator i.
A legislator must choose whether to vote for ϑj or ϕj. Using a utility maximization
model that assumes quadratic loss in distance from her ideal point, assume that she
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chooses the alternative which grants the highest utility:
Ui(ϑj) = −‖ωi − ϑj‖2 + ηij
Ui(ϕj) = −‖ωi −ϕj‖2 + νij
(2.1)
where ηij and νij are stochastic elements of the utility functions. This model is
completely specified if a known structure is placed on ηij and νi,j (Heckman and
Snyder Jr, 1996; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Clinton et al., 2004).
Let Y be a matrix of roll call votes and yi,j be the vote choice that legislator i makes
on proposal j : yij = 1 if legislator i votes “Yea” on vote j and yij = 0 if she casts a
“Nay” vote. Given the model construction, the probability that legislator i votes for
ϑj can represented as:
P (yij = 1) = F (λ
′
jωi − αj) (2.2)
where F (·) is the CDF associated with the chosen error structure, αj = ϑ
′
jϑj−ϕ′jϕj
σ2j
,
and λj =
2(ϑj−ϕj)
σ2j
.
This construction admits a corresponding statistical model that allows for estimation
of the structural parameters α and Λ and the latent variables, Ω. Assuming the errors
are independent and identically distributed, a likelihood function can be derived:
L(α,Λ,Ω|Y ) =
N∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
F (λ′jωi − αj)yij ×
(
1− F (λ′jωi − αj)
)1−yij (2.3)
Bayesian implementations of this model place priors on all of the structural param-
eters and estimation proceeds using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (Clinton
et al., 2004). With minor changes, this model is equivalent to the NOMINATE pro-
cedure (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
Under this specification, a choice of the number of dimensions, K, leads to fully
tractable model that can be estimated. Currently, this choice is made by examining
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a Scree plot (Cattell, 1966). The spirit of the Scree procedure revolves around es-
timating the latent variable model under a number of different assumptions for the
number of dimensions and plotting the fit metric to find the “elbow” in the plot.
Once adding a new dimension no longer adds “enough” value to the fit metric, then
no new dimensions are added. Typically, the choice of fit metric revolves around the
proportion of votes correctly classified under a model: aggregate proportion reduc-
tion in error (Poole and Rosenthal, 2011) or marginal proportion reduction in error
(Roberts et al., 2016).
Regardless of the choice of metric, I contend that the Scree test presents many prob-
lems for inference. By its very nature, the Scree test is inherently subjective; the
choice of how much reduction in error is enough to include a new dimension is sub-
jective and can lead to biases in the number of dimensions chosen. For example,
the Scree test cannot detect small improvements in model fit that are due to adding
dimensions that only contribute to a few votes. Rather, the Scree test says that the
model improvement over the aggregated set of roll call votes is small and the dimen-
sion should not be included. This feature of the Scree test is not ideal as there is an
entire body of the literature which shows that dimensions in roll call voting appear
at the vote-topic level and important dimensions can appear infrequently (Roberts
et al., 2016).
Aldrich et al. (2014) and Roberts et al. (2016) point to the high frequency of votes
that occur along party lines as a problem for current dimensionality testing proce-
dures. When many votes are explained by party lines, the perceived influence of party
can be much higher than what is actually present within the data. Given that there
is often correlation between vote choices in specific policy domains and party mem-
bership, party bloc voting can appear to account for all of the explainable variation
within roll call voting data sets when many dimensions are truly influencing decisions.
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This result is corroborated by the finding that scaling within parties reveals many di-
mensions even when using Scree tests as the decision making criterion (Aldrich et al.,
2014). Similarly, multidimensionality is highly apparent when dimensionality is tested
within and across topically similar bill-episodes (Roberts et al., 2016). Aldrich et al.
(2014) points to the inclusion of zeroes in the matrix of discrimination parameters
as a method for properly modeling the covariance between dimensions and, in turn,
accurately estimating the dimensionality of the ideal points.
These findings point to a couple of features that a roll call scaling method that
accurately uncovers dimensionality should have:
1. Dimensionality should be tested under distributional assumptions. In turn,
probabilistic tests of whether or not a dimension provides a non-zero improve-
ment to the model under an assumption about what constitutes random noise
can be performed. This ensures the inclusion of dimensions which have a strong
influence on a small set of votes.
2. Dimensionality should be tested at the vote level. Each vote should be al-
lowed to draw on a different set of dimensions, if necessary. The aggregated
set of vote-level dimensionalities then dictates the dimensionality of the ideal
point. However, each set of vote-level dimensions should be subject to overfit-
ting penalties in order to estimate substantively useful parameters that account
for both vote-level and aggregate behavior of legislators over the course of time
analyzed. This leads to a proper encoding of conditional independence between
dimensions at the vote-level and, in turn, an accurate count of the number of
dimensions that make up the ideal point space.
A roll call scaling method that meets these conditions should provide an accurate
representation of the dimensionality of the data while also reducing the dimensionality
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of the data to something useful for further examination of aggregate legislative voting
behavior.
2.3 A Roll Call Scaling Model with Varying Dimensions
2.3.1 A Spatial Model of Voting with Varying Dimensions
To address the above conditions for accurately estimating dimensionality, I propose
a new roll call scaling model with varying dimensions. As before, legislator i must
choose to vote for ϑj or ϕj. She votes for the alternative that maximizes her utility
under a quadratic loss function such that:
Ui(ϑj) = −‖rj(ωi − ϑj)‖2 + ηij
Ui(ϕj) = −‖rj(ωi −ϕj)‖2 + νij
(2.4)
Under this specification, the new addition is the binary vector rj. rj is a vector of
length K where rjk = 1 if she considers dimension k ∈ (1, ..., K) in vote j. On the
other hand, rjk = 0 if she does not use her ideal point on dimension k when making
a decision for vote j. Note that rj is assumed to be globally known to all legislators.
The length of rj does not need to be set before specifying the model. For example,
if only dimensions one and three are needed to dictate the utility function associated
with a vote (i.e. rj1 = 1, rj2 = 0, rj3 = 1), then this vector is equivalent to one where
rj4 = 0, rj5 = 0, and all subsequent elements of the vector are set to zero. Thus, the
vector of length three and the corresponding vector of infinite length are equivalent.
This characteristic of the binary vector is key to addressing the shortcomings of the
standard roll call scaling model.
Placing all of the vote level binary vectors, rj, into a matrix with the number of
rows equal to the number of votes and the number of columns equal to the number
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of possible dimensions creates a binary matrix, R, that dictates the mapping of
individual votes to ideal point dimensions. R captures the dimensionality of the
underlying ideal point space across all votes analyzed. Recall that each rj can be
of infinite size, but only the elements equal to one matter for the underlying utility
model. Thus, the dimensionality of the overall space can be modeled as the number
of columns in R which have at least one non-zero element. Similarly, the structure of
rj is allowed to vary across votes - each vote can call on a different set of dimensions
to construct the parameters of the assumed utility calculations that lead to vote
decisions.
As with the standard model, the construction admits a corresponding statistical
model. With similar rearrangement, a likelihood function is determined:
L(α,Λ,Ω,R|Y ) =
N∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
F ((rj  λj)′ωi)− αj)yij×(1− F ((rj  λj)′ωi − αj))1−yij
(2.5)
where  is the Hadamard product of two vectors.2 As with the likelihood function
for the standard roll call scaling model, the likelihood is comprised of the structural
parameters Λ and α and the ideal points, Ω. R is assumed to modify the loadings, Λ.
Like the standard model, the parameters of the estimated statistical model explicitly
link back to the formal theoretic foundation where αj =
rj(ϑ
′
jϑj−ϕ′jϕj)
σ2j
and λj =
2rj(ϑj−ϕj)
σ2j
.3
The varying dimensions model of voting explicitly adds the two conditions listed
previously. First, R constitutes a new quantity that can be estimated. With distri-
butional assumptions, R can be estimated with the other structural parameters of
2The standard roll call scaling models is a special case of the varying dimensions version - setting
all elements of R equal to one and fixing K to a known finite value replicates the model of Clinton
et al. (2004).
3Like the Bayesian IRT approach of Clinton et al. (2004) and the NOMINATE model, this model
assumes that all voters vote sincerely based on their underlying ideal point. Using a model that ties
abstention to strategic behavior, this assumption could be changed.
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the ideal point model to determine the number of dimensions needed to effectively
model the ideal point space. If this choice penalizes against adding many dimensions,
R can dictate a sparse set of dimensions that directly model the aggregate set of roll
call votes. Second, each binary vector, rj, contains a mapping of each vote to some
subset of the ideal point space. This allows each vote to be modeled in a potentially
different set of dimensions. Again, under proper distributional assumptions about R,
this allows each vote to be modeled as a subset of aggregate dimensions. However, if
only one dimension is needed for the collection of votes, R can be reduced to estimate
only one dimension. All in all, this model of voting allows for the dimensionality of
the latent space to be estimated simultaneous to the structural parameters of the
ideal point model.
2.3.2 Estimating the Roll Call Scaling Model with Varying Dimensions
Using equation (2.5) as a starting point, a Bayesian scaling procedure for binary roll
call votes with varying dimensions can be defined.4 Let X be a continuous latent
mapping of the observed roll call votes Y such that:
xij ∼

T N−∞,0((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yij = 0
T N 0,∞((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yij = 1
N ((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yij is missing
(2.6)
where T N l,u(µ, σ2) is the truncated normal distribution truncated between l and u.
Assuming a probit structure on the errors and, without loss, an infinite dimension
ideal point space, equation (2.6) defines the varying dimension roll call scaling model.
This voting model shares many parameters with the two-parameter item response
4The benefits of approaching the roll call scaling problem under the Bayesian paradigm are well
documented. A thorough discussion of these benefits are presented by Clinton et al. (2004).
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model used in educational testing where λj is a vector of item discrimination param-
eters, αj is the item difficulty parameter, and ωi is a vector of ideal points associated
with the vote decisions made by a legislator (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Londregan,
1999).
2.3.3 Estimating the Binary Matrix
A number of approaches for selecting the appropriate number of dimensions in latent
variable models have appeared in the statistics and social sciences literatures (Kim
et al., 2018). However, these approaches often are developed for the purpose of finding
a reduced dimensionality representation of the covariance matrix and estimation of the
structural parameters and item-level differences in dimensionality are not addressed.
I use nonparametric priors on the number of dimensions and allow the dimensions
to vary stochastically. These priors have strict probabilistic properties that make
identification and estimation of structural parameters plausible (Bhattacharya and
Dunson, 2011).
One Bayesian nonparametric approach which allows probabilistic modeling of both
the overall and vote-level dimensionalities uses the beta process (Paisley and Carin,
2009). For rjk ∈ R, let the prior be:
P (rjk|pijk) ∼ Bern(rjk; pijk)
P (pijk|ajk, bjk) ∼ Beta(pijk; ajk, bjk)
(2.7)
Letting K → ∞ allows all possible dimensions to be potentially present in R and
constitutes a beta process.
Without further constraint, the model will always find that the optimal number of
features is equal to the number of items - each item is modeled by its own dimension.
This outcome is akin to over-fitting in regression and provides a solution that is not
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useful for summarizing high-dimensional data; the roll call scaling model needs a
sparse estimate of R. Along with other challenges related to fitting an infinite set of
dimensions to a finite set of data, estimation under the beta process prior has proven
a difficult task in the statistics literature.
A marginalized approach exists that allows for a relatively simple sampling scheme in
the infinite limit that prevents against over-fitting by allowing the number of effective
dimensions to scale with the number of observations and items (Paisley and Carin,
2009). Here, the beta-Bernoulli process dictating the values of the infinite matrix, R,
has a prior such that:
P (pik) ∼ Beta
(
pik;
a
K
,
b(K − 1)
K
)
P (rjk|pik) ∼ Bern(rjk; pik)
(2.8)
where a and b are hyperparameters and K is arbitrarily large such that:
E[pik|K] ≈ 0 (2.9)
which induces a sparse estimate of the binary matrix.
The beta process prior of this form constitutes a simple stochastic process. Marginal-
izing over pi, this process is the two parameter Indian Buffet Process (IBP) (Ghahra-
mani and Griffiths, 2006). IBP has two notable properties for modeling sparse matri-
ces. First, over the entire set of P votes, the number of dimensions sampled follows:
P (K+ = h) = Pois
(
h;
P∑
j=1
ab
b+ j − 1
)
E[K+] ≈ O(ln(P ))
(2.10)
where K+ is the number of columns of R with at least one element equal to one. This
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shows that as P increases, the number of dimensions that can potentially appear in
the latent space increases. However, the expected number of dimensions is small
relative to P and a sparse solution is ensured. On the other hand, if P is small,
then the number of dimensions that can potentially appear in the latent space is also
small. This property ensures that the number of dimensions estimated is supported
by the amount of data present during estimation.
Second, IBP exhibits a “rich get richer” property:
P (rjk = 1) ∝
−rjk +
P∑
h=1
rhk
P + 1 + rjk −
P∑
h=1
rhk
(2.11)
As a dimension becomes more popular, the probability that it is sampled in other
votes increases. In turn, features that are not popular are rarely sampled and have a
small chance of being included in the final model specification. Thus, IBP explores the
feature space in accordance with P , but still promotes sparsity by allowing popular
dimensions to dominate the feature space. This allows the IBP prior to prevent
against overfitting. However, in the face of strong statistical evidence, IBP still allows
an unpopular feature to emerge.
2.3.4 A Beta Process IRT Model
Under the specification in equation (2.6), rj induces a spike and slab prior on the
vector of discrimination parameters, λj . Placing an Indian Buffet Process prior on
R, the induced prior on λj,k is:
P (λjk|rjk) ∼ rjk P (λjk) + (1− rjk)δ0 (2.12)
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where δ0 is a point mass PDF at zero and P (λjk) is the marginal prior on λjk. Thus,
if rjk = 1, λjk is allowed to take a non-zero value. On the other hand, if rjk = 0, it is
restricted to be equal to zero. This aspect of the model bridges the infinite number
of dimensions implied by IBP and the finite number of dimensions that are actually
observed - the first K+ columns of R contain non-zero elements while the countably
infinite set of columns after K+ include only zeroes. In turn, the corresponding ideal
points are simply nuisance parameters. In the context of roll call scaling, the rows
of R tell whether or not a vote draws on a specific dimension when estimating the
parameters of the underlying utility model.
Using the IBP prior on R allows for a full model definition, which is outlined in
Section A.2 of the Appendix. The full model, a beta process item-response theory
model (BPIRT), is a close analogue to the infinite latent feature model developed by
Knowles and Ghahramani (2011). BPIRT has many of the same properties as the
standard Bayesian IRT model (Clinton et al., 2004).
Under this specification, estimation of the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
methods proceeds in a relatively straightforward manner. Technical details related
to estimation of the BPIRT model are included in the appendix. The full conditional
distributions and sampling methods are outlined in Section A.3. The BPIRT model
uniquely identifies estimates for the structural parameters; this property is discussed
in Section A.4. Methods for determining good starting values and assessing conver-
gence of the Markov chains are outlined in Section A.5 and Section A.6. Finally,
simulations which show how accurately BPIRT uncovers the binary matrix under a
known model are shown in Section A.7.
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FIGURE 2.1. Dimensionality and Corresponding 95% HPD Intervals Estimated
by BPIRT for the 1st - 115th Sessions of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate.
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2.4 Multidimensionality in the U.S. Congress Over Time
The varying dimensions model of voting is well suited to examining the question
of multidimensionality in voting and BPIRT provides a rigorous statistical tool for
creating estimates of dimensionality in roll call voting. The results related to multi-
dimensionality from BPIRT promise to provide insight into this problem.5 I begin by
assessing how many dimensions are estimated in the 1st−115th (1789−2017) sessions
for each chamber of the U.S. Congress. Figure 2.1 shows the estimated number of
dimensions and corresponding 95% highest posterior density intervals for each session
within each chamber of Congress. This plot shows a generally multidimensional legis-
lature. In the case of the U.S. House, sessions near the beginning of U.S. history and
some sessions in the late 1800s and early 1900s have credible intervals that include a
5Additional figures and discussion for this section can be found in Section B of the appendix.
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single dimension. However, the vast majority of sessions are estimated to need more
than one dimension to best model roll call behavior.
A similar story is seen in the U.S. Senate. While there are more sessions which are
estimated to require only one dimension, the majority require at least two dimensions
to best model the roll call voting variation. One important caveat for these unidi-
mensional sessions is that the IBP prior which drives BPIRT is limited in its ability
to estimate multidimensionality when there are a small number of votes and/or vot-
ers. In early sessions of the U.S. House, there were less voting members and there
were typically less votes than in more recent sessions of the U.S. House. As shown
in simulations, BPIRT underestimates dimensionality in these settings, so there is
reason to believe that this is the case for the U.S. House. Similarly, there are always
around 100 voting U.S. Senators in a given session which inherently places a cap on
the number of dimensions which can be modeled for a session of this chamber. This
is not to say that these results should be discarded - rather, it is important to point
this aspect of BPIRT out as a weakness for estimating dimensionality in smaller sets
of roll call data.
In order to examine multidimensionality at the vote level, a measure of multidimen-
sionality must be established (Roberts et al., 2016; Bateman et al., 2017; Smith,
2007). One method of summarizing the dimensionality of a single vote is to simply
use the posterior probability that the vote took on more than one dimension in the
binary matrix (MD). However, this metric suffers from minor theoretical deficiencies;
it does not explain how much a vote needs each dimension. Thus, I use a second
supplementary measure of multidimensionality - the proportion of variance explained
(PVE) by each dimension on a specific vote:
PVEjk =
rjkλ
2
jk
K∑
h=1
rjhλ2jh
(2.13)
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FIGURE 2.2. Proportion of Multidimensional Votes and Proportion of Variance
Explained by the 1st Dimension Estimated by BPIRT in the 1st - 115th Sessions
of the U.S. House
Proportion of Variance Explained by 1st Dimension
Proportion Multidimensional Votes
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
U.S. House Year
Pr
o
po
rti
on
All Votes     CQ Key Votes
Note: Values reported are posterior means.
Using PVE to examine the influence of the first dimension on a vote, PVE takes a
value of one when only the first dimensions is needed. As the influence of other di-
mensions increase, PVE for the first dimensions decreases. Therefore, PVE measures
the overall influence of a given dimensions on vote outcomes. MD and PVE are highly
correlated, but provide different views of each dimension’s necessity in the individual
case.
Using the proposed measures of multidimensionality, I examine the role of the first
dimension and the set of dimensions beyond the first estimated by BPIRT in explain-
ing variation within U.S. House roll call data sets.6 One of the many advantages of
6For this and the proceeding examinations of multidimensionality in roll call voting, I choose to
only present results for the U.S. House. The trends and inferences made from U.S. House data are
similar to those that are made from U.S. Senate data. For the sake of brevity, I withhold figures
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the BPIRT approach is that these metrics can be examined for any subset of votes
within the analyzed sets. An application of the property is examining the difference
between the aggregate set of all roll calls and more important “key votes” (Smith,
2007; Roberts et al., 2016).
I examine MD and PVE for both the full aggregate sets of roll call votes for the 1st−
115th sessions of the U.S. House as well as the set of votes classified as “key votes” by
Congressional Quarterly for the 80th−115th sessions. Figure 2.2 shows these quantities
over time for the U.S. House. Examining the proportion of multidimensional votes in
each session shows highly multidimensional voting within the U.S. House, especially
in the 20th and 21st centuries. Even in recent sessions of the U.S. House, which are
considered to be extremely party driven and one-dimensional, a significant number of
votes require more than one dimension to best explain variation in the roll call votes.
On the other hand, the PVE for the first dimension is relatively high throughout
time. While voting in recent sessions is certainly explained more heavily by the
first dimension than in the mid and late 1900s, the reliance on the first dimension
is equal to many non-unidimensional sessions during Reconstruction and the Great
Depression.
Looking only at key votes provides support for the theory that important votes are
multidimensional and require more than simply using the first dimension of ideal
points.7 While MD shows a modest difference between the aggregate roll call sets
and the set of key votes, PVE shows that a significantly lower amount of variance can
be explained by the first dimension in key votes. On average, approximately 25% less
variance is explained using the first dimension. This finding along with conflicting
and other summaries of the U.S. Senate data in this paper. Results from my analysis of the U.S.
Senate can be seen in the replication files included with this paper.
7For each session where CQ key votes were examined, there were between 80 and 300 votes that
were classified as important votes by Congressional Quarterly.
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FIGURE 2.3. Geometric Mean Probability of Correct Classification for Unidi-
mensional and Multidimensional Votes in the 1st - 115th Sessions of the U.S.
House
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Note: Values reported are posterior means.
results for the aggregate roll call sets provides evidence for the aggregation hypotheses
presented by Roberts et al. (2016) and should serve as a starting point for more fine-
grained examinations of dimensionality in landmark legislation over time.
Examining vote level dimensionality is not the only way to demonstrate the neces-
sity of dimensions past the first - BPIRT shows marked improvements over other
roll call scaling techniques in terms of overall model fit. One method of comparison
that rewards correct classification of model outcomes given the ideal points while also
penalizing inefficient estimates is the geometric mean probability of correct classifi-
cation (Carroll et al., 2009). For a given set of votes, the geometric mean probability
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of correct classification (GMP) is:
GMP =
(
N∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
P (yˆij = yij)
) 1
N∗P
(2.14)
where yˆij is the predicted vote for a legislator and yij is the observed vote.
Figure 2.3 shows the GMP for each session of the U.S. House broken out by the
dimensionality of the vote implied by BPIRT.8 Unsurprisingly, there are significant
gains made in model fit when examining multidimensional votes. The difference in
model fit between WNOMINATE-1D and BPIRT on these votes is quite large. Com-
bined with the knowledge that many votes within each session are multidimensional,
this provides strong evidence that unidimensional models are missing out on a large
portion of the variation which drives voting in the U.S. House. BPIRT also shows
large gains over WNOMINATE-1D when analyzing unidimensional votes. This result
is somewhat unintuitive as the underlying formal model for a unidimensional vote is
essentially the same for BPIRT and WNOMINATE. However, this result can be at-
tributed to proper placement of zeros in the binary matrix and, in turn, ensuring that
each vote corresponds only to the correct subset of potential dimensions of the policy
space.
2.4.1 Interpretation of Ideal Points
BPIRT paints a picture of a legislature that behaves in a multidimensional manner;
while not all votes require multiple dimensions to explain voting patterns, many votes
need something beyond a single dimensional ideal point to best explain voting. A
natural question that follows pertains to the meaning of the dimensions - what is
represented by the first dimension and what concepts are represented by dimensions
8Gaps in the multidimensional plot occur when BPIRT estimates that a session has only one
dimension or less than 10 votes required more than one dimension to best model its vote outcomes.
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FIGURE 2.4. Correlation between the 1st Dimension of Ideal Points Estimated
by BPIRT, the Ideal Points from WNOMINATE-1D, and the Proportion of
Majority Party Voting
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beyond the first?
First, I examine the meaning of the first dimension, over time. In particular, I examine
whether the first dimension is simply providing a measure of the individual frequency
of party bloc voting (Aldrich et al., 2014; Lee, 2009; Harbridge, 2015). In order to
test this hypothesis, I measure how frequently a voting member of the legislature
votes with that session’s majority party.9 Given that more than 99% of votes have a
non-zero contribution from the first dimension, over time, understanding the meaning
of this dimension is key.
Figure 2.4 shows the correlation between the ideal points from the first dimension
9Specifically, I determine the majority party vote on a given roll call vote to be the most frequently
made choice by the members of the majority party in a given session.
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FIGURE 2.5. Ideal Points and Dimensions Estimated by BPIRT for the 107th
Session of the U.S. House (2001 - 2003)
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Note: The reported ideal points are from the iteration of the MCMC procedure with
the highest complete-data likelihood.
for each voting member compared to the proportion of votes for which they cast the
same vote as the majority party preference. The relationship between majority party
voting and the uncovered ideal points strongly supports the theory that the first
dimension of BPIRT ideal points is simply modeling party teamsmanship. Figure 2.4
also shows that BPIRT and WNOMINATE are highly correlated over time. This,
in turn, implies that the first dimension of WNOMINATE is largely estimating the
same construct with the first dimension.
In order to demonstrate the importance of dimensions beyond the first in explaining
legislative behavior that exists outside of party loyalty, I examine one particular
session.10 The 107th session of the U.S. House took place between 2001 and 2003
10Roberts et al. (2016) and Bateman et al. (2017) show that dimensions beyond the first are
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and contained the September 11th attacks and the ensuing scramble from the U.S.
government attempting to respond to domestic and foreign security concerns. These
issues created strong divisions within parties and led to a number of outcomes that
appeared to favor the pro-war members of the U.S. Congress. It is reasonable to
expect that a significant portion of roll call votes in this session require dimensions
beyond party loyalty when explaining variation and estimating ideal points.
Figure 2.5 shows the seven dimensions of ideal points uncovered by BPIRT for the
107th session of the U.S. House.11 First, and foremost, the party loyalty dimension is
highly apparent and shows a split between Republican and Democratic voting (PVE
= .77). Other dimensions are important and explain the other 23% of explainable
variance. Some of the dimensions relate closely to specific policy topic areas such
as rural/infrastructure issues (PVE = .03) and the government budget (PVE = .05).
Another dimension that emerges relates to purely procedural votes, such as ceremonial
motions and approving the chamber’s journal (PVE = .02). However, the set of
dimensions that are most important to this session, beyond party loyalty, relate to
the September 11th attacks and the relating security measures. These dimensions
include national security (PVE = .07), foreign policy (PVE = .04), and a dimension
that relates to funding the war in Afghanistan (PVE = .02). Given the sets of issues
that were salient in the 107th session of the U.S. House, this set of dimensions beyond
party voting makes sense.
Though all votes do require party loyalty to explain some of the variance, most votes
require additional explanations from other sources. One example that is particularly
relevant to the 107th U.S. House relates to funding the war in Afghanistan. Votes
colored by the salient issues of their time and the preferences of the agenda setters. This make a
general analysis of dimensions beyond the first difficult.
11Additional material about how I used vote classifications and bill summaries to determine names
for each dimension and about how I determined the structure of dimensions beyond the first are
included in Section B.3 of the appendix.
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FIGURE 2.6. Votes and Cutlines for Department of Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 Vote in the 107th Session of the U.S. House (Roll Call
No. 655)
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related to funding military action arose after the September 11th attacks. While the
Republican party unanimously agreed to motions to increase funding to the Depart-
ment of Defense for these actions, Democrats were split in these votes. Though the
Republicans held the House majority, many Democrats used these votes to signify
support for or against the war to their constituents and this created splits in the
voting.
The BPIRT estimation procedure selects 14 of these votes and estimates that these
votes require a common dimension in addition to the party loyalty dimension. While
this dimension only accounts for around 2% of the total variance explained in this
session, it models an important heterogeneity in Democrat voting. Figure 2.6 shows
the vote outcome by party for one of these votes, which pertained to an amendment to
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the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 2003 proposed by Loretta Sanchez
(D-CA). This figure shows the BPIRT ideal points of the voters in two dimensions:
the party loyalty dimension and the DOD dimension. Additionally, I illustrate three
separate cutlines which show the line on which a voter would be undecided between
a “Yea” or “Nay” vote. When this vote is scaled using WNOMINATE with only
one dimension, the cutline indicates perfect within party agreement. This is not the
case and is indicative of a second dimension at play. However, WNOMINATE in two-
dimensions misses the important cut needed for this vote. On the other hand, BPIRT
creates a cutline that splits the Democrats into those that support higher funding and
those that oppose spending increases. This example perhaps best demonstrates the
differences between BPIRT and other roll call scaling procedures; BPIRT estimates
dimensions as a function of clusters of votes that share similar voting patterns and
finds dimensions that are necessary for modeling their outcomes. This consistency
in topic is a feature unique to BPIRT and provides a tool that can create in-depth
inference of the topics that drive legislative voting throughout U.S. history.
2.5 U.S. Legislative Voting and Multidimensionality
BPIRT provides a tool for analyzing roll call votes and understanding the dimension-
ality of votes as well as the issue sets that drive variation in voting within the U.S.
legislative chambers. While BPIRT shows marked improvements over previous ap-
proaches to roll call scaling, its benefit can be seen as bridging the aggregate roll call
scaling approaches of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and the issue-specific approaches of
Roberts et al. (2016) and Bateman et al. (2017). This gives rise to measures of multi-
dimensionality that are comparable within and across sessions and provides a unique
measure that can assess the impacts of multidimensionality on theories of legislative
behavior.
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I leverage the ideal points estimated by BPIRT and the corresponding measures of
dimensionality to explore the relationship between the dimensionality of a vote and
the outcomes that are predicted by models of U.S. legislative voting. While there
are numerous examples of models that appeal to unidimensionality and test theories
leveraging unidimensional NOMINATE scores, I turn my attention to two specific
models: the pivotal voter model presented by Krehbiel (1998) and the party cartel
model presented by Cox and McCubbins (2005). These two models are widely cited
in studies of U.S. legislative behavior and seek to explain the ways in which the
organization of legislative voting and parties influence voting outcomes. These two
models differ in their explanations of how voting decisions are made, but strongly
leverage a unidimensional policy space in the theoretical and empirical examinations
of their theories.
Specifically, I seek to understand how robust these theories are to the assumption of
unidimensionality. Theoretical outcomes under multidimensionality are well estab-
lished (Shepsle, 1978; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981), but there are few empirical studies
of the impact of multidimensionality on voting in the literature. Unidimensionality
can be best described as a stabilizing assumption - when the underlying policy space
is unidimensional, the outcome is predictable given assumptions about how legisla-
tors behave. In contrast, multidimensional votes are theoretically characterized by
outcomes that can take any form. Thus, the goal is to measure the stability of out-
comes implied by the pivotal voter and party cartel models when properly taking
dimensionality into account.
As discussed previously, multidimensionality comes in many different shapes and sizes.
For example, a vote can be multidimensional, but rely very heavily on one single di-
mension while there is only a small amount of variance explained by another set of
dimensions. For this reason, I explore three separate ways in which multidimension-
ality may relate to vote instability:
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1. No Effect: As the multidimensionality of a vote increases, there is no dis-
cernible change in the stability of voting outcomes.
2. Continuous Effect: Vote outcomes become more and more unstable as the
multidimensionality of the vote increases; low levels of multidimensionality show
more stable outcomes than votes with higher levels of multidimensionality.
3. Threshold Effect: Vote outcomes are stable and predictable up to a small
amount of multidimensionality. Once this threshold is crossed, vote outcomes
fundamentally change (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978). Even when the amount
of multidimensionality is small, there is a marked difference between unidimen-
sional and multidimensional outcomes.
Each of these mechanisms provide a different view of how theories of U.S. legislative
voting might be influenced by the assumption of unidimensionality.
Evidence that multidimensionality influences vote outcomes has significant impli-
cations for the study of U.S. legislative voting. First, existing theories related to
legislative voting must be examined for conditional relationships - if the vote is multi-
dimensional, does the prediction from the theory change? Multidimensionality points
to different factors that are necessary for contextualizing the conditions under which
a vote are made. Second, the usage of unidimensional ideal points under evidence for
multidimensionality leads to potential biases in further results. Given the interpreta-
tion of the first dimension examined previously, usage of unidimensional ideal points
when multiple dimensions are needed essentially summarizes the level of majority
party voting of a member while treating other sources of predictable roll call behav-
ior as noise. Particularly when being used as proxies of preferences to test theories of
party control, this can lead to acceptance of theories as a product of an endogenous
measure. Finally, under the common assumption of rational voters, evidence that
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multidimensionality leads to more unpredictable outcomes points to ways in which
rational proposers can skew proposals to their advantage (Riker, 1980; Shepsle, 1978;
Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). If multidimensional models
are appropriate models of legislative voting, then the idea that strategic proposers
can use multidimensionality to achieve better outcomes must be accounted for within
theories related to the legislative process.
2.5.1 A Theory of Pivotal Voters
Perhaps one of the most well known theories of U.S. legislative behavior, Krehbiel
(1998) outlines a theory of pivotal voters in legislative voting. Under this model,
a proposal, the status quo, and voters are mapped to a unidimensional, commonly-
known policy space. Under the rules of the legislative body, Krehbiel (1998) contends
that policies must be proposed outside of the gridlock zone in order to pass the
chamber. The gridlock zone is defined by the median voter, the presidential veto pivot,
and (when appropriate) a Senate filibuster pivot. These members of the legislature
effectively control the proposals which pass and, in turn, rational proposers craft
legislation with these constraints in mind. This model of legislative voting is simple
and effective, leading to many insights about periods of low and high gridlock within
the U.S. legislature.
To examine how multidimensionality influences empirical support for the theory of
pivotal politics, I recreate the empirical analysis from Krehbiel (1998, Chapter 5)
that examines the behavior of filibuster pivots in successive cloture votes in the U.S.
Senate. When a vote to invoke cloture goes before the U.S. Senate, Krehbiel (1998)
contends that the filibuster pivot controls whether or not debate on a vote is stopped.
An interesting test of this theory arises when a cloture vote occurs multiple times in
the same bill-episode. The theory of pivotal voters claims that changes in individual
votes from vote to vote are most likely to occur for members close to the filibuster
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pivot location. Using unidimensional NOMINATE scores to find voters close to the
theoretical filibuster pivot, Krehbiel (1998) finds evidence for the pivotal voter model.
I contend that the empirical evidence shown by Krehbiel (1998) is driven by the
unidimensional assumption made when using unidimensional NOMINATE scores; I
expect that evidence for the pivotal voter model disappears in pairs of votes which
are multidimensional. This conditional view of the pivotal politics model fits well
within the original construction - if voters are able to collapse the preference space
to a single dimension, then rational proposers can target changes in bills. However,
under the multidimensional model, no such targeting can be made.
To examine these competing theories, I recreate this analysis on new data.12 Using the
set of all cloture votes that took place in the 89th− 115th sessions of the U.S. Senate,
I examine all instances of votes to invoke cloture that occurred at least twice within
the same bill-episode. I then grouped these into sequential vote pairs, mimicking
the data set of Krehbiel (1998). This led to 477 cloture vote pairs over the course
of time analyzed. For each vote pair, I then recorded whether each U.S. Senator
switched their vote. This led to 44, 710 vote observations and 3, 363 vote switches.
For each individual U.S. Senator, the ideal point associated with the first dimension
of BPIRT scores was coded into quartiles: the f -quartile which contains the filibuster
pivot, the f -adjacent moderates quartile, the f -adjacent extremists quartile, and the
non-adjacent extremists quartile. Similarly, the controls outlined by Krehbiel (1998,
Chapter 5) were recorded: President-side vetoes, voting under a unified government,
and whether or not the voter was a Democrat.13
12Additional discussions about how I collected and processed the set of cloture votes and how I
estimated the logistic regression model can be seen in Section C.1 of the appendix.
13Corresponding switches to the quartile coding were made when the vote met the conditions of
a “president-side veto”. For a further explanation of this control and the corresponding recoding,
see Krehbiel (1998, Chapter 5, p. 106).
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FIGURE 2.7. Probability of Cloture Vote Switch by Ideal Point Quartile
Unidimensional Multidimensional
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
Non−Adj. 
 Extremists
f−Adj. 
 Extremists
f−Adj. 
 Moderates
f−Quartile
Probability of Cloture Vote Switch
Note: Probabilities were calculated setting President Side, Unified Government, and
Democrat to zero. Error bars show 95% HPD intervals.
To measure the dimensionality of a pair of cloture votes, I used the PVE for dimen-
sions beyond the party-loyalty dimension in both votes. If both votes were estimated
by BPIRT to be unidimensional, then dimensionality was coded as zero. Otherwise,
dimensionality was set to be equal to the posterior mean value of PVE. The effect
of multidimensionality is measured by testing three models with different underlying
mechanisms. The theory of no effect was tested by not including a control for the di-
mensionality of the vote. Under the theory of continuous effect, multidimensionality
was coded as the PVE attributed to dimensions beyond party loyalty. Finally, the
threshold effect was tested by including a dichotomous variable for dimensionality
coded to be multidimensional if the PVE for other dimensions in the vote pair was
greater than .001. 43% of vote pairs were classified as multidimensional under the
threshold model.
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TABLE 2.1. Logistic Regression Results for Krehbiel’s Cloture Vote Switching
Example
Dependent variable:
Senator Vote Switch in Cloture Vote Pair
No Effect Continuous Threshold
f -Quartile 0.40 0.63 0.96
(0.31,0.50) (0.52,0.74) (0.80,1.13)
f -Adj. Moderates 0.03 0.17 0.22
(-0.06,0.14) (0.04,0.28) (0.03,0.40)
f -Adj. Extremists 0.06 0.25 0.52
(-0.04,0.16) (0.13,0.36) (0.36,0.69)
President Side -1.04 -1.03 -1.01
(-1.14,-0.95) (-1.13,-0.92) (-1.12,-0.92)
Unified Government -0.46 -0.45 -0.42
(-0.55,-0.38) (-0.54,-0.36) (-0.51,-0.33)
Democrat -0.40 -0.39 -0.36
(-0.47,-0.33) (-0.46,-0.31) (-0.43,-0.28)
Multidimensional 1.34 1.10
(1.07,1.63) (0.94,1.26)
f -Quartile × -2.10 -0.94
Multidimensional (-2.64,-1.72) (-1.15,-0.73)
f -Adj. Moderates × -1.03 -0.28
Multidimensional (-1.47,-0.60) (-0.50,-0.05)
f -Adj. Extremists × -1.61 -0.74
Multidimensional (-2.08,-1.14) (-0.97,-0.52)
Intercept -2.11 -2.29 -2.78
(-2.19,-2.02) (-2.39,-2.19) (-2.92,-2.63)
Observations 44,710 44,710 44,710
Log Marginal Likelihood -11,609.54 -11,577.67 -11,464.47
1 The comparison group is non-adjacent extremists.
2 Coefficient values are posterior medians and values in parentheses are 95% HPD
intervals.
Following the empirical exercise by Krehbiel (1998), I estimated the probability of
a vote switch given the ideal point quartiles, dimensionality of the vote, and the
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controls.14 Table 2.1 shows the results of this regression under the three different
theories of how dimensionality might influence vote outcomes. Similarly, Figure 2.7
shows the probabilities of vote switching as a function of ideal point quartile and
the dimensionality of the vote as defined by the threshold model. The results from
the regressions show a number of interesting relationships. First, under the model
of no effect, the results from Krehbiel (1998, Chapter 5) are largely replicated in the
new data set - assuming that dimensionality has no effect on vote switching, voters
in the f -quartile are most likely to switch votes between cloture vote pairs. This
relationship is also seen in the other two models when the vote pair is unidimensional,
providing strong support that the pivotal voter findings are supported in the strict
unidimensional case. However, this relationship disappears in the multidimensional
case. When the vote pair is multidimensional, there is no statistical difference between
any quartile in the 95% HPD intervals.
Comparing the marginal likelihood across the models provides an assessment of the
degree to which controlling for multidimensionality improves model fit. First and
foremost, it is clear that the marginal likelihood for both the continuous and thresh-
old models is lower than the model with no effect. Given that the marginal likelihood
inherently penalizes against overfitting, this is strong evidence that multidimensional-
ity explains a significant amount of variation within the data. Between these models,
the threshold effect has the lowest marginal likelihood indicating that even a small
amount of multidimensionality leads to a fundamentally different role of the pivotal
voter. This result points to a chaotic result for almost 50% of the votes analyzed;
the pivotal voter model provides no information about where vote switches will occur
when the vote is multidimensional. This is one example of how properly accounting
for multidimensionality in U.S. legislative voting can fundamentally change long held
14While a case could be made that session-level random effects are needed, I appeal to the response
of Krehbiel (1998) that such controls would be “utterly atheoretic” as there are no session specific
elements of the pivotal voter theory.
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beliefs about legislative decision making.
2.5.2 A Theory on Party Control
In response to the work of Krehbiel (1998), scholars pointed to parties as another
source that influences both the proposals that are made and the decisions made by
their respective members. One example of this work is the party cartel theory of
agenda control (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Under this model, rational voters in a
unidimensional preference space want to select proposals that are close to their ideal
points. However, their desire to be reelected also influences their vote choices and
they frequently delegate to the central authority of the party to make vote decisions.
This leads to strong party control in vote choice which can lead to votes that are
against their individual best actions conditional on their ideal points.
Party cartel theory leads to a number of empirically testable predictions about agenda
control in the U.S. Congress. One specific example relates to final passage votes in the
U.S. House (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, Chapter 5). For each final passage vote, the
result can be classified by the proportion of members from the majority and minority
parties voting in support of passage: if less than 50% of the minority party votes
in support of passage, the vote is considered a minority roll with similar conditions
defining a majority party roll. Under the theory of party cartels, these rolls occur
in predictable ways. First, majority rolls should be rare and uniformly distributed
conditional on the distance between the ideal point of the chamber median and the
ideal point of the median member of the majority party. On the other hand, minority
rolls should occur often with the frequency increasing as the distance between the floor
median and the minority party median increases. Using unidimensional NOMINATE
scores as estimates for the ideal points, Cox and McCubbins (2005, Chapter 5) find
empirical evidence for both predictions.
As with Krehbiel (1998), I expect that this empirical evidence is colored by the usage
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of unidimensional ideal point estimates and the result is again conditional on the
dimensionality of a vote. It is reasonable to believe that close alignment between the
majority party median and the floor median indicates high levels of party loyalty and,
in turn, produces strong agreements within the majority party on votes that can be
thoroughly explained by party bloc voting. On the other hand, multidimensionality
in a vote points to sources other than party voting and it is reasonable to expect that
these votes have less predictable outcomes.15
To assess the role of multidimensionality, I examined the set of all final passage
votes for the 83rd − 115th sessions of the U.S. House.16 This data was retrieved from
the Political Institutions and Public Choice Roll-Call Database (Crespin and Rohde,
2012). I determined if each final passage vote was a majority party roll, minority
party roll, or if no roll had occurred. This led to 4, 429 observations of final passage
votes with 127 majority party rolls and 1, 743 minority party rolls.17 I used ideal
point estimates from the first dimension of BPIRT for each session and recorded
the location of the floor median and the respective party medians for each vote.
The absolute difference between these two metrics constitutes the distance between
medians.18
As before, the three theories of multidimensionality are tested. Under the theory of
no effect, the probability of a roll is tested only as a function of distance between the
respective medians. The continuous effect was tested by using the PVE for dimensions
beyond the first on a given vote, the distance between medians, and a multiplicative
15It is worth noting that multidimensionality is mentioned by Cox and McCubbins (2005) and
this possibility is explicitly considered, but not examined in depth.
16In line with Cox and McCubbins (2005), I restrict this set to votes which required a simple
majority for passage.
17The rate of passage for final passage votes is around 98%.
18Additional discussions about how I collected and processed the set of final passage votes and
how I estimated the regression model can be seen in Section C.2 of the appendix.
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FIGURE 2.8. Results of Final Passage Votes in the 83rd - 115th Sessions of
the U.S. House
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interaction between the two. Finally, similar to the continuous model, the threshold
effect was tested by classifying any vote where the PVE for dimensions beyond the
first was greater than .001 as multidimensional. Under the threshold model, 68.8%
of final passage votes were classified as multidimensional.
Figure 2.8 shows the set of final passage votes analyzed. Votes are compared based on
the proportion of “Yea” votes cast by each party in each case. Votes are then classified
as unidimensional or multidimensional using the threshold model. The difference in
vote proportions between the two classes of votes is stark. On unidimensional votes,
there are two general outcomes: near unanimous support by the entire set of voters
or minority rolls with nearly unanimous support from the majority party. Majority
party rolls on unidimensional votes are incredibly rare - only 4 out of 1,382 (.002%)
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FIGURE 2.9. Probability of Party Rolls as a Function of Distance between the
Party Median and the Floor Median
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Note: Probabilities were calculated only within the range of observed outcomes for
majority and minority party distances. Dotted lines show 95% HPD intervals.
unidimensional final passage votes result in majority party rolls. On the other hand,
the results for multidimensional votes are more varied; the rate of minority rolls
appears to be equivalent to the rate of votes where the minority party is not rolled
and the rate of majority rolls (4%) is much higher than in the unidimensional case.
I used a logistic regression to examine the relationship between party median distance,
multidimensionality, and party rolls. In order to best replicate the test from Cox
and McCubbins (2005), I chose to include zero-mean session-level random intercepts
estimated via a normal random effect. I report the variance of these parameters with
the results from these regressions. Diffuse normal spike-and-slab priors with a spike
at zero were placed on the regression coefficients.
Table 2.2 shows the results from these regressions. First, examining the model of no
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effect, the results from Cox and McCubbins (2005) are replicated. When all votes are
assumed to be unidimensional, the probability that a final passage vote results in a
majority party roll shows no evidence that it is influenced by the distance between
medians. Similarly, there is a large positive correlation between the probability of
a minority party roll and the distance between the minority party median and the
floor median. However, there is strong evidence that controlling for the dimension-
ality of a vote explains more variation in both sets of party rolls. First, the DIC, a
proxy for the marginal likelihood in hierarchical models that penalizes the addition of
new parameters, is lower for the models that control for multidimensionality in both
majority and minotiry party rolls. While this decrease is moderate in the majority
rolls case, the minority rolls case shows a massive decrease in DIC. In each regression,
the threshold model shows the smallest DIC, implying that a model that treats votes
with even a small amount of variation that can be explained by dimensions beyond
the first differently than unidimensional votes provides the best fit to the data.
Figure 2.9 shows the predicted probabilities of majority and minority party rolls as
a function of distance between the respective medians and the dimensionality of a
vote under the threshold model. These results point to a characterization of negative
agenda control that is conditional on the dimensionality of the vote. First, the prob-
ability of a majority party roll is low in both unidimensional and multidimensional
votes. While certainly lower in the unidimensional case, multidimensional votes show
a predicted probability of around .06 in the case of the maximum observed distance
between the floor and majority party medians. However, there is a statistically mean-
ingful increase in the probability of majority rolls in the multidimensional case - while
negative agenda control from the majority party is apparent, it seems that there are
potentially other factors at play (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000).
On the other side, minority party voters benefit from multidimensionality. Under
strict unidimensional votes, the minority party roll rate is positively correlated with
54
the distance between medians. However, in multidimensional votes, knowing the
distance between the minority party median and the floor median provides no infor-
mation about the probability of a minority party roll. In other words, the predictions
from party cartel theory relating to the minority party only apply to around 30% of
final passage votes. This finding does not invalidate the party cartel theory. Rather,
it points to multidimensionality creating cross-party support for bills that are not
necessarily correlated with the number of times that a member votes with the ma-
jority party. Along with theory that strategic proposers use multidimensionality to
create passing votes that cater to their own preferences, this opens a new door for
research into the role of agenda control in the U.S. Congress under potentially highly
multidimensional bills.
2.6 Conclusion
Roll call scaling and the operationalization of the spatial model is critical to the
scientific examination and development of theories about how members of the U.S.
Congress cast votes. While existing methods produce scores that appear to be best
represented in a single dimension, I show that this finding is due to the tests used
to determine dimensionality. In turn, I develop a varying dimensional representation
of the spatial model and show a corresponding estimation technique that allows for
estimation of both the aggregate-level dimensionality of the ideal point space as well as
vote-specific sets of dimensions. Using this model, I show that there is little evidence
for unidimensional ideal points in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate and that historical
voting demonstrates multidimensional patterns. I present a set of ideal points that
bridge the gap between the common aggregate methods and the more subject-specific
examinations that are present in the roll call scaling literature. Under this new model,
I then show that multidimensionality is an important aspect to be considered for
further models of U.S. legislative voting that rely on ideal points as summaries of
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the preferences of voters. All in all, I show that BPIRT is a powerful procedure for
determining the dimensionality of latent variables used in social science applications.
While the work in this article is catered to the study of roll call scaling, the models
presented here are widely applicable to any study where latent variables are estimated
via an item-response theory model. With light changes, Indian Buffet Process priors
can be used to test dimensionality in a variety of settings and can be used as vali-
dation for claims related to the dimensionality of a latent space. Similarly, there are
numerous extensions which can be made to the model presented in this paper. Un-
der the Bayesian nonparametric framework, it is possible to examine how dimensions
change over time by providing sufficient changes to the underlying priors. Similarly,
different methods of clustering can be used to find interesting similarities in voting
between both voters and the topics of the votes, themselves. This model serves a
starting point into more complex examinations of what all can be learned from the
spatial model of voting and scaling techniques.
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TABLE 2.2. Logistic Regression Results for Cox and McCubbins’ Final Passage
Vote Example
Dependent variable:
Majority Party Roll on Final Passage Vote
No Effect Continuous Threshold
Distance 0 0 0
(0,2.31) (-2.63,0) (-3.5,0)
Multidimensional 0 0
(0,0) (0,0)
Distance × 10.08 9.75
Multidimensional (6.68,13.80) (6.51,13.27)
Intercept -3.79 -5.55 -5.48
(-4.32,-3.38) (-6.35,-4.72) (-6.28,-4.66)
Variance of 0.72 0.68 0.66
Random Effects (0.43,1.05) (0.4,.99) (0.38,0.97)
Observations 4,429 4,429 4,429
DIC 1131 1096 1077
Dependent variable:
Minority Party Roll on Final Passage Vote
No Effect Continuous Threshold
Distance 7.78 10.04 9.44
(4.82,10.45) (7.17,12.91) (6.52,12.48)
Multidimensional 3.60 2.00
(2.16,4.88) (1.22,2.83)
Distance × -15.22 -8.88
Multidimensional (-18.26,-12.46) (-10.71,-7.23)
Intercept -4.15 -4.38 -4.26
(-5.48,-2.74) (-5.75,-2.95) (-5.72,-2.82)
Variance of 0.29 0.24 0.25
Random Effects (0.2,0.41) (0.15,0.35) (0.15,0.37)
Observations 4,429 4,429 4,429
DIC 4994 4264 4158
1 Coefficient values are posterior medians and values in parentheses are 95% HPD
intervals.
2 Models were estimated with spike-and-slab priors on the coefficients. The spike
was placed at zero. Posterior values equal to zero arise when the coefficient is not
statistically distinguishable from zero.
3 Congress-level random effects were estimated for the intercept terms only.
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A The BPIRT Model and Estimation
A.1 Beta Processes
A beta process is a random discrete measure that is completely described by a count-
ably infinite set of atoms, where each atom has a finite mass determined from a
stick-breaking process (Hjort, 1990). Unlike the well-known Dirichlet process (Fer-
guson, 1973), the probabilities that an individual unit belongs to a set of potential
groups do not have to sum to one. Rather, the masses must only be between zero
and one. The beta process is then used as a base measure for a Bernoulli process. In
other words, a beta process yields a stochastic process for binary random variables
or feature selection.
Definition 1. Let Ω be a measurable space and B be its σ-algebra. Let H0 be be a
continuous probability measure on (Ω,B) and α a positive scalar. Assume that Υ can
be divided into K disjoint partitions, (B1, B2, ..., BK). The corresponding beta process
is generated as:
H(Bk) ∼ Beta(αH0(Bk), α(1−H0(Bk))) (2.15)
where Beta(·, ·) corresponds to the standard two-parameter beta distribution. Allow
K →∞ and H0(Bk)→ 0, then H ∼ BP (αH0).
The beta process can be written in set-function form:
H(ν) =
∞∑
k=1
pikδν,k(ν) (2.16)
where H(νi) = pii and δν,k(ν) is an arbitrary measure on ν. In the case of the beta
process, pi does not serve as a PMF. Rather, pi serves as part of a new measure that
parameterizes a Bernoulli process:
Definition 2. Let the column vector, rj, be infinite and binary with the k
th value,
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rj,k:
ri,k ∼ Bern(pik) (2.17)
The new measure on the measurable space, Υ, is drawn from a Bernoulli process.
By arranging the samples for a set of infinite vectors as a matrix, we can see that a
beta process is a prior over an infinite binary matrix with each row corresponding to
a location in the measurable space.
A.2 BPIRT Full Model Specification
Beginning with the likelihood of the data, a full model specification for the BPIRT
model can be defined. First, recall that the binary random variable is projected to
a latent continuous space through data augmentation (Albert and Chib, 1993) such
that:
xi,j ∼

T N−∞,0(λjωi − αj, 1) if yi,j = 0
T N 0,∞(λjωi − αj, 1) if yi,j = 1
N (λjωi − αj, 1) if yi,j is missing
(2.18)
Then, the BPIRT model can be defined as:
P (xi,j|−) ∼ N ((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1)
P (ωi) ∼ NK(0, IK)
P (λj,k|rj,k) ∼ rj,kNp(λj,k; 0, γ−1k ) + (1− rj,k)δ0
P (rj,k) ∼ Bern(pik)
P (pik) ∼ Beta(a/K, b(K − 1)/K)
P (γk) ∼ Gamma(c, d)
(2.19)
In all cases, intentionally vague or improper uniform priors are used on the structural
parameters. Similarly, conjugate priors are used for convenience in estimation. While
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there is debate as to the impact of these choices (Murray et al., 2013), simulation
shows that these choices are relatively innocuous given the size of the standard roll
call data set.
Under a large, but finite K that approximates an infinite dimensional representation
ofR, the model can be estimated with an explicit beta-Bernoulli prior on the elements
of the binary matrix (Paisley and Carin, 2009; Doshi et al., 2009). If K = ∞, then
we use the Indian Buffet Process prior (Ghahramani and Griffiths, 2006). I choose to
use the explicit infinite approach in this article.
A.3 MCMC For BPIRT
Estimation of the BPIRT model uses the following sampling routine (Knowles and
Ghahramani, 2011):
1. Sample Continuous Mappings for the Binary Random Variables, X.
For each i ∈ (1, ..., N) and j ∈ (1, ..., P ), sample xi,j from a truncated normal
distribution according to:
xi,j ∼

T N−∞,0(λjωi − αj, 1) if yi,j = 0
T N 0,∞(λjωi − αj, 1) if yi,j = 1
N (λjωi − αj, 1) if yi,j is missing
(2.20)
2. Sample R and Λ jointly.
Sampling Currently Observed Features
Define K+ as the current number of active features. For each j ∈ (1, ..., p)
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and k ∈ (1, ..., K+) define:
tj,k =
P (rj,k = 1|X,−)
P (rj,k = 0|X,−)
=
P (X|rj,k = 1,−)
P (X|rj,k = 0,−)
P (rj,k = 1)
P (rj,k = 0)
(2.21)
P (X|rj,k = 1,−)
P (X|rj,k = 0,−) =
√
γk
γ
exp
(
1
2
γµ2
)
(2.22)
P (rj,k = 1)
P (rj,k = 0)
=
m−j,k
P −m−j,k + 1 (2.23)
where γ = ω′kωk + γk, µ =
1
γ
ω′kEˆj, Eˆj = xj − λjΩ + αj setting λj,k = 0, and
m−j,k = −rj,k +
p∑
h=1
rh,k. Let
pr=1 =
tj,k
1 + tj,k
then sample P (rj,k|−) ∼ Bern(rj,k; pr=1). If rj,k = 1, then sample P (λj,k|−) ∼
N (λj,k;µ, γ−1). Otherwise, set λj,k = 0.
Sampling New Features
Begin by sampling the two Indian Buffet Process hyperparameters, a and b.
Sample a from the full conditional:
P (a|−) ∼ Gamma (a;K+, HP (b)) (2.24)
where HP (b) =
P∑
h=1
b
b+h−1 . b must be drawn via a Metropolis-Hastings step.
Draw a new proposal:
P (b∗) ∼ Gamma(b∗, 1, 1) (2.25)
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Accept b∗ with probability min(1, rb→b∗):
rb→b∗ =
(ab∗)K
+
exp[−aHP (b∗)]
K+∏
k=1
B(mk, P −mk + b∗)
(ab)K+ exp[−aHP (b)]
K+∏
k=1
B(mk, P −mk + b)
(2.26)
where B(·, ·) is the Beta function and mk =
P∑
j=1
rj,k.
For each j ∈ (1, ..., P ), sample the new number of dimensions to try:
P (κj) ∼ Pois
(
κj;
ab
b+ P − 1
)
(2.27)
Knowles and Ghahramani (2011) discuss ways to make this proposal explore
the feature space in a faster way.
Draw values for each of the new potential dimensions. For q ∈ (1, ..., κj):
P (λj,q) ∼ N (λj,q; 0, 1) (2.28)
which will be referred to collectively as λj,κj .
Using this as the proposal for a Metropolis-Hastings draw, accept the new di-
mensions with probability min(1, rη→η∗):
rη→η∗ = (2pi)(Nκj)/2|M |−N/2 exp
[
.5
N∑
i=1
m′iMmi
]
(2.29)
where M = λ′j,κjλj,κj + Iκj , mi = M−1λj,κj Eˆi,j, and Eˆ = X −ΛΩ +α.
If the new proposal is accepted, set λj,(K++1:K++κj) to the proposed values.
Scheduling this part of the algorithm after updating values of Λ improves mix-
ing. Set K+ to the new number of columns represented in Λ.
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3. Remove Inactive Features and Normalize Λ. For each k ∈ (1, ..., K+), if
rj,k = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ p, remove k from the analysis. Recalculate K+. Post-process
Λ to normalize the variance. For each j ∈ (1, ..., p) and k ∈ (1, ..., K+) set
λj,k:
λj,k =
λj,k√
1 +
K+∑
h=1
λ2j,h
(2.30)
4. Sample Ω. For each i ∈ (1, ..., n), sample ωi ∈ RK+ from:
P (ωi|−) ∼ NK+(ωi; (Λ′Λ + IK+)−1Λ′yi, (Λ′Λ + IK+)−1) (2.31)
5. Sample Item Level Intercepts, α. For each j ∈ (1, ...p), sample the item
level intercept from:
P (αj|−) ∼ N
(
µ¯j,
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(µi,j − µ¯j)2
)
(2.32)
where µi,j = λ
′
jωi − xi,j and µ¯j = 1N
N∑
i=1
µi,j.
6. Sample Factor Precisions, γk. For each k ∈ (1, ..., K+), sample γk from:
P (γk|−) ∼ Gamma
(
mk
2
,
p∑
j=1
λ2j,k
)
(2.33)
where mk is the number of sources for which feature k ∈ (1, ..., K) is active.
A.4 Identification of Structural Parameters in BPIRT
One model consideration which requires further examination relates to identification
of the structural parameters. It is well known that ideal points estimated using
latent variable models are unidentified without further constraints (Rivers, 2003).
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Identification can be induced by placing constraints K(K+1) ideal points or requiring
that the matrix of discrimination parameters have a lower-block triangular structure
with positive elements on the main diagonal (Geweke and Zhou, 1996).
Using BPIRT, neither of these approaches are viable - since the number of columns in
the matrix of discrimination parameters is technically infinite, placing a priori con-
straints is not possible. Fortunately, the sparsity inducing beta process prior on the
discrimination parameters ensures identification. First, the number of votes which
take on a feature necessarily decreases as the cardinality of the feature increases
(Bhattacharya and Dunson, 2011). For example, if rj,1 = 1 ∀ j ∈ (1, ..., P ) and
P∑
j=1
rj,1 = P , then
P∑
j=1
rj,1 < P . This ensures that
P∑
j=1
(1 − rj,k) ≥ k ∀ k ∈ (1, ...,∞).
Second, the spike-and-slab priors on the matrix of discrimination parameters en-
sures that each element of this matrix has a posterior distribution completely con-
tained on one side of zero (Knowles and Ghahramani, 2011). Together, these two
features effectively mimic the requirements for identification presented by Geweke
and Zhou (1996) and ensure that all structural parameters estimated using BPIRT
are uniquely identified. This is echoed by examining the posterior distributions for
the ideal points, which never exhibit bimodality, evidence that the sign-switching
problem is not present in MCMC estimation.
A.5 Assessing Convergence for the BPIRT Algorithm
Convergence of the vote level difficulty parameters can be assessed using routine con-
vergence diagnostics included in the R package superdiag (Tsai et al., 2012). The
number of dimensions retrieved from the BPIRT procedure can also be monitored
using standard convergence diagnostics. However, due to the discrete nature of this
value, it is often more beneficial to assess convergence using visual inspections. As-
sessing the convergence of the difficulty parameters, ideal points, and elements of the
binary matrix proves more challenging due to the varying dimension nature of the
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set of estimates that make up each set of structural parameters. Convergence for
these parameters is not directly assessed. Rather, convergence diagnostics are per-
formed on the mean of the latent distribution passed to the data augmentation step -
(rj λj)ωi−αj. Similarly, I monitor the log-likelihood of the data given the implied
model at each step and use this to assess convergence of the posterior distribution
of the log-likelihood of the data. Under a converged model, the log-likelihood should
be 1) unimodal and approximately symmetric and 2) show behavior that appears
as a random walk over iterations. Both of these conditions are generally met when
allowing the procedure to have a long burn-in. There is relatively low autocorrelation
between draws when the stationary distribution is reached, so the parameter space
is explored relatively quickly. Similarly, the posterior distributions of interest are
normally distributed due to the conjugacy of the model. Thus, the number of draws
needed to truthfully represent the posterior distributions are relatively low.
A.6 Methods for Achieving Faster Convergence
As with many MCMC procedures, setting good starting values is a key aspect to
achieving fast convergence to the stationary posterior distribution. Using the matrix
of binary random variables, I used principal components to put together a reasonable
set of starting values. For any values that were missing, I used multiple imputation
to quickly fill-in the missing values. I then ran PCA on this full matrix and kept
Pois(1) of the scores and loadings as the latent variables and discrimination parame-
ters, respectively. I always started the difficulty parameters at 0 and set 50% of the
elements of each column of R to 1. The variance parameters are always started at 1.
One potential problem arises at the beginning of a MCMC chain - if the starting
values are particularly bad and the RNG is not giving favorable initial draws from
the infinite part of the feature sampler, it is possible for the number of features at
the end on an MCMC iteration to move to zero. This is problematic. In order to
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prevent this behavior, I chose to begin each chain of the MCMC procedure with 100
iterations where the IBP prior 1) did not look at the number of other votes which
took on a feature when determining if it would take the feature (i.e. setting Equation
2.23 equal to 1 for all votes) and 2) did not use the infinite search over the feature
space. This creates a period where the model simply learns the ideal points over a
fixed number of dimensions. Once the ideal points begin to sort, the rest of the model
runs smoothly and there is never less than 1 dimension in the analysis.
A.7 Simulation Exercises
In order to understand how BPIRT estimates the binary matrix that encodes each
vote’s dimensionality and, in turn, the dimensionality of the underlying policy space,
I ran simulations on data sets with known parameters and examined how BPIRT
uncovers the true underlying latent structure of the data.
The purpose of these simulations is two-fold. First, it is necessary to examine how
accurately BPIRT recovers the binary matrix associated with the matrix of discrimi-
nation parameters from a known data generating process as a function of the number
of voters, number of votes, and the true underlying dimensionality of the latent policy
space. Given that the goal of BPIRT is to recover the vectors that dictate which votes
correspond to which dimensions of the underlying policy space, it is important to un-
derstand when the procedure succeeds in providing an accurate representation of this
data. Second, and closely related to the first goal, it is important to understand the
properties of the Indian Buffet Process prior across varying numbers of votes, voters,
and true underlying dimensionalities. In particular, it is important to examine the
ability of the IBP prior to recover the true number of dimensions and to ensure that
BPIRT does not uncover spurious sets of features that do not correlate with the true
underlying feature set. While theory dictates that the IBP will uncover the exact
solution when the number of votes and voters is large, roll call data sets are inher-
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TABLE 2.3. Number of Dimensions Estimated From Simulated Data With
Various Numbers of Voters, Votes, and Known Dimensionalities Using BPIRT
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 1 1 1
250 1 1 1
400 1 1 1
(a) True Dimensionality = 1
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 1 1 1
250 1 3 3
400 1 3 3
(b) True Dimensionality = 3
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 1 1 1
250 1 4 4
400 1 4 5
(c) True Dimensionality = 5
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 1 2 3
250 2 5 6
400 2 5 6
(d) True Dimensionality = 7
Note: Values reported are posterior modes. In almost every case, the posterior for number of
dimensions converged to a single value.
ently limited in the number of voters and the number of votes made within a session.
Thus, understanding the small and medium sample properties of this nonparametric
prior is of interest.
In order to simulate data that has a similar structure to actual roll call data, I used
PCA on a set of 928 votes made by 428 members of the 105th session of the U.S. House
to estimate a seven-dimensional covariance matrix. This covariance matrix was used
to generate simulated roll call data sets with 100/250/400 voters, 100/450/900 votes,
and 1/3/5/7 true underlying dimensions in the latent policy space. These simulated
data sets were then passed to an implementation of BPIRT and the structural pa-
rameters were estimated. Each Markov Chain Monte Carlo routine was run with a
burnin of 5000 iterations and 1000 unthinned draws were taken from the stationary
posterior distribution over 2 chains. There were no indications of convergence issues
in these simulations.
I first examine the relationship between number of voters, number of votes, the true
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dimensionality of the vote set, and the dimensionality uncovered by BPIRT using the
Indian Buffet Process prior. The number of dimensions uncovered by BPIRT for each
simulation set can be seen in Table 2.3. On first glance, it is easy to see that the
behavior of the IBP prior to uncover the correct number of dimensions expectedly
depends on the number of votes. As shown by Ghahramani and Griffiths (2006), the
number of features represented by the prior increases in O(log(P )). This property
is apparent in the simulation sets as the ability to estimate the true dimensionality
is contingent on having a large number of votes. This relationship is also seen in
the number of voters, though not as strongly. This property makes sense, as one
would expect that more observations would lead to more accurate estimation of model
parameters. However, the number of dimensions estimated appears to be capped in
the number of votes.
A second important observation is that the model is conservative in its estimation
of new dimensions when the number of votes or voters is low. In all cases, the number
of estimated dimensions is lower than the truth with small roll call voting data sets
resulting in a one dimensional posterior. On the other hand, when presented with
a data set that is truly one-dimensional, BPIRT accurately estimates that only one
dimension is needed. This finding should assuage concerns that BPIRT uncovers
spurious dimensions. All in all, BPIRT provides a useful tool for estimating the
dimensionality of the underlying policy space. In particular, it is well suited to
examine whether or not a roll call data set requires only one dimension to explain
variance within the data set.
I also examine BPIRT’s ability to correctly uncover structural zeros in the binary
matrix. Recall that zeros in this matrix imply that a specific vote does not rely
on variance explained by a given dimension when explaining the underlying utility
functions that lead to certain vote outcomes. The proportion of correctly classified
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TABLE 2.4. Proportion of Elements in R Correctly Classified From Simulated
Data With Various Numbers of Voters, Votes, and Known Dimensionalities
Using BPIRT
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 0.93 0.99 1.00
250 0.97 1.00 1.00
400 0.97 1.00 1.00
(a) True Dimensionality = 1
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 0.77 0.73 0.73
250 0.80 0.81 0.84
400 0.80 0.87 0.89
(b) True Dimensionality = 3
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 0.81 0.77 0.77
250 0.82 0.84 0.86
400 0.83 0.89 0.91
(c) True Dimensionality = 5
Voters
Votes
100 450 900
100 0.84 0.82 0.84
250 0.86 0.87 0.89
400 0.87 0.91 0.93
(d) True Dimensionality = 7
Note: Values reported are posterior medians.
elements of R for each simulation set is shown in Table 2.4.19 The relationship between
the number of votes, number of voters, and accuracy in recovering elements of the
binary matrix is similar to the one seen in Table 2.3 - more votes and more voters
results in more accurate estimation of the structural parameters in R. However,
unlike in the previous case, the accuracy of estimation seems to be driven by the
number of voters. This finding makes sense, however, as each estimate within R is
related to a specific vote/dimension combination. Thus, more voters means more
information about which sources of variation best describe the vote. Even in smaller
samples, BPIRT provides an accurate representation of the binary matrix. This is
especially apparent in estimations with a true one-dimensional model. All in all, these
19When constructing this data, I attempted to recreate the number and structure of dimensions
that are typically seen in roll call voting. This led to seven dimensions with a decreasing number of
votes which took on each dimension. Every vote took on the first dimension while other dimensions
were only required for a proportion of votes. This leads to the high hit rate when the true number
of dimensions is one and the decrease in hit rate between one and three.
73
simulations show that BPIRT can accurately recover the underlying structures which
drive voting under the varying dimensions model of vote choice.
B Multidimensionality in the U.S. Congress Over Time
For analysis in this section, I examine the roll call voting data sets for the 1st− 115th
(1789−2017) sessions of both chambers of the U.S. Congress, separately. Over the set
of roll call votes in each session, I analyzed votes that had at least 5 votes in the mi-
nority and voters that registered roll call votes for at least 50% of the votes analyzed.
I chose to run the BPIRT procedure on each roll call data set for a burnin of 20,000
iterations and capture 1000 draws of the parameters from the stationary posterior
distribution over two independently initialized chains. Assessments of convergence
both within and across chains showed no evidence of lack of convergence.
The proportion of variance explained by a dimension for a vote can be derived using
the properties of the BPIRT model. Recall that the marginal probability of the
augmented data under BPIRT is:
P (xi) ∼ NP (α, (RΛ)(RΛ)′ + IP ) (2.34)
Note that under the marginal posterior, each voter has the same probability density
function. This implies that the variance of the augmented data for a vote is:
V [xj] =
K∑
k=1
rj,kλ
2
j,k + 1 (2.35)
Then, the proportion of variance explained (PVE) by a dimension on a vote can be
defined as:
PVEj,k =
rj,kλ
2
j,k
K∑
h=1
rj,kλ2j,h
(2.36)
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FIGURE 2.10. Relationship Between Number of Votes, Estimated Number of
Dimensions, and Prior Number of Dimensions Implied by IBP for each Session
of the U.S. House
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Since each of these quantities presented in this section are, themselves, uncertain
measures, the posterior means are also associated with a 95% highest posterior density
interval. In practice, these ranges are very tightly bunched around the posterior
means. As these quantities do not plot well, I have chosen not to include the error
bars in many of the figures. These quantities can be found in the replication materials.
The inclusion of 95% HPD intervals do not change the overall conclusions made from
any of the graphs included in this section.
B.1 IBP and Dimensions Observed in the U.S. House
For many sessions of the U.S. House and U.S. Senate, the posterior distribution
for the number of dimensions converged strongly on a single value. These sessions
are indicated in Figure 2.1 by points with no error bars. Exploring the infinite set
75
of features using the beta process prior is contingent on tuning parameters, which
are outlined in the estimation procedure presented in the Appendix. Similarly, the
discrete nature of the posterior distribution for number of dimensions can lead to
results that appear to not have reached stationarity. Given the performance of BPIRT
in simulation exercises, there is strong evidence that these values are equal to or below
the truth and assuage any concerns related to not fully exploring the posterior. Other
choices for these hyperparameters lead to results that share the same mode but have
higher values included in the 95% HPDs.
The relationship between the number of voters, number of votes, and estimated di-
mensionality is well established in the simulation section. However, it is important
to see how these relationships manifest in the actual roll call data used in these ap-
plied examples. Similarly, one might question whether or not these results are unduly
driven by the choice of priors for the hyperparameters of the IBP prior. To address
these concerns, I checked the relationship between the number of votes, the expected
number of dimensions drawn from the IBP prior, and the estimated dimensionality.
Figure 2.10 shows the logarithm of the number of votes analyzed, the posterior mean
number of dimensions estimated, and the number of dimensions implied by the IBP
prior using posterior means values for the IBP hyperparameters for each session of the
U.S. House. First, it is easy to see that there is s strong dependence in the number
of votes and the prior number of dimensions implied by BPIRT - the prior number of
dimensions scales almost perfectly with the logarithm of the number of votes with an
additive constant implied by the IBP hyperparameters. On the other hand, there is
not a strong correlation between the posterior mean number of dimensions estimated
by BPIRT and the prior expected number of dimensions. This implies that the choice
of prior is not unduly influencing the number of dimensions estimated by BPIRT.
However, the choice of prior does seem to place a cap on the number of dimensions
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FIGURE 2.11. Number of Unidimensional and Multidimensional Votes Ana-
lyzed in Each Session of the U.S. House
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which can be estimated; the number of dimensions estimated rarely goes above the
number of dimensions implied by the prior. This behavior is expected due to the
properties of the IBP prior discussed in the simulations.
B.2 More Summaries of Multidimensional Voting in the U.S. House
Figure 2.11 shows the number of votes that were analyzed for each session of the
U.S. House. These votes are then classified as unidimensional or multidimensional
by the posterior mean probability that a vote requires more than the first dimension
to best explain individual vote variation. This figure demonstrates two key concepts.
First, the sheer number of votes that occur within each session dramatically increase
after 1950. This allows BPIRT to better estimate the number of dimensions needed
to model the roll call data set and, in turn, allows for more multidimensionality in
votes to appear. Second, this plot makes it clear that the proportion of votes that
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FIGURE 2.12. Aggregate GMP and Proportion Correctly Classified Votes for
the 1st - 115th Sessions of the U.S. House
Probability of Correct Classification of Vote Using Optimal Cutpoint
Geometric Mean Probability of Correct Classification
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.9
U.S. House Year
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
BPIRT          
WNOMINATE−1D
were classified as multidimensional by BPIRT also dramatically increases after 1950.
While there is a downturn in this proportion in recent times, these proportions are
generally on par with the proportion of votes that were classified as unidimensional
in the mid-1800s. This is another way of showing that the unidimensional, party bloc
voting of recent times is not a unique occurrence.
GMP is only one way in which the quality of ideal point models is assessed. The most
common way in which models are compared is through correct classifications metrics.
Using the ideal points and other structural parameters, the proportion of votes that
are correctly classified can be used to demonstrate the ability of the model to partition
“Yea” and “Nay” votes appropriately in different situations. This metric is a natural
fit for predictive models like NOMINATE, but does not necessarily account for the
uncertainty associated with each of the model parameter estimates (Carroll et al.,
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2009). The proportion of votes correctly classified using optimal cutpoints for BPIRT
was estimated using the mean of the augmented posterior - µi,j = (rj  λj)ωi − αj.
If µi,j < 0, then the vote was a predicted “Nay” and “Yea” otherwise. A similar
calculation is used for NOMINATE.
Figure 2.12 shows the aggregate GMP and proportion correct classification under the
optimal cutpoint for both BPIRT and one-dimensional WNOMINATE model. Be-
ginning with correct classification, it is easy to see that BPIRT and a unidimensional
WNOMINATE model yield similar results throughout much of U.S. history, especially
in recent sessions. While this could certainly be taken as evidence that the unidi-
mensional model is sufficient, correct classification done in this sense is theoretically
deficient and ignores the inherent uncertainty associated with ideal point measures
while encouraging heavily overfit models (Aldrich et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2016).
Ideal points are rarely used to predict new votes; in fact, ideal points are almost
always used to explain the voting behavior given the entirety of votes for an analyzed
period. It is imperative that ideal point fits are treated with the same probabilistic
rigor that any other inferential technique requires when attempting to explain be-
havior and, thus, important to consider more statistically rigorous approaches when
making choices about the underlying parameters of ideal point models.
Proportion reduction in error metrics are similar to correct classification metrics (Car-
roll et al., 2009; Aldrich et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2016). These approaches are
central to previous discussions of how many dimensions are needed to model a roll
call voting set. While these approaches provide some information of this topic, they
are post-hoc statistics that require a priori assumptions about the structure of the
underlying latent space. BPIRT estimates the dimensionality and necessity of dimen-
sions at a vote-level within its statistical procedure and, therefore, is incompatible
with the notion of adding or subtracting whole dimensions from the latent space. For
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TABLE 2.5. Correlation between Dimensions Estimated for the 107th U.S.
House
Party Procedural Security Budget Rural Foreign DOD
Party 1.00 0.30 0.28 0.33 -0.07 -0.09 0.17
Procedural 0.30 1.00 0.35 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.25
Security 0.28 0.35 1.00 0.10 0.09 -0.04 0.16
Budget 0.33 0.05 0.10 1.00 0.13 -0.01 0.05
Rural -0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.13 1.00 0.04 -0.06
Foreign -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 1.00 0.01
DOD 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.05 -0.06 0.01 1.00
Note: Values reported are posterior means for the Pearson correlation coefficient
between estimated ideal points.
this reason, I choose to avoid inappropriate attempts to compare APRE and MPRE
achieved from BPIRT.
B.3 More Summaries for the 107th U.S. House
I used a suite of tools to provide names for each of the dimensions estimated by
BPIRT for the 107th session of the U.S. House. First, I used vote classifications
from voteview.com to analyze the set of votes which had non-zero contributions to a
dimension and saw general trends in the content of votes that loaded in each dimension
(Poole and Rosenthal, 2012). Second, I used non-negative matrix factorization and
regularized logistic regression to extract important words from the bill summaries
associated with each vote on each set of votes. These tools created a general picture
of what each dimension was modeling. While still somewhat ad-hoc, this approach
defines a general method that will be useful for future research attempting to find
trends in what each dimension means, over time.
BPIRT tends to extract dimensions which run relatively orthogonal to one another.
One of the advantages of the IBP prior is that it generally prevents against dimensions
that are highly correlated with one another from arising during estimation. This can
be attributed to the IBP draws, which check to see if there is any new information
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FIGURE 2.13. Highest PVE Dimensions and Number of Dimensions For Each
Vote in the 107th U.S. House
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Note: Values reported are estimates of the binary matrix from the iteration of the
MCMC procedure with the highest complete-data likelihood. Points on the main
diagonal of the PVE graph required only one dimension to best model variation within
the vote.
added by a new dimension while conditioning on previously existing dimensions. Ta-
ble 2.5 shows the pairwise correlations between dimensions estimated for the 107th
session of the U.S. House. Correlations for this session range from .01 to .35. While
this indicates that there are dimensions which are not orthogonal to one another, the
correlation is still relatively low.
One advantage that comes from using an IBP prior is that votes are allowed to take
on a collection of dimensions rather than one, and only one, dimension. Given the
complexity of the topics that are being considered when votes are cast, this is a
desirable property. BPIRT models this complexity and presents the set of dimensions
which each vote requires to best model its variance in voting. To this end, it is
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interesting to examine the number of dimensions, and which dimensions, are chosen
for votes within the analyzed set. Figure 2.13 illustrates this dynamic by showing the
dimensions with the highest and second highest PVE for each vote analyzed. While
around 35% of votes only require the party loyalty dimension to model the roll call
votes, the other 65% of votes require at least one other dimension. However, all votes
require a non-zero contribution from the party loyalty dimension. This dynamic is
partially due to the “rich get richer” property of the IBP prior, the fact that most votes
require the party loyalty dimension as the highest or second highest PVE dimension
fits well with theories of party control in U.S. legislative voting.
C U.S. Legislative Voting and Multidimensionality
C.1 A Theory of Pivotal Voters
I constructed a data set of all cloture votes that took place between the 89th and 115th
sessions of the U.S. Senate. I began by collecting all cloture votes recorded in the
U.S. Senate records, which can be found at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
cloture/clotureCounts.htm. Using this set of votes, I attempted to create matches
to roll call votes retrieved from https://www.voteview.com (Poole and Rosenthal,
2012). For each cloture vote, I attempted to match the roll call records via the session
number and the rollcall number. However, this proved challenging in cases where the
clerk roll number was not recorded. Thus, I pulled in supplementary information
about each vote from the Propublica API to attempt to join cloture votes to roll call
records using date and bill name (Leeper, 2015). This approach was used to give each
cloture vote a date, roll call number, and relevant bill number.
Once each record was joined to a roll call vote, I created a series of cloture vote
episodes for each set of motions to invoke cloture that involved the same bill in the
same session of the U.S. Senate. I defined a cloture vote episode as any group of
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cloture votes that occurred within the same session for the same bill number that
had at least 2 members. This led to 777 cloture votes and 257 cloture vote episodes.
In each episode, I analyzed pairs of votes in sequence, meaning that I compared the
votes from the first and second votes, second and third votes, etc. This led to 517
direct comparisons.
For each comparison, I defined a vote switch as a pair of votes from a U.S. Senator that
were different (i.e. “yea” to “nay” or “nay” to “yea” on whether to invoke cloture).
Another key component of this design is placing U.S. Senators in ideal point quartiles.
Using the set of ideal points for a specific session (which are defined at the session
level), I divided the ideal points into quartiles and assigned each member a quartile
based on this measure. For this division, I used the ideal points retrieved from the
iteration of the stationary posterior that had the highest complete data likelihood.20
Corresponding switches to the ideal point quartiles were made when the vote was
classified as a “President-Side Veto”.
More recent sessions of the U.S. Senate introduced a new problem that was seemingly
not present in the data set from Krehbiel (1998). In some votes pairs, there appeared
to be an unusually large number of switches that occurred across both parties. Upon
further examination, these cases corresponded to complicated cloture votes that were
associated with various amendments to bills proposed by both parties. Given that
these votes were occurring on the same bill, but had completely different underlying
contexts, I removed these 40 vote pairs from the data set. I identified votes pairs
to remove by finding all votes in which 50% of the votes from each party switched.
20I explored the idea that the results may change if the uncertainty of the ideal points was included
in further empirical models using these measures. To do this, I ran the models in proceeding parts of
this section using the full first-dimension ideal point posteriors and taking a random draw for each
observation that is then used to create the quartiles. This bootstrap design essentially incorporates
the uncertainty of the ideal points into the estimation procedure. The coefficients retrieved from
the logistic regression models then represent a distribution of the full-error model. For a 1000-draw
bootstrap design, I found no discernable difference between the full-error and single point estimate
models.
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Analysis of the full data set including these 40 vote pairs could not directly replicate
the findings of Krehbiel (1998). Upon removal, I was left with 477 cloture vote pairs.
Table 2.6 shows some summary statistics for this data.
The logistic regression models in this section were estimated using MCMClogit from
MCMCpack (Martin et al., 2011). Priors on the coefficients were conjugate normal
with zero mean and variance of 1000. Each model was estimated twice using diffuse
starting values and convergence was checked using the suite of tools provided by the
superdiag package (Tsai et al., 2012). After a generous burn-in of 100,000 iterations,
there was no evidence of a lack of convergence to the stationary distributions. One
consideration when estimating the models for cloture vote switching is choosing the
threshold for multidimensionality in the threshold model. While a small value for this
threshold makes sense, there is empirical justification for the decision. The threshold
of .001 was chosen after using a grid search of all values between .001 and .999 as the
cutpoint and estimating the logistic regression for vote switching for all values. Using
.001 as the cutpoint yielded the model with the highest log-marginal likelihood. Code
for the models in this section can be found in the replication materials.
C.2 A Theory on Party Control
Data on the set of all final passage votes in the U.S. House was retrieved from the
political institutions and public choice roll-call database, which includes each roll
call vote that occurred in the U.S. Congress and classifications relating to they type
of vote that occurred (Crespin and Rohde, 2012). To match the analysis from Cox
and McCubbins (2005), I only analyzed final passage votes which required a simple
majority for passage. Table 2.2 shows some summary statistics for this data.
One modeling consideration which arose was what to do with final passage votes
that were nearly unanimous. When estimating ideal points, I chose not to estimate
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vote-level dimensionalities for votes that had less than a 5 vote split in order to
prevent singularity issues when inverting matrices. In order to best replicate the
methods of Cox and McCubbins (2005), I chose to code these votes as unidimensional.
Theoretically, this is justified - on a unanimous or nearly unanimous vote, the vote
can be modeled using a single dimension with a cutpoint that exists outside of the
range implied by the ideal points. This was done to attempt to faithfully recreate the
data set and estimation strategy from Cox and McCubbins (2005).
Models for this section were estimated using JAGS (Plummer, 2003). runjags was
used to run the models within R (Denwood, 2016). Diffuse normal priors were placed
on the coefficients. Special care needed to be taken to appropriately model the in-
tercept in these logistic regressions. Since the underlying model predicts that the
probability of a roll is zero when the distance between the floor median and party
median is zero, it is expected that the intercept will be highly negative and only
partially locally identified. For this reason, the mean of the prior for the intercept is
set to be -10 while other means are set to 0. This helped model convergence greatly.
Spike-and-slab priors on the regression coefficients were computed using a beta-
Bernoulli specification. Specifics can be seen in the replication materials. I chose
to use this prior specification given the nature of the test presented by Cox and Mc-
Cubbins (2005) - under party cartel theory, the distance between the majority party
median and the floor median should have zero effect on the probability of a majority
party roll. While this specification is not a test of zero effect, directly, it forces the
model to be fit under conditions where the value of a coefficient that is not statis-
tically distinguishable from zero is forced to be represented as zero. This allows for
easier interpretation of the expected null result.
As with the previous set of models, the value of .001 is both theoretically and em-
pirically justified. For each of the models run in this section, I first ran a version of
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the threshold model which places a uniform prior, bounded between 0 and 1, on the
cutline for the threshold model. Under the convergence guarantees of MCMC meth-
ods, this value should converge to a stationary distribution which dictates values of
the cutline that maximize the posterior likelihood conditional on the priors. In each
case, the posterior distribution had a single mode close to a small number around
zero. This provides empirical justification for this choice. All models and JAGS code
can be found in the replication materials for this paper.
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TABLE 2.6. Summary statistics for cloture vote switches in the 89th - 115th
Sessions of the U.S. Senate
Number of Number of Proportion Switches by:
Congress Vote Episodes Switches Adj. Adj. Mods f-Quart. Non-Adj.
89 3 7 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.43
90 3 12 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.25
91 1 2 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
92 9 49 0.20 0.16 0.33 0.31
93 13 59 0.15 0.22 0.37 0.25
94 12 46 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.57
95 7 16 0.06 0.38 0.38 0.19
96 8 68 0.25 0.26 0.44 0.04
97 14 65 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.12
98 5 28 0.46 0.18 0.18 0.18
99 8 43 0.37 0.23 0.40 0.00
100 20 60 0.08 0.42 0.25 0.25
101 6 42 0.24 0.24 0.36 0.17
102 17 129 0.06 0.41 0.20 0.33
103 19 40 0.23 0.10 0.65 0.03
104 24 52 0.25 0.21 0.48 0.06
105 22 83 0.27 0.20 0.39 0.14
106 18 126 0.03 0.44 0.06 0.47
107 27 237 0.22 0.30 0.19 0.29
108 17 216 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.26
109 11 89 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.21
110 44 508 0.15 0.32 0.25 0.28
111 32 154 0.29 0.18 0.45 0.08
112 20 327 0.41 0.05 0.47 0.07
113 28 293 0.40 0.04 0.54 0.02
114 68 501 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.36
115 13 111 0.30 0.12 0.43 0.15
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TABLE 2.7. Summary statistics for final passage votes in the 83rd - 115th
Sessions of the U.S. House
Number of: Distance between Floor Median and:
Congress Votes Maj. Rolls Min. Rolls Maj. Median Min. Median
83 48 0 9 0.21 0.33
84 46 3 7 0.31 0.26
85 58 5 8 0.31 0.26
86 72 2 24 0.18 0.39
87 95 1 30 0.21 0.33
88 92 3 36 0.25 0.33
89 169 0 45 0.11 0.46
90 214 2 27 0.27 0.31
91 168 8 19 0.28 0.31
92 173 8 15 0.26 0.33
93 245 5 34 0.26 0.34
94 255 8 62 0.12 0.47
95 209 4 56 0.13 0.46
96 169 1 52 0.15 0.45
97 126 4 30 0.26 0.36
98 121 10 55 0.16 0.49
99 116 6 48 0.20 0.47
100 116 1 47 0.19 0.48
101 117 2 42 0.19 0.48
102 117 8 50 0.17 0.50
103 107 3 63 0.17 0.54
104 130 3 72 0.21 0.56
105 124 8 62 0.23 0.54
106 166 10 61 0.26 0.52
107 111 4 41 0.24 0.54
108 129 1 48 0.19 0.59
109 119 5 59 0.18 0.62
110 149 5 98 0.23 0.58
111 104 1 81 0.16 0.62
112 126 1 104 0.20 0.67
113 139 3 112 0.23 0.65
114 159 2 136 0.20 0.69
115 140 0 110 0.23 0.67
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CHAPTER III
A Bayesian Nonparametric Approach to
Estimating Group Dynamics in Roll Call Scaling
3.1 Introduction
Studies of legislative behavior focus upon the relationship between legislative pref-
erences, institutional structure, and legislative outcomes. Spatial models are a fre-
quently used tool for studying these relationships. In a spatial model of voting bodies,
policies are represented geometrically and votes occur as a function of individual leg-
islators’ ideal points. An ideal point represents a legislator’s most preferred policy
outcome and competing policies are judged based upon their distances from her most
preferred policy. Under the assumption of utility-maximizing, rational legislators, the
spatial model provides a consistent method for researchers to understand how ideal
points and policy lead to specific legislative outcomes.
A common task in the legislative behavior literature is to estimate the set of ideal
points for matrix of roll call data. In this data, the votes for each legislator on a variety
of different proposals are recorded. Then, a scaling procedure is used to determine
the ideal points for each legislator (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Clinton et al., 2004).
Scaling procedures typically seek to represent each policy votes on in the roll call set
in a low-dimensional Euclidian space. In turn, this allows estimation of ideal points
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in the same Euclidian space. Thus, the scaling procedure admits a consistent space
in which all votes within the roll call set can be represented. Scaling roll call votes
in this way implies that there exists a single policy space in which represents all roll
call votes within the analyzed roll call set.
The policy space uncovered by scaling methods encompasses the various complexities
of the legislator voting behaviors. While the ideal points, themselves, are generally
of interest, the uncovered policy space is also substantively interesting. For example,
McCarty et al. (2016) utilize ideal points estimated using NOMINATE methodology
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1984) and the corresponding policy space to show increased
polarization in elite voting over time. This result (and many others like it) relies on
the assumption that meaningful parts of the policy space exist only in one dimension.
This low-dimensionality conjecture is a key part of numerous theories relating to
changes in Congress over time and is key to many other theories which utilize ideal
point estimates.
McCarty et al. (2016) argue that there are between one and two dimensions in most
session of Congress. The first dimension projects legislators’ votes to a “liberal-
conservative” dimension which corresponds mostly to economic issues. The second
dimension, if needed, corresponds to social issues of the time, typically questions
related to race. Over time, NOMINATE shows that the need for a second dimension
has disappeared and most roll call voting behavior can be described by the liberal-
conservative dimension. The single dimension argument has been the basis for many
formal models and empirical findings about Congress (Aldrich and Battista, 2002;
Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Binder, 1999; Cameron, 2000; Cox and McCubbins, 2005;
Jessee, 2009, 2010; Krehbiel, 1992). However, many of these results are incredibly
sensitive to changes in this assumption; if the dimensionality of the congressional
vote choice model is any value greater than one, then median voter theorem no longer
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holds and the results no longer hold (Kramer, 1973). Thus, strong evidence for the
one-dimensional model should be in place.
Along with concerns about the dimensionality of the policy space, there has been
recent research that examines the notion of independence that is required for roll
call scaling models to make estimates. In particular, there are questions about the
role of groups within the data. A base assumption that must be made for proce-
dures like NOMINATE is that the errors associated with each individual vote are
independent and identically distributed conditional on the ideal point. While roll call
scaling techniques are attempting to decompose dependence among the votes to find
ideal points, dependence among errors is still a potential problem. This problem is
discussed in depth by Spirling and Quinn (2010), showing that there is cause to be
concerned about correlated errors in parliamentary voting in the U.K. This problem
is mostly due to party incentives and can cause dependence among the votes that is
not accounted for in the standard spatial model. Spirling and Quinn (2010) utilize
an infinite mixture model approach which models the policy space as a number of
latent clusters, but forgo the standard ideal point interpretation which is often used
in studies of U.S. legislatures.
Continuous measurements of ideal points are key to numerous studies of the U.S.
Congress, particularly those related to party control and party effects in the legislative
chambers. Following Krehbiel (1992) and Krehbiel (2010), understanding the effects
of party membership and the role that parties play in voting became an important
endeavor in legislative studies. Through careful qualitative accounts and empirical
studies, theories of party control emerged and posited that members of Congress
have incentives to vote with their party and the groups assess situations where strong
control over members is needed (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000; Aldrich, 1995; Cox and
McCubbins, 2007). These studies and many that followed used NOMINATE scores to
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empirically test these points. NOMINATE scores were also used to show that parties
do not have much influence over the voters of their members (Cox and Poole, 2002).
These opposite findings raise causes for concern when using NOMINATE scores to
test theories of party effects.
The main problem that arises when using NOMINATE scores and other roll call scal-
ing techniques to test theories of party control is that, a priori, groups are assumed
to be orthogonal noise. These stimation procedure require that errors are assumed
to be independent and identically distributed across both individuals and bills, con-
ditional on the uncovered latent variables. Given that there appears to be grouping
that arises according to party membership in these latent scores, the possibility that
group effects exist should, at least, be considered a possibility when estimating the
model. Thus, flexible models that allow for less restrictive assumptions are needed in
order to better test theories of voting in Congress.
Using the clustering approach proposed by Spirling and Quinn (2010) as a starting
point, I propose a new model which allows for both individual ideal points and group
ideal points and membership to be measured. This model, Clustered Beta Process
IRT (C-BPIRT) utilizes a combination of beta process priors on the number of di-
mensions for the uncovered ideal point space (Knowles and Ghahramani, 2011) and
Dirichlet process priors (Ferguson, 1973) on group membership within the set of roll
call votes. This model flexibly estimates continuous level ideal points for each in-
dividual voter with unknown dimensionality while also uncovering a set of discrete
groupings within the data and estimating the group effect on voting. This model uses
Bayesian nonparametric approaches to let the data dictate which groups and dimen-
sions are needed to best model the voting behavior of members of Congress. By not
constraining the model to fit a rigid set of assumptions, the data dictates which po-
tential mechanisms of vote behavior are important and estimates the corresponding
measures.
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3.2 A Model for Roll Call Analysis
For a legislature, assume there are N voting members that cast P votes over the course
of time analyzed. For any given vote j ∈ (1, P ), legislator i ∈ (1, N) must choose
between two alternatives: cast a “Yea” vote for the proposed motion (ϑj ∈ RK) or
cast a “Nay” vote for the proposed motion (ϕj ∈ RK). Behavior in this legislature
is assumed to be describable in a K-dimensional policy space - all votes that are made
by legislator i can be described by the K-dimensional point locations of ϑj and ϕj
within the space and a K-dimensional ideal point, ωi, which encapsulates the policy
preferences of legislator i.
A legislator must choose whether to vote for ϑj or ϕj. Using a utility maximization
model that assumes quadratic loss in distance from her ideal point, assume that she
chooses the alternative which grants the highest utility:
Ui(ϑj) = −‖ωi − ϑj‖2 + ηij
Ui(ϕj) = −‖ωi −ϕj‖2 + νij
(3.1)
where ηij and νij are stochastic elements of the utility functions. This model is
completely specified if a known structure is placed on ηij and νi,j (Heckman and
Snyder Jr, 1996; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Clinton et al., 2004).
Let Y be a matrix of roll call votes and yi,j be the vote choice that legislator i makes
on proposal j : yij = 1 if legislator i votes “Yea” on vote j and yij = 0 if she casts a
“Nay” vote. Given the model construction, the probability that legislator i votes for
ϑj can represented as:
P (yij = 1) = F (λ
′
jωi − αj) (3.2)
where F (·) is the CDF associated with the chosen error structure, αj = ϑ
′
jϑj−ϕ′jϕj
σ2j
,
and λj =
2(ϑj−ϕj)
σ2j
.
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This construction admits a corresponding statistical model that allows for estimation
of the structural parameters α and Λ and the ideal points, Ω. Assuming the errors
are independent and identically distributed, a likelihood function can be derived:
L(α,Λ,Ω|Y ) =
N∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
F (λ′jωi − αj)yij ×
(
1− F (λ′jωi − αj)
)1−yij (3.3)
Bayesian implementations of this model place priors on all of the structural param-
eters and estimation proceeds using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (Clinton
et al., 2004). With minor changes, this model is equivalent to the NOMINATE pro-
cedure (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
McAlister (2018) derives a similar model that allows for appropriate estimation of
the dimensionality of the resulting ideal point space. Unlike previous approaches
that require post-hoc Scree tests of the number of dimensions (Cattell, 1966), often
erroneously leading to conclusions that one dimension is appropriate for describing
the policy preferences of members of the U.S. Congress, a Bayesian nonparametric
approach is used that places a prior on the number of dimensions in the model. Using
the Indian Buffet Process prior for the number of dimensions needed to represent the
ideal point space, a slightly altered formulation is proposed:
P (yi,j = 1) = F ((rj  λj)′ωi −αj) (3.4)
where rj is a binary vector that takes a value of zero if bill j does not influence a
dimension and a one otherwise. This specification induces a spike-and-slab prior on
the bill loadings and the infinite nature of the priors allows for estimation of a sparse
set of dimensions. Figure 3.1 shows a graphical representation of the beta process
IRT model.
The main workhorse of the BPIRT model is the Indian Buffet Process, which places
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FIGURE 3.1. Graphical Representation of Beta Process IRT Model
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a prior on the number of dimensions needed to best explain the latent ideal point
space (Ghahramani and Griffiths, 2006; Paisley and Carin, 2009). The Indian Buf-
fet Process is a version of a stochastic Beta process that places a prior on binary
matrices. This approach allows for each bill-dimension pair to be explicitly tested
against the hypothesis of no effect; a test that tells whether the collection of votes on
bill j provides any information about the location of the ideal point on dimension k.
The dimensionality of the set of ideal points is a substantively meaningful variable
(McCarty et al., 2016) and proper estimation is a meaningful task (Aldrich et al.,
2014). For these reasons, this specification of the ideal point model will serve as a
starting point for the model derived in this paper.
3.3 A Model for Roll Call Analysis with Group Influences
Under a model with group influence, legislator i must choose between ϑj and ϕj,
as before. She uses a utility maximization model that assumes quadratic loss in
distance from her ideal point to choose the best alternative. However, unlike the
previous model, assume that she belongs to a group, g ∈ (1, ...G) that influences
her vote choice.1 Members of g share common policy goals, policy preferences, and
1Throughout this paper, let gi refer to the group with which voter i is associated. Each voter is
associated with one, an only one, group. This is a strict assumption, but one that generally holds
in U.S. legislatures (Aldrich, 1995).
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leadership that rewards loyalty to the group as well as individual policy and career
goals. As such, g can be viewed as a set of legislative actors that have multiple
influences driving vote choice. Like individual actors, it is assumed that groups have
an ideal point, τg, that encapsulates its policy preferences in a K-dimensional policy
space. Each actor also has an individual ideal point, ξi. Some convex combination
of these two ideal points makes up the observed ideal point, ωi = βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi,
where βi is a mixing component between zero and one that dictates how heavily i’s
ideal point leverages the group ideal point. Formally, this implies that the new utility
functions are:
Ui(ϑj) = −‖βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi − ϑj‖2 + ηij
Ui(ϕj) = −‖βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi −ϕj‖2 + νij
(3.5)
where ηi,j and νi,j are stochastic elements of the utility functions.
As before, these equations can be rearranged to give the standard IRT formulation:
P (yi,j = 1) = Φ
−1((rj  λj)′(βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi)−αj) (3.6)
where Φ−1 is the inverse normal CDF.2 This formulation can also be expressed in a
more familiar regression-like form:3
P (yi,j = 1) =
∞∫
0
N (xi,j ; (rj  λj)′(βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi)−αj, 1)dxi,j
= P ((rj  λj)′(βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi)−αj + i,j > 0) ; i,j ∼ N (0, 1)
(3.7)
where the loadings, Λ and α, can be seen as the regression coefficients and the K-
dimensional ideal points, ωi = βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi, as the observed data.
2Throughout this paper, probit link functions are used to link the binary outcomes to the data
generating function. The formal model and following empirical procedures can be altered to use the
logistic link function. This leads to a generally similar formal model and empirical procedure. For
more information, see Carroll et al. (2009); Goplerud (2019).
3N (x ; µ, σ2) is the normal density of x given mean µ and variance σ2.
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Assuming i,j is independent across all observations and items, a joint likelihood over
the data can be specified:
L(Y ) =
N∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
P ((rj  λj)′(βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi)−αj + i,j > 0)yi,j
+P ((rj  λj)′(βiτgi + (1− βi)ξi)−αj + i,j < 0)1−yi,j
(3.8)
The standard roll call scaling model can be seen as a special case of this model;
specifically, assuming that ωi = ξi:
L(Y ) =
N∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
P ((rj  λj)′ξi −αj + i,j > 0)yi,j
+P ((rj  λj)′ξi −αj + i,j < 0)1−yi,j
(3.9)
meaning that each ideal point is only made up of an individual component.
This points to a key question - what happens if only individual components are
estimated when a group component to the ideal point truly exists? The answer
depends wholly on the relationship of τgi and ξi. Omitted variable bias is a well-
known phenomenon in regression analysis and establishes that a variable that is left
out of the regression specification that is correlated with one of the included regressors
leads to biased estimates of the coefficients. This identity is a key result that has led to
an entire body of work on detecting and correcting for missing correlates in regression
analyses.4
In the roll call scaling setting, similar results are expected. Significant work has shown
that parties and other legislative groups influence roll call vote outcomes (Krehbiel,
1992; Krehbiel et al., 2005; Cox and Poole, 2002; Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich et al., 2014).
Under the grouped model of roll call scaling, this work expresses doubt that τgi is
4See Ferrari (2020) for a very thorough discussion of this problem and solutions in the regression
context.
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independent of ξi. This can manifest in the estimates of the structural parameters
in several ways. Formally, assume that there is a meaningful effect from a common
group, but βi = 0 ∀ i ∈ (1, ..., N). For any legislator where βi 6= 0:
P (yi,j = 1) = P ((rjλj)′ξi)−αj + i,j > 0) ; i,j ∼ N (0, 1)− (rjλj)′βiτgi (3.10)
If i,j is treated as standard normal idiosyncratic noise, the residual left by τgi must
go somewhere.
A first problem with this misspecification is that errors can be pushed to the ideal
point estimates, themselves. Since the model assumes that ideal points are condi-
tionally independent given all other parameters, these estimates will take on some of
the residuals. In the theoretically most likely scenario that τgi and ξi are positively
correlated, uncertainty will be underestimated and the ideal points will be biased
away from zero. This result is important since a large body of work relies on ideal
point estimates for the U.S. Congress to study polarization (McCarty et al., 2016;
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2017; Fiorina et al., 2006). If the ideal points estimated
in this way are biased away from zero, then estimates of polarization are overstated.
There is also evidence that misspecification of group effects in the ideal point model
can lead to poor inference about the number of dimensions needed to model the ideal
point space. Aldrich et al. (2014) show that in simulations of ideal point spaces with
a known number of policy dimensions, the standard roll call scaling model tends to
underestimate the dimensionality of the space when there are strong group effects.
This problem can be mitigated by scaling any known groups separately. While the
American legislative context may appear to lend itself to prior specification of voting
groups, this assumption might be too strong. In order to appropriately estimate di-
mensionality, systematic correlations among votes due to groups should be estimated,
then taken into account.
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Beyond problems of dependence in errors, roll call scaling using the standard model
also suffers from attempting to place a discrete latent variable on a continuous scale.
Theories of the role of groups in the U.S. Congress posit that there is a tiered approach
to vote decision making - first members of the party consult with the party desire
then decide whether or not they should depart from the party wishes (Aldrich and
Rohde, 2000; Rohde, 2010; Cox and McCubbins, 2007). While there are certainly
cases where this model is not appropriate, there is evidence that party plays a role
in the vote decision. The first dimension of the NOMINATE model is correctly
interpreted as party loyalty (Lee, 2009), and is often made up of distinctive clusters
of ideal points. These clusters are interpreted as parties and the distances are used
to make statements related to the behavior of parties in Congress (McCarty et al.,
2016). However, this usage of ideal points is not supported by the theory of the
model - if party is a cause of votes, then party should be accounted for in the ideal
point estimates. However, party is a discrete covariate. Thus, the continuous model
is unequipped to properly estimate these effects. The effect of mapping a discrete
latent variable to a continuous manifold is explored by Aldrich et al. (2014) and is
shown t0 lead to an understatement of the dimensionality of the ideal point space.
The party effect model derived above provides an approach to properly estimating
the underlying group latent variables.
This theoretical exercise demonstrates the importance of ensuring that potential
group effects are taken into account when modeling roll call outcomes. However,
there are two significant challenges in estimating and interpreting the group model.
First, it is too strong of an assumption to explicitly specify the number of groups and
their internal structure in a roll call model. While there are theories of voting in leg-
islative chambers that posit that various groupings matter, there are corresponding
theories which say the opposite. For this reason, it is important that any estimation
procedure that attempts to model group effects is flexible and allows for the possibil-
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ity that group effects may not exist - specifying group effects when group effects do
not exist leads to inefficient estimations of the ideal points, which lead to inefficient
estimates of the other structural parameters in the roll call model. Similarly, relying
on party labels alone does not sufficiently or flexibly explore group effects.
Second, given the problems of rotational invariance present in estimates of the struc-
tural parameters of the IRT model, the estimates for ξi, τgi , and βi are not uniquely
identifiable - ξi has infinite solutions, even if ωi would be uniquely identified. At-
tempting to estimate two components of an additive effect leads to more problems
and requires more stringent constraints in order to identify a unique solution. For
these reasons, it is worthwhile to derive an estimation strategy for the group effects
model that allows for an infinitely exchangeable prior specification; rather than es-
timating ξi and τgi separately, the sum of the two is estimated, ωi = ξi + τgi , such
that i,j|ωi, gi ⊥ i′,j|ω′i, gi′ ∀ j ∈ (1, ..., P ) , i 6= i′.
3.4 Clustered Beta Process IRT
A key assumption for the latent variable models previously discussed is that each of
the N observations are independently and identically distributed. Each of the i random
vectors associated with the observed data are modeled separately and assumed to
constitute a joint likelihood:
P (Y |−) =
N∏
i=1
P (yi|−) (3.11)
Put another way, each observation is assumed to be exchangeable conditional on the
structural parameters. In the context of ideal point estimation, the exchangeability
assumption arises in the estimation of the latent variables, Ω. A priori, ωi is assumed
to follow:
ωi ∼ NK(0, IK) ∀ i ∈ (1, ..., N) (3.12)
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where IK is a K × K identity matrix. This implies that each observation has the
same prior on the ideal point regardless of group and directly leads to the i.i.d. result
on the errors.
As pointed out previously, there is reason to doubt this assumption. Previous work
on roll call scaling in a variety of legislatures has sought to address this problem.
Ramey (2016), Aldrich et al. (2014), and Bernhard and Sulkin (2018), just to name a
few pieces, have sought to perform a combination of within and between party scaling
to account for the group incentives present in roll call voting. In each of these cases,
however, scaling was done as an iterative procedure: ideal points were uncovered for
each party and then mapped back to the latent space using ex-post assumptions.
This approach is not ideal for a number of reasons - 1) strong prior theory is used to
say that parties are the only groups that matter, 2) the link back to a common space
assumes that strict separation exists between the parties on all issue dimensions, 3)
the dimensionality of the policy space was assumed to be known, a priori, or was
tested using ad-hoc post-processing approaches. Similar, but distinct, a hierarchical
IRT formulation has been explored in recent years (Rai and Daume´, 2009; Gruhl
et al., 2013), but the applied literature has given very little attention to this class of
models. While hierarchical IRT addresses the issue of combining the groups into a
common latent space, it still ignores that many applied situations have data where
groups are unknown.
An alternative scaling approach is presented by Spirling and Quinn (2010). Rather
than seeking to extract continuous manifolds, Spirling and Quinn (2010) seek to find
latent clusters within binary roll call votes from the U.K. parliament. This approach
addresses many of the issues presented by avoiding explicit scaling and assuming
that members are wholly loyal to a single group. This allows for the estimation of
beta-Bernoulli clusters from the binary data. However, this comes at the cost of con-
tinuous ideal points in a reduced dimensional setting - clusters are still associated with
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a P -dimensional mean and covariance. Since one of the goals of ideal point scaling
is to project high dimensional roll call data into a lower-dimensional substantively
meaningful space, Similarly, this model sacrifices specification of individual depar-
tures from the overall group. While this is certainly appropriate for the strong party
systems present in the U.K. parliament, there has been significant work in the U.S.
legislature that shows that individual legislators mix individual and party incentives
when making vote choices (Sulkin, 2005; Lee, 2009).
3.4.1 Uncovering Unknown Latent Groups
I seek to derive an approach to estimating groups in the ideal point model that places
each of the i legislators in one of G groups:
P (yi) =
∞∫
0
∫
Θ
∫
ωi
∫
G
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi−α,IP )P (ωi|gi)P (gi|g∗i )dGdωidΘdxi (3.13)
where gi is a categorical variable with probability densities corresponding to the
probability that observation i is part of cluster g ∈ (1, ..., G), g∗i and Θ is the collection
of all other parameters not explicitly written above.
In the case where gi is unknown, but the number of clusters, |G|, is known, then a
prior can be placed on gi such that:
P (gi) ∼ Cat(ζ) (3.14)
where Cat(ζ) corresponds to a |G|-dimensional categorical distribution. ζ is a set of
|G| probabilities that sums to 1.
However, the case of interest in this context is one where the number of clusters
within the data is unknown. Thus, a standard categorical distribution is inappro-
priate. For this situation, a Bayesian nonparametric approach will be used and gi
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assumed to follow a Dirichlet process (Ferguson, 1973). The Dirichlet process can be
seen as a prior over distributions. Each g ∈ (1, ..., G) constitutes a cluster with an
associated distribution. The Dirichlet process prior admits a probability density over
the membership for observation i. In other words:
P (gi) ∼ DP (β,H)
where β is a mixing parameter and H is a base measure. Given this choice of prior, the
posterior distribution, P (G|Θ) can be defined. Due to the conjugacy of the Dirichlet
prior to the categorical distribution P (Θ|G), the resulting posterior follows a Dirichlet
distribution.
Given the form of the posterior distribution, we know the joint probability that G =
G∗ for some permutation of group labels. However, this is not the quantity of interest.
Rather, the inferential task asks to find P (gi|Θ). Given that the Dirichlet process is
infinitely exchangeable, a predictive distribution can be defined and used to examine
the individual probability distributions:
P (gi) =
1
β +N
(
βH +
∑
j 6=i
δgj
)
(3.15)
where H is the base measure, β is the DP hyperparameter, and δgj = 1 if observation
j is in group g. In words, this says that the probability that i ∈ g is proportional
to the number of other observations that are already in group g. There is also some
probability that i belongs in its own cluster, which is quantified by the base measure
H and the DP hyperparameter, only.
Using this structure, a process can be defined for the case of interest- a case where
the number of groups is unknown a priori. By driving G→∞, a process can defined
where gi is modeled as an infinite mixture. In words, this means that there are infinite
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possible cluster components within the data. In order for the model to be tractable,
a finite number of these components should be used within the data. Thus, of the
G = ∞ possible clusters that gi can join, only G+ have a positive probability of
occurrence. This process constitutes the Chinese Restaurant Process (Rasmussen,
2000; Pitman et al., 2002; Blackwell and MacQueen, 1973; Escobar and West, 1995).
Under this prior, each observation is assumed to take on a currently defined cluster
with probability proportional to the number of other observations that are currently
in that cluster and take a new cluster assignment with probability proportional to β.
This prior is sparsity inducing as the expected number of clusters grows with N :
E[G+] ≈ O(log(N)) (3.16)
This implies that the complexity of the inferred mixture can only be as complex as
the sample size allows. This is desirable as it prevents against overfitting.
As with all mixture models, the cluster assignments achieved using the CRP are
unique up to a permutation of labels; the model is identified, but the individual
cluster assignments are not. However, the groupings are identifiable. For this reason,
inference performs not on the individual cluster labels, themselves, but the probability
that gi = gj∀i 6= j.
3.4.2 Latent Groups within Ideal Point Estimation
The key quantity of interest in this model is P (gi|g−i). Using Bayes rule, this quantity
can be defined as:
P (gi = g|g−i) ∝
∫
ωi
∫
g
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi −α,IP )P (ωi|gi = g)dωidg (3.17)
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Note that finding gi amounts to evaluating the probability of legislator i’s roll call
record given the model for each of the groups currently active under the CRP and
integrating over the ideal point. Without further specification of the distributional
structure of ωi|gi, this model is intractable.
For the purposes of ideal point analysis, multivariate normal clusters are assumed.
For each g ∈ G, the corresponding cluster is assumed to follow a K+ dimensional
multivariate normal cluster with mean vector µg and diagonal covariance matrix Σg,
where K+ is dictated by the beta process prior on the loadings matrix (McAlister,
2018). Standard conjugate priors are assumed on these parameters. Plugging this
into (3.17), we can redefine the model as:
P (gi = g|g−i) ∝
∫
ωi
∫
µg
∫
Σg
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi −α,IP )
NK+(ωi;µg,Σg)NK+(µg;µ0, (κ0Σg)−1)
K+∏
k=1
IG(σg,k;α0, β0)dΣgdµgdωi
(3.18)
This quantity encapsulates the probability that i belongs in cluster g given all other
observations that are currently in g.
This integral can be simplified by recognizing that the latter part of the integral
is the posterior predictive distribution for the conjugate multivariate normal model.
Simplifying gives:
P (gi = g|g−i) ∝
∫
ωi
∫
µg
∫
Σg
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi −α,IP )TK+;2αg
(
µg,
βg(κg + 1)
αgκg
)
dωi
(3.19)
where TK;d(µ,Σ) is the K dimensional multivariate t-distribution with location µ,
scale matrix Σ, and d degrees of freedom. Let ω−i,g be the values of the latent
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variable for all observations in cluster g not including observation i and ng be the
number of observations currently in g excluding observation i. Define:
ω¯−i,g =
∑
ω−i,g
ng
µg =
κ0µ0 + ngω¯−i,g
κ0 + ng
κg = κ0 + ng
αg = α0 +
ng
2
βg = β0 +
1
2
ng∑
j=1
(ω−i,g,j − ω¯−i,g)2 + κ0ng(ω¯−i,g − µ0)
2
2(κ0 + ng)
Unfortunately, this integral has no analytical solution; numerical methods must be
used. An accurate approach utilizes a Laplace approximation to the multivariate
t-distribution. Using the quadrature approach, define the approximate normal distri-
bution as:
TK+,2αg
(
ωi ; µg,
βg(κg + 1)
αgκg
)
≈ NK+
(
ωi;µg,
βg(κg + 1)(
αg +
1
2
)
κg
)
(3.20)
This allows the integral to be solved analytically:
P (gi = g|g−i) ∝
∫
ωi
∫
µg
∫
Σg
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi−α,IP )TK+;2αg
(
µg,
βg(κg + 1)
αgκg
)
dωi ≈ exp(q∗−q)
(3.21)
where
Ξg =
βg(κg + 1)(
αg +
1
2
)
κg
A = −1
2
(Λ′Λ + Ξ−1g )
b = (yi + α)
′Λ + µ′gΞ
−1
g
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q∗ = −1
2
((yi + α)
′(yi + α) + p log(2pi) + µ′gΞ
−1
g µg +K
+ log(2pi) + log(det(Ξg)))
q =
1
4
bA−1b′ − K
+
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
log
(
det(−1
2
A−1)
)
Given the choice to use a CRP prior on gi, a base distribution must also be specified
from which new clusters are proposed. In the context of factor analysis, it makes
sense to define the base distribution:
H ∼ NK+(0,IK+) (3.22)
which is equivalent to the standard prior used in factor analysis procedures. This
allows the probability that gi belongs in a new cluster, gnew, to be defined as:
P (gi = gnew) ∝
∞∫
−∞
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi −α,IP )Nk(ωi; 0,IK+)dωi = exp(q˙∗ − q˙)
(3.23)
where
A˙ = −1
2
(Λ′Λ + Ik)
b˙ = (yi + α)
′Λ
q˙∗ = −1
2
((yi + α)
′(yi + α) + p log(2pi) +K+ log(2pi))
q˙ =
1
4
b˙A˙−1b˙′ − K
+
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
log(det(−1
2
A˙−1))
Given these quantities, we can define the conditional posterior distribution for gi.
Due to the conjugacy of the DP prior and the categorical likelihood, the posterior
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will follow a Dirichlet distribution:
P (gi|−) ∼ Dirichlet(g∗i )
g∗g,i = nqP (gi = g|g−i) ∀ g ∈ (1, ..., G+)
g∗g+1,i = βP (gi = gnew)
(3.24)
The probability that gi belongs to group g is a weighted average of the number of
other observations in g and the probability that gi is in the same cluster as the other
like observations. To assign legislator i to a single group, a standard Dirichlet draw
is taken from g∗i .
The differences between this approach and the standard continuous latent variable
model arise in how each latent variable is taken into account. In the standard proce-
dure, each ωi is assumed to be independent of the other observations. In the clustered
case, each ωi is assumed to belong to a cluster and information about the location
of the latent variable is shared between observations in the same cluster. In other
words, latent variables are essentially estimated in groups rather than individually.
Using the exchangeability properties of the Dirichlet process, this addresses the ini-
tial exchangeability problem by partitioning the set of observations into conditionally
exchangeable groups - observations are assumed to be exchangeable within the same
cluster. This allows group properties to propagate through the latent variable rather
than emerging as its own set of orthogonal latent manifolds.
This property can be expressed in another way - the latent variable associated with
each individual is a function of both group and individual dynamics. Given the con-
struction of the latent variable, there are two influences on the posterior distribution
of each idea point: a group effect and an individual effect. Here, the group effect can
be seen as a shared prior on the latent variable that is common across members of
the same group. Then, the individual effect can be seen as a noise component that
108
is separate from the group effect. Using the Dirichlet process approach allows the
individual effect to be modeled as conditionally independent from the group effect,
given the specification of the model. While it is not possible to directly estimate these
two effects due to the rotational invariance that is inherent in latent variable models,
post-processing procedures can be used to estimate the two effects given a specific
rotation of the latent structural parameters.
A final consideration for the latent variable generating process is to examine the CRP
hyperparameter, β. This parameter controls how likely it is for each observation to
dictate a new cluster. When β is small, the a priori likelihood that an observation in
cluster g finds a new unique cluster decreases. On the other hand, when β is large,
clusters will have lower overall membership and be less “stable” when estimated.
Finding the appropriate value for β is key for estimation. Escobar and West (1995)
shows that β follows a gamma distribution and a conditional posterior can be defined
as:
P (β|−) ∼ Gamma(1 + C+, 1 + γclog(N)) (3.25)
where C+ is the number of active clusters and γc is Euler’s constant.
3.4.3 Estimation of the C-BPIRT Model for Binary Outcomes
Using the theory above, a roll call scaling procedure utilizing sparsity inducing beta
process priors for measuring the dimensionality of the space and Dirichlet process
priors on the latent variables is derived. Let X be a continuous latent mapping of
the observed roll call votes Y such that:
xij ∼

T N−∞,0((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yij = 0
T N 0,∞((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yij = 1
N ((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yij is missing
(3.26)
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FIGURE 3.2. Graphical Representation of C-BPIRT
yi
ωi Λ
gi
g∗i
µgΣg
βH
R a
b
α
N observations
G+ 1 groups
where T N l,u(µ, σ2) is the truncated normal distribution truncated between l and u.
Placing the IBP prior on the loadings as in McAlister (2018), a Dirichlet process prior
on Ω, and standard conjugate priors on the other parameters completes the full model
specification. Figure 3.2 shows a graphical representation of the C-BPIRT model.5
Due to the conjugacy between the Dirichlet Process prior/ideal points and Indian
Buffet Process prior/factor loadings, Gibbs sampling can be used to estimate the
joint posterior of all parameters in the C-BPIRT model. Gibbs sampling steps are
given in Appendix A.
This model has many of the same features as the basic factor analysis model. The
manifest variables are decomposed into the loadings matrix, Λ, and the latent vari-
5In contrast to McAlister (2018), this paper uses a slightly modified finite variant of the Indian
Buffet Process. Details on this approach can be found in Paisley and Carin (2009). The major dif-
ference between these approaches regards the posterior over R. Rather than defining a full posterior
over R, a lower bound is found on K+ and the maximum a posteriori arrangement of zeros and ones
in R is found. This approach compares favorably to the full IBP specification and there is little
reason to believe that it produces substantively different results (Doshi et al., 2009).
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ables, Ω. The dimensions of the latent variables are assumed to be orthogonal.
Marginally, P (xi + α) ∼ NK+(0,Λ′Λ + IK). The new additions, however, pro-
vide interesting properties for the factor analysis procedure. First, the addition of
the infinite binary matrix, R, allows learning about the true number of latent dimen-
sions within the manifest data. R represents whether feature k ∈ (1, ...,∞) is a
meaningful summary of the data. Similarly, the CRP prior on Ω sorts the latent vari-
ables into meaningful groups, allowing simultaneous estimation of latent groupings
with corresponding location and spread information. In contrast to simply clustering
the data, this model grants the desirable properties of knowing latent groups while
also having the same continuous measure properties that make factor analysis an
attractive approach to estimating a latent space.
A problem that is common to all ideal point specification is that the estimates for
the structural parameters are not uniquely identified without further constraints -
identical estimates of Ω can be achieved by multiplying Λ by an orthonormal matrix,
M , such that MM ′ = IP . Following a common convention to ensure identifiability,
many implementations of Bayesian factor analysis assume that Λ has a full-rank lower
triangular structure with positive elements on the diagonal (Geweke and Zhou, 1996).
The spirit of this recommendation relies on the notion that structural zeroes can be
placed in the loadings matrix in accordance with theory. However, this is rarely
achievable as the theory behind a latent space, especially those with more than one
dimension, is difficult to put in terms of the loadings matrix. Similarly, the resulting
prior on Λ is no longer exchangeable. When these constraints are placed in an ad-hoc
manner, they can lead to significant multimodalities in the resulting posterior.
C-BPIRT places zero constraints by virtue of the Indian Buffet Process prior on the
loadings matrix. The properties of the IBP prior lead to a sparse solution for the
loadings matrix that requires that the number of non-zero elements for each dimen-
sion increases as each dimension is added. While this prior does not guarantee a
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uniquely identifiable rotation of the latent space, most applications of C-BPIRT re-
sult in unimodal posteriors for the loadings and ideal points, indicating that enough
zeros have been placed in the loadings matrix to uniquely identify a rotation. As
always, it is prudent to check the resulting posteriors for evidence of rotational re-
flections. Should these reflections arise, post-processing methods presented by Gruhl
et al. (2013) can be used.
A key quantity of interest using this model is the set of group assignments, gi ∈
(1, ..., G) ∀ (1, ..., N). As mentioned previously, inference on gi is difficult - when
estimated via MCMC, the model is only identifiable up to a permutation of the cluster
labels. From iteration to iteration in the Gibbs sampler, there is no guarantee that the
cluster labels are significant. However, the membership of the clusters is consistent.
Though there are numerous solutions to the label switching problem when the number
of clusters is known and fixed, the fact that the number of clusters is stochastic proves
problematic for these approaches. Thus, inference about group membership should
proceed examining the probability that two or more observations share the same
cluster. Using this information, many interesting techniques can be used to establish
cluster membership. An alternative method uses the cluster labels from the maximum
a posteriori iteration from the posterior Monte Carlo draws. While this approach loses
some of the information about posterior uncertainty around the cluster moments and
cluster membership, it allows for a simple sorting of observation into classes.
A final point is that the C-BPIRT model allows for estimation of a meaningful pos-
terior predictive interval on the ideal points given group membership. Specifically:
P (ωN+1|g∗N+1 = g ∈ G,Ω,G,µg,Σg) ∼ TK+,ng(ωN ; µˆg; Σˆg)P (ωN) (3.27)
Under the reasonable assumption that the prior on the new ideal point has an im-
proper uniform prior, the posterior predictive distribution on the new ideal point is
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simply a multivariate T distribution with location and scale equal to the mean of the
posterior distributions of the mean and variance of the group’s multivariate normal
cluster. Posterior predictive distributions are useful for examining new ideal points
and a common criticism of current roll call scaling methods is that new legislators
cannot be easily placed in the common space without strong prior assumptions about
their relative rankings compared to other legislators. Group membership, however, is
much easier to assign - new legislators are elected under a party label, so assigning
them to the group that is most commonly associated with that party would provide
reasonable predictions on their votes. Similarly, this approach can be used to think
of common group ideal points. Assuming that all members of a group share the same
underlying distribution over their ideal points, ideal points can be drawn from the
cluster distribution or all legislators in the group can be assumed to have a common
ideal point. Either choice can lead to interesting models that could not be achieved
using coll call scaling methods that assume independent and identically distributed
ideal points and errors.
3.5 Application to Roll Call Scaling in the U.S. Congress
I illustrate the benefits of C-BPIRT in two legislative voting settings. First, I explore
roll call voting in the 107th session (2001 - 2003) of the U.S. House. I use C-BPIRT
to uncover interesting group related voting, particularly regarding the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Second, I explore group dynamics in the 88th session
of the U.S. House (1963-1965). This session saw major civil rights and social welfare
reforms and is known, historically, as a session where parties splintered on these issues.
Each legislative setting explored features a situation where group dynamics beyond
party loyalty played a key role in dictating policy outcomes. Unlike standard roll call
scaling techniques that ignore these group dependencies, C-BPIRT allows for both
group and individual ideal point estimation and provides rich insight into the sets of
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votes and individuals that shape legislation through non-party coalition behavior.
Roll call scaling using C-BPIRT uses the set of all roll call votes and U.S. Representa-
tives for each session. Votes that were unanimous or nearly unanimous were excluded
(i.e. less than five voters in the minority). Similarly, legislators that cast a “Yea” or
“Nay” vote in less than 75% of the total roll calls were excluded from the analysis.
For each session, two chains of the MCMC procedure were run with a healthy burnin
of 10,000 iterations and 10,000 Monte Carlo samples were taken from the posterior
distribution. Across all chains, there were no apparent issues of convergence.
3.5.1 107th U.S. Congress
I begin by exploring roll call voting behavior in the 107th session of the U.S. House.
This session began in 2001 and ended in 2003. During this time, members of the
U.S. Congress dealt with a variety of pressing issues regarding the September 11th
attacks and the resulting war on terror. These issues ranged from funding of the war
efforts, security on domestic soil, immigration reform, and budget reform to ensure
that the resulting economic depression did not interrupt vital government services.
Along with issues of national security, the U.S. Congress also addressed the numerous
financial scandals in previous years and sought to address the relatively unfettered
power large corporations had in donating money to political campaigns. These two
issue areas defined much of the within and between party conflict of this session.
Legislative actions taken in this session generally followed party lines. Democrats had
a slim majority of the seats in this session and Republicans often sought to draw a
number of more conservative Democrats across the aisle to pass more conservative
legislation. However, finance reform and issues related to counterterrorism and the
war effort created strong cleavages in both parties. Given their slim majority, however,
Democrats controlled much of the roll call agenda and most votes that went to the
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floor resulted in Democrats voting along the party line. Republicans, on the other
hand, were often split in roll call votes - regardless of them being needed to create
a winning coalition, Republicans showed splits in voting on issues of defense and
financial reform.
Even with these complications, current roll call scaling methods like NOMINATE and
Bayesian ideal point estimation show that the 107th U.S. House is mostly described
by a one-dimensional ideal point model with a second dimension needed only on
a few votes (Carroll et al., 2009; Clinton et al., 2004). Beyond the simple count
of dimensions, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between necessity
of the second dimension in NOMINATE and the topic of the roll call vote. While
this is supported through generic classification quality metrics, the interpretation of
the 107th U.S. House granted by NOMINATE ideal points does not align with the
multifaceted and group driven narrative which actually drove this session of Congress.
McAlister (2018) finds that one aspect of this misalignment comes from inappropriate
testing of dimensionality. While NOMINATE finds that the 107th U.S. House was
largely one dimensional, McAlister (2018) finds strong evidence that there are many
dimensions which lead to roll call outcomes. While the first dimension shown by
BPIRT correlates heavily with the first dimension of NOMINATE ideal points, six
other meaningful dimensions are uncovered by the beta process priors on the latent
space. These six dimensions show votes where intraparty disagreement in roll call
votes occurs and are largely related to the issue sets that are known to have created
variation in roll call voting within parties - budgetary issues and topics related to the
September 11th attacks.
The analysis using BPIRT still suffers from the assumption that all errors, even in
many dimensions, are independent and identically distributed after accounting for
the individual ideal points. While the new dimensions are certainly informative to
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FIGURE 3.3. Ideal point estimates from NOMINATE and C-BPIRT for the
107th U.S. House.
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complexity in the roll call votes, there is still evidence of correlated errors due to
shared party incentives. This can be seen most clearly in the estimates that make
up the first dimension of roll call voting as they appear to simply map a notion
of party loyalty (Lee, 2009) and shows a strong separation between parties. While
some literature argues that this is simply a feature of legislative preferences (Cox and
Poole, 2002; Krehbiel, 1992), modern literature on Congressional voting shows that
this feature of the first dimension is an artifact of group correlations (Aldrich et al.,
2014; Ramey, 2016). In an ideal scenario, groups would be mapped to a discrete
measure in the ideal point space and variations in voting beyond groups would be
mapped to the continuous latent space.
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C-BPIRT offers an alternative to NOMINATE and BPIRT that accounts for these
correlations and, theoretically, maps the party loyalty of a voter to a discrete measure.
In turn, this procedure creates conditionally exchangeable errors that are more in
line with the necessary independent and identically distributed assumption that is
baked into roll call scaling procedures. C-BPIRT also provides many useful pieces of
information about what group dynamics exist in the legislature and how they influence
roll call voting outcomes. Applying C-BPIRT to the 107th U.S. House and comparing
its results to those attained from NOMINATE and BPIRT should demonstrate how
accounting for group voting changes interpretations ideal point estimates and provides
new insights into legislative voting behavior.
Roll call scaling using C-BPIRT produces three substantively interesting sets of es-
timates: 1) multivariate T groupings in the ideal point space and the corresponding
means and covariances, 2) the number of dimensions and the votes that load on each
dimension, and 3) individual legislator ideal points. For the 107th U.S. House, this
information can be seen in Figure 3.3. C-BPIRT scaling on the 107th U.S. House re-
veals three distinct voting groups: Democrats, Republicans, and a set of 38 Moderate
Republicans. These voting groups strictly follow party lines with no crossover be-
tween parties. A map of U.S. House districts and the corresponding group uncovered
by C-BPIRT is shown in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.4 shows that the group of Moderate
Republicans is not a surprising finding; the members of the 107th U.S. house in this
group generally represent Republican districts in New England. Defined by more lib-
eral views on social issues and a commitment to social welfare programs, this group
of Republican representatives is well known in U.S. legislative history and has long
played the part of a pivotal group in determining landmark legislative outcomes (Lee,
2009; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984).
In contrast to NOMINATE’s 1-2 dimensional space and BPIRT’s 7 dimensional space,
C-BPIRT uncovers three dimensions. These dimensions generally correlate to three
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areas: an overall ideology dimension, similar to NOMINATE’s first dimension, a
dimension that includes votes on the budget and other financial issues, and a dimen-
sion related to votes on defense spending and counterterrorism in response to the 9/11
attacks. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the relationship between groups and uncovered di-
mensions and shows that dimensions emerge as a combination of two scenarios. First,
a dimension emerges when a distinct voting coalition needs to be modeled. The first
dimension corresponds to votes where the moderate Republican cluster votes with the
Republican cluster and against the Democrat cluster. On the other hand, the budget
dimension corresponds to votes where the Moderate Republicans coalesce with the
Democrats. The defense dimension shows the second scenario - dimensions emerge
when clustered voting does not seem to model voting outcomes. In other words,
the defense dimension includes a set of votes where assuming similar voting within
clusters provides a poor model of roll call voting outcomes.
In many ways, this behavior is in line with the party driven roll call scaling approaches
of Ramey (2016) and Aldrich et al. (2014) and the numerous theories of party orga-
nization in U.S. legislative voting (Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Rohde, 2000; Rohde,
2010). While NOMINATE and BPIRT scores assume that all individuals compute
the utility calculus for each vote independent of one another, C-BPIRT assumes that
there is some shared component to these utility computations. C-BPIRT leads to a
representation of the policy space uncovered by roll call scaling and ideal point esti-
mates that are more in line with modern conceptions of the many influences which
drive legislative voting.
A first important difference between the estimates of independent and identically
distributed ideal points and C-BPIRT is the structure of the first dimension. Unlike
NOMINATE and BPIRT, C-BPIRT estimate that not all votes load on the first
dimension; of the 645 roll call votes scaled in this session, only 438 load on the
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FIGURE 3.5. Comparison of first dimension ideal point estimates from NOM-
INATE, BPIRT, and C-BPIRT for the 107th U.S. House
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first dimension. This aspect of C-BPIRT’s ideal points can be attributed to the
grouped estimation. Since much of the party line voting is included in the estimates
of the discrete grouping measure, a vote only loads on a dimension when there is
additional variation that is unexplained solely by group voting. Put another way, the
first dimension attained from C-BPIRT models votes where the votes of Moderate
Republicans align with those from the Republican cluster and are opposite of those
in the Democrat cluster.
The effect of clustering can be seen in the shape and distribution of the first dimension
ideal points. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of ideal points broken out by party
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label on the first dimension as estimated by NOMINATE, BPIRT, and C-BPIRT.
The first dimension of NOMINATE and BPIRT ideal points show a distinct division
between Republican and Democrat voting. C-BPIRT, on the other hand, shows more
crossover between the two parties. Looking at the bottom panel, it is clear that this
is due to C-BPIRT’s discovery that there exists a group of moderate Republicans.
This difference between the main Republican cluster and the Moderate Republicans
manifests in different ways across the models. The left panel of Figure 3.3 shows
NOMINATE scores colored by the group estimated by C-BPIRT and demonstrates
that the first dimension situates on votes that have party line voting while the second
dimension gets the disagreement within the Republican party. BPIRT behaves in a
similar way, but attributes these differences to multiple dimensions. C-BPIRT finds
that Moderate Republicans cluster votes similarly across many different votes and
ensures that their ideal points are close in all cases.
A key point is that breaking the ideal points into groups creates conditional exchange-
ability of errors and leads to better estimates of the structural parameters. While it
is difficult to show which scaling method produces the best estimates, the residuals
for each model can be examined to see if they better fit the independence of errors
assumption that underlies all of the scaling procedures. To accomplish this, I explore
239 roll call votes that C-BPIRT estimates are one-dimensional votes and use only
the first dimension of ideal points. I estimate the raw squared residuals for each indi-
vidual vote implied by the first dimension NOMINATE ideal points and the posterior
mean of the first dimension C-BPIRT ideal points.6
Figure 3.6 shows NOMINATE residuals compared to C-BPIRT residuals. Looking
at the average squared residual for all votes taken together, C-BPIRT and NOMI-
NATE perform similarly with C-BPIRT performing slightly better on votes where
6In this context, the raw squared residual is (yij−Φ−1((rjλj)ωi−αj))2. Results using deviance
residuals and studentized residuals yielded similar results.
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FIGURE 3.6. Comparison of squared residuals for 239 one dimensional votes
in the 107th U.S. House.
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NOMINATE struggles to accurately classify votes. A similar result is seen for the
Republican cluster. However, NOMINATE trades accuracy in the Moderate Repub-
lican cluster for better accuracy in the larger Democrat cluster; the residuals are not
independent of classification. C-BPIRT, however, corrects for this by allowing larger
residuals in the Democratic cluster and passing this accuracy to the Moderate Re-
publican cluster. In turn, this allows the residuals to uncorrelated with group labels
and lead to more reasonable ideal point arrangements.
A similar effect can be seen on the second dimension of the NOMINATE ideal points,
shown in Figure 3.3. The second dimension of NOMINATE correlates most heavily
with membership in the Moderate Republican cluster - lower scores on the second
dimension correlate with being a Moderate Republican. This implies that a vote that
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only used the second dimension would separate Democrats and Moderate Republicans
while splitting the main Republican cluster. However, this orientation is substantively
backwards. Members that are classified as Moderate Republicans in the 107th U.S.
House, such as Chris Shays (R,CT) and Judy Biggert (R,IL), were generally noted
for their more liberal positions on social policies and issues of financial reform. In
fact, much of the bipartisan legislation proposed in this session of the U.S. House
was sponsored by members within this cluster. Under a group interpretation of ideal
points, this would imply that there were some votes where a portion of Democrats
and Republicans cast the same vote while Moderate Republicans voted opposite the
Democrats and some portion of Republicans.
Examining the roll call record for this session reveals that this kind of voting never
happened. The closest that a specific roll call vote gets to this kind of coalition
occurs on a vote for an amendment to the Farm Bill and Rural Security Act of
2002 (Roll Call #364), where 35% of Democrats, 45% of Republicans, and 61%
of Moderate Republicans cast votes to approve the amendment. Aside from this
single vote, however, no other vote within this legislative session yielded a clear vote
where Republicans and Democrats coalesced against the preferences of the Moderate
Republicans. This sentiment is echoed by the dimensions uncovered by C-BPIRT - the
only meaningful coalitions were Republicans vs. Democrats and Democrats/Moderate
Republicans vs. Republicans. This result indicates that, on its own, the second
NOMINATE dimension has no meaningful interpretation and only serves as a pivot
to separate Moderate Republicans from Republicans on those votes which they voted
against the rest of the party.
C-BPIRT corrects for this result by ensuring that ideal points are meaningfully ar-
ranged in the ideal point space. One way to demonstrate this is to examine one
particularly important roll call vote in the 107th U.S. House. Following his 2000 Pres-
idential bid, John McCain led the U.S. Senate to pass a version of the Bipartisan
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TABLE 3.1. Votes on the Shays Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act presented during the 107th session of the U.S. House
Yes No
Democrats 200 10
Republicans 38 177
(a) By Party
Yes No
Democrats 200 10
Republicans 10 171
Moderate Republicans 28 6
(b) By C-BPIRT Group
Campaign Finance Reform Act, frequently known as the McCain-Feingold act. This
bill, written as a way to limit the influence of corporations in political campaigns, was
designed by Chris Shays (R,CT) and Marty Meehan (D,MA) of the U.S. House and
John McCain (R,AZ) and Russ Feingold (D, WI). Since the legislation was crafted
by a bipartisan group, it was expected to have support from Moderate Republicans
in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate. This support was critical for passage in the U.S.
Senate as the Democrats did not have 60 votes to invoke cloture on debate. Ulti-
mately, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 passed both chambers and was
signed into law.
A critical vote that occurred in the U.S. House regarded the Shays Amendment to the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (RC #527). This amendment sought to set further
limitations on soft money given to political parties. Though the vote was championed
by Chris Shays (R,CT), Republicans were not supportive of the amendment or the
bill, as a whole. Table 3.1 shows the raw counts of Yes and No votes by party and by
C-BPIRT groups. While party alone does not explain certain Republican support for
the amendment, C-BPIRT explains this support as a function of members clustering
with other Moderate Republicans.
Figure 3.7 shows the votes on this amendment as a function of ideal points estimated
by NOMINATE, BPIRT, and C-BPIRT grouped by C-BPIRT groups. For BPIRT
and C-BPIRT, this vote used ideal points on two dimensions: the first party line
dimension and a budget dimension. Both NOMINATE and BPIRT generally explain
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FIGURE 3.7. Ideal point estimates and roll call votes associated with the
Shays Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act presented during
the 107th session of the U.S. House.
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Note: For BPIRT and C-BPIRT, this vote was associated with only two dimensions:
the overall first dimension and a dimension associated with votes related to the federal
budget and campaign finance reform. Dotted lines indicate points in the ideal point
space where a legislator would have a .5 probability of casting a “Yea” vote.
the vote in the same way - the cutline between Yes and No is mostly controlled
by the first dimension and the point of indecision is within the set of Republican
representatives. In both cases, the members that are close to the cutline are Moderate
Republicans. Both methods, however, require some contribution from the second
dimension to fit the best cutline. For NOMINATE, this second dimension ranks
Moderate Republicans below Republicans and has Democrats spread across almost
all viable ideal point values. BPIRT ranks Democrats in the middle with Moderate
Republicans below Democrats and Republicans spread over the entire set of viable
values. Neither of these ideal point arrangements points to a particularly informative
ideal point space, especially for explaining votes on Shays amendment.
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C-BPIRT presents estimates that align with the theoretical arrangement of ideal
points that explain voting for campaign finance reform. On this vote, and other votes
that have similar voting patterns, there is a two dimensional ideal point space. The
first dimension accounts for party line voting while the second dimension accounts
for votes where Democrats and Moderate Republicans coalesce. Given knowledge
of how the series of votes regarding campaign finance reform played out in the U.S.
House, this arrangement fits the prior understanding of which legislators cast Yes and
No votes to shape the legislation. Unlike NOMINATE and BPIRT, C-BPIRT finds
an arrangement of ideal points and cutline that places Moderate Republicans with
Democrats while still explaining party line votes in a meaningful way.
The roll call vote on the Shays amendment can also be used to explore a model
where individual ideal points are irrelevant and only the group ideal points matter.
While C-BPIRT groups do not perfectly predict voting outcomes in this roll call
vote, Table 3.1 shows that groups alone do a pretty good job of explaining the vote
outcomes. This notion can be formalized by replacing the individual ideal points with
the distribution of ideal points implied by the cluster moments and assuming that all
members in that cluster vote in accordance with that ideal point distribution. Using
C-BPIRT estimated factor loadings for this roll call vote, I used a post-processing
procedure to simulate from the posterior predictive distribution of probabilities for
casting a Yes vote on the Shays amendment assuming only group label is known. This
simulation seeks to assess how well using only the group distribution of ideal points
explains the roll call vote outcome.
Figure 3.8 shows the resulting distribution of probabilities that a member from each
cluster casts a Yes vote in support of the the Shays amendment. Each density can
be interpreted as a distribution over probabilities that a single voter casts a Yes
vote given only their group label. Under this group model, the vote distributions
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FIGURE 3.8. Posterior predictive probability distribution that a new legislator
casts a “Yea” vote to approve the Shays amendment to the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act in the 107th session of the U.S. House given only a C-BPIRT
group label.
Democrat Moderate Republican Republican
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0
3
6
9
Probability of Yes Vote
D
e
n
s
it
y
Probability of Vote Agreeing to Shays Amendment Given Group Label Only
Note: Posterior predictive probabilities were computed using 100,000 random samples
from the multivariate-T clusters using the maximum a posteriori cluster means and
variances. The true proportion of members in each cluster casting a “Yea” vote is also
reported.
TABLE 3.2. Expected number of Yes and No votes on Shays amendment to
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in the 107th session of the U.S. House
given only a C-BPIRT group label.
Yes No
Democrats 195.27 14.73
[188,202] [8,22]
Republicans 20.38 161.62
[12,29] [153,170]
Moderate Republicans 23.01 11.00
[18,28] [6,16]
Note: Brackets under each value show 95% credible intervals.
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TABLE 3.3. Proportion of Votes Correctly Classified and Geometric Mean
Probability of Correct Classification for all roll call votes in the 107th U.S.
House.
Correct Class GMP
NOMINATE 0.92 0.80
BPIRT 0.92 0.81
C-BPIRT 0.92 0.84
C-BPIRT Groups 0.89 0.82
Note: Results are presented for two dimensional NOMINATE ideal points, BPIRT ideal
points, C-BPIRT ideal points, and C-BPIRT votes conditional on groups alone.
generally align with those actually observed in Table 3.1 - Democrats are almost
100% likely to cast a Yes vote while Republicans are almost 100% likely to cast a
No vote. Moderate Republicans show more uncertainty with a posterior mean of .65
and spread over the entire unit interval. This echoes the fact that the cutline for
this vote went through the Moderate Republican cluster. Using these distributions,
Table 3.2 shows expected Yes and No counts for the roll call vote using the groups
only model. While there are some departures from the observed counts, this model
performs admirably and estimates vote counts that are generally close to the truth.
This finding is encouraging for one of the core benefits of C-BPIRT - group voting
matters in U.S. legislative voting and can often yield results that are similar to those
from more complicated ideal point models.
As a final point of comparison, I examine the ability of each roll call scaling model to
correctly classify vote outcomes. I compare the two dimensional NOMINATE model,
BPIRT with seven dimensions and corresponding binary matrix, C-BPIRT with three
dimensions and individual ideal points, and C-BPIRT with three dimensions and
group ideal points only using the posterior predictive ideal point distribution. For each
model, I compute the proportion of votes correctly classified and the geometric mean
of correct classification over all 426 representatives and 645 roll call votes analyzed.7
7The proportion of votes correctly classified finds the probability that each legislators’ vote is a
Yes given each models’ structural parameters. A prediction is considered correct if yij = 1 & P (yij =
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Table 3.3 shows the results of these comparisons. In terms of correct classification,
BPIRT, NOMINATE, and C-BPIRT perform similarly. C-BPIRT using groups only
yields a correct classification rate that is slightly lower, but performs admirably given
that any individual deviations from assigned groups is assumed to be baked into
the cluster moments. The geometric mean probability of correct classification shows
similar results. However, a surprising result is that the groups only model outperforms
NOMINATE and BPIRT. This speaks to the importance that group dynamics played
in the legislative voting during the 107th session of the U.S. House.
3.5.2 88th U.S. Congress
The 88th U.S. Congress took place between 1963 and 1965. This session of Congress
is often noted as one of the most important sessions due to the amount of landmark
legislation that was considered and ultimately approved during this session. Over the
course of these two years, major reforms to the U.S. social welfare system were made,
including the Food Stamps Act of 1964, which crafted the modern social welfare
system that still exists in the U.S. today. Along with social welfare issues, the 88th
U.S. Congress saw passage of two important civil rights acts, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which established a number of important
laws that ensured equal rights and access to U.S. citizens, regardless of race. These
bills are often seen as an important turning point in the U.S. Civil Rights movement
of the 1950s and 1960s.
Beyond the importance of the legislation considered in this sessions, the 88th U.S.
Congress saw a significant splintering of parties. Historically, four groups are known to
have existed and created voting coalitions within the Congressional session: Democrats,
1) > .5 or yij = 0 & P (yij = 1) < .5. The geometric mean of correct classification for the entire ses-
sion exp
[
1
NP
N∑
i=1
P∑
j=1
yij log(P (yij = 1)) + (1− yij) log(1− P (yij = 1))
]
. This metric rewards mod-
els where incorrect classification is accompanied by probabilities closer to .5.
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Republicans, Southern Democrats, and New England Republicans. Like other ses-
sions in the 20th century, all members were elected under either Democrat or Re-
publican party membership. However, divides within each party existed. Southern
Democrats were Democrats elected from the the southern United States that held
strong views on racial equality and social welfare programs. While they did caucus
with the Democrats, there were a number of issues where Southern Democrats split
with the main Democratic party and cast votes that were against the party desires.
This cleavage was particularly important to civil rights legislation, as Democrats
supported sweeping reforms to the law which established equal rights regardless of
race. New England Republicans were also an important group. More liberal on many
issues than their Republican counterparts (and often the Democrats), New England
Republicans supported sweeping civil rights changes to ensure equality for all and pro-
grams that ensured that all Americans received government assistance, when needed.
However, they were largely anti-Socialist and wanted to design programs that ran
efficiently and supported large tax hikes to prioritize a balanced budget.
The 88th U.S. House is well-known among legislative scholars as a session where group
dynamics outweighed individual voting preferences. Poole and Rosenthal (1987)
demonstrates that the NOMINATE model performs better than a party/group driven
model in all U.S. House sessions other than the 88th U.S. House - there is strong
evidence that simply modeling parties as cohesive units performs better than the
standard two dimensional NOMINATE model. I argue that this finding is partially
true, but the failure of NOMINATE comes from assuming that all errors are indepen-
dent and identically distributed without taking group membership into account and
assuming only two groups. Using C-BPIRT, I show that there is substantial varia-
tion across parties and individuals and that continuous ideal point measures provide
information that would not be attainable simply from looking at party label.
As a starting point, Figure 3.9 shows the estimates of ideal points, groups, and dimen-
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FIGURE 3.9. Ideal Points and Dimensions estimated by C-BPIRT for the 88th
session of the U.S. House.
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Note: Individual ideal points are plotted with group labels and cluster densities
associated with the highest complete data likelihood iteration of the MCMC procedure.
sion uncovered by C-BPIRT for the 88th U.S. House. C-BPIRT uncovers four groups
that align with historical expectations: Democrats, Republicans, New England Re-
publicans, and Southern Democrats. As shown in Figure 3.10, these groups have a
strong correlation with geography in the U.S. As shown previously, C-BPIRT group
discovery requires finding groups and dimensions where there are unique overall ar-
rangements of votes. To this end, C-BPIRT discovers five dimensions of voting in the
88th U.S. House. As with the 107th U.S. House, C-BPIRT dimensions are more sparse
than their BPIRT counterparts - the first dimension, domestic spending, loads on 134
of the 190 roll call votes analyzed in contrast to 100% of votes loading on the first
dimension in BPIRT. C-BPIRT uncovers four other dimensions - Racial/Civil Rights,
Social Welfare, Foreign Spending, and Taxes. Each of the five dimensions uncovered
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FIGURE 3.11. Two Dimensional NOMINATE Ideal Points for the 88th U.S.
House.
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Note: Points are divided by party and groups uncovered by C-BPIRT.
by C-BPIRT correspond to different legislative coalition combinations. For example,
the Racial/Civil Rights dimensions shows votes where New England Republicans and
Democrats opposed Southern Democrats and Republicans were split. In another case,
the tax dimension pits the low tax desires of the Democrats, Republicans, and South-
ern Democrats against the higher tax preferences by New England Republicans. The
domestic spending dimension corresponds more closely to a continuous dimensions,
having a loose notion of coalitional structure, but still showing significant variation
within clusters. These ideal points demonstrate a dimension where individual varia-
tion is important. The consistency of dimensions with coalitions aids in interpretation
of dimensions and ensures that ideal points align in meaningful ways.
Figure 3.9 demonstrates the importance of groups in determining roll call outcomes
in the 88th U.S. House. While the explicit clustering is unique to C-BPIRT, these
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groups are discussed and shown in roll call analysis using NOMINATE. Figure 3.11
shows two dimensional NOMINATE ideal points for the 88th U.S. House. The first
dimension of NOMINATE ideal point estimates is generally separated by party label
- all Democrats, regardless of membership in the Southern Democratic coalition,
are to the left of Republicans. The second dimension of NOMINATE ideal points
corresponds to roll call votes corresponding to Racial/Civil Rights and the parties
share similar structures; New England Republicans support civil rights legislation
more than the bulk of Democrats and Republicans while Southern Democrats oppose
civil rights legislation en masse. While the second dimension of NOMINATE closely
aligns with the Racial/Civil Rights dimension from C-BPIRT, the first dimension
seems to correspond most closely to the domestic spending dimension. However, the
interpretation of the first dimension from NOMINATE ideal point estimation differs
- the first dimension accounts for the largest portion of variation in roll call voting
across all votes.
This interpretation is problematic when considering that the first dimension of NOM-
INATE is often interpreted as member ideology not including preferences on civil
rights. In words, NOMINATE scores imply that Democrats are more liberal than
the roughly equivalent Southern Democrats and New England Republicans which are
more liberal than the Republicans. This orientation of ideal points implied by NOMI-
NATE has two problems: 1) Southern Democrats and New England Republicans have
roughly equivalent voting records outside of racial issues and 2) Southern Democrats
were moderate on some set of issues. Neither of these points fit with the historical
view of Southern Democrats.
To explore the idea implied by NOMINATE that Southern Democrats and New Eng-
land Republicans cast similar votes on a number of issues, I analyze the probability
that a representative from each C-BPIRT group casts the same roll call vote across
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TABLE 3.4. Probability of same vote cast on a roll call vote for each C-BPIRT
group.
Dems. NE Reps. Reps. South Dems.
Dems. .87 .53 .33 .55
NE Reps. .53 .76 .67 .33
Reps. .33 .67 .77 .55
South Dems. .55 .33 .55 .71
(a) All Votes
Dems. NE Reps. Reps. South Dems.
Dems. .80 .51 .45 .51
NE Reps. .53 .98 .88 .04
Reps. .45 .88 .82 .15
South Dems. .51 .04 .15 .93
(b) Votes on Civil Rights
Dems. NE Reps. Reps. South Dems.
Dems. .84 .52 .33 .58
NE Reps. .52 .77 .67 .35
Reps. .33 .67 .75 .55
South Dems. .58 .35 .55 .69
(c) All Votes, No Civil Rights
Note: Votes are broken out in three ways: 1) All 190 roll call votes, 2) 18 roll call
votes on civil rights, 3) 172 Votes on non-civil rights issues. Vote classifications were
retrieved from the Policy Agenda Project (Adler and Wilkerson, 2006).
votes as both those within the same group and those from other groups. Along with
aggregate probabilities, I also find the probability that they share common votes on
Civil Rights votes and non-Civil rights votes. Probabilities from this analysis can be
seen in Table 3.4. From this analysis, it is clear that there is very little evidence for
Southern Democrats and New England Republicans to share similar ideal points on
an aggregate ideology dimension. For all votes, New England Republicans and South-
ern Democrats cast the same vote the same proportion of times that Republicans and
Democrats cast the same vote. As the goal of roll call scaling to place like voting
patterns in similar locations of the latent space, placing Southern Democrats and New
England Republicans together is just as bad as placing Democrats and Republicans
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in the same location. Removing the 18 votes on civil rights from the analysis yields a
similar conclusion. This examination shows that there is no meaningful way that the
first dimension of ideal points can be twisted to make them align in a meaningful way.
This further shows the inappropriateness of using the first dimension of NOMINATE
scores as a substitute for legislator ideology.8
Beyond placing New England Republicans and Southern Democrats in the same
place on the first dimension, NOMINATE implies that Southern Democrats rep-
resent a moderate group, outside of racial issues. Aside from the domestic spending
dimension, which shows no clear group divides across all groups, Figure 3.9 shows
no evidence that Southern Democrats had ideal points that are in the middle on
any issue set. On foreign spending, Southern Democrats represent a policy position
that strongly opposes defense and foreign investment - more extreme than Democrats
and New England Republicans. On welfare issues, their position is similar to that of
Democrats. Finally, on taxation issues, they exhibit preferences similar to those seen
by Republicans and Democrats. Given that there is no clear place where the Southern
Democrats represent a moderate policy position, NOMINATE provides a misleading
characterization of Southern Democrat preferences. The implied moderate position
can be chalked up to overaggregation and Simpson’s paradox. Since the vast majority
of legislators are in the Democrat or Republican cluster (289 out of 395 legislators, to
be exact), NOMINATE weights its ideal point orientation around these major groups.
Since the Southern Democrat cluster mixes being more liberal and more conservative
than the Democrats on each distinct issue set, the average comes out towards the
middle when the truth is that Southern Democrats represented an extreme group in
the U.S. House session. C-BPIRT avoids this issue by modeling groups first, then
ideal points. This ensures that the orientation of ideal points is consistent with the
group model when groups are an important part of the voting calculus.
8See Lee (2009) and Aldrich et al. (2014) for further discussion of why this is a really bad practice.
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The 88th U.S. House shows a case where accounting for group similarities provides
ideal point estimates that are more consistent with the truth than the independent and
identically distributed counterparts. The group dynamics that dominate the voting
in this session come to the forefront and provide consistent ideal point estimates
that make sense in the historical context. Unlike NOMINATE, C-BPIRT requires
no postprocessing or stringent a priori assumptions that the legislators belong to
specific groups. This aspect of C-BPIRT demonstrates promise as an estimation
approach that provides a richer and more consistent view of historical roll call voting
for explorations of U.S. legislative voting behavior.
3.6 Conclusion
In this article, I derive and show how to implement an ideal point estimation proce-
dure that allows for Bayesian nonparametric estimation of both issue dimensions and
group-consistent ideal points from roll call voting records. I show the importance of
this model from both a formal perspective regarding lack of independence in errors
and from a historical perspective by analyzing the 107th and the 88th sessions of the
U.S. House. I show that C-BPIRT can uncover substantively meaningful group voting
behavior that is ignored by NOMINATE and BPIRT. I also show that NOMINATE
recovers ideal point orientations that do not align with historical or observational
evidence for how voting groups actually chose to vote in each of these sessions. The
results provided by C-BPIRT show that meaningful dimensions and groups can be
extracted from roll call vote data sets without trading off accuracy for interpretability.
Extensions to the C-BPIRT model exist that can provide even richer inference about
group voting in the U.S. Congress. First, C-BPIRT assumes that each session of the
U.S. Congress is independent of those that occur before and after. This assumption
is generally incorrect since there is, historically, relatively low turnover for members
137
of Congress between sessions. Since voting behavior is unlikely to change session
to session, time-varying dynamic models of ideal points will certainly improve model
accuracy and provide more consistent insights about legislative voting behavior. Aside
from the ideal points, themselves, information can be shared about issue dimensions
and groups across Congresses to provide a picture of how Congressional issue sets
and voting coalitions evolve over time. Novel advances in tree-based priors in the
Bayesian nonparametric literature provide a route for this dynamic model. Second,
there are numerous covariates which correlate with group membership apart from raw
roll call voting records. Including these covariates in the group estimation procedure
would provide opportunities to model relationships between donor records, legislative
speech, etc. and voting while also assuming that these actions occur with group
incentives in mind. Finally, this model represents an empirical analogue to work in
social choice theory about group preference aggregation and outcomes. Given that
the U.S. Congress is unique in its combination of group incentives and individual
policy incentives due to varied constituent preferences, C-BPIRT can be extended to
uncover ideal points that include constituent preferences and estimate the impact of
these preferences of roll call voting outcomes.
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A Gibbs Sampling for C-BPIRT
Estimation using Gibbs sampling proceeds in the following way:
1. Sample the latent variable, X. For each i ∈ (1, ..., N) and j ∈ (1, ..., P ),
sample xi,j from a truncated normal distribution according to:
xi,j ∼

T N−∞,0((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yi,j = 0
T N 0,∞((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yi,j = 1
N ((rj  λj)ωi − αj, 1) if yi,j is missing
(3.28)
2. Sample R and Λ jointly.9 Define K+ as the current number of active features.
For each j ∈ (1, ..., P ) and k ∈ (1, ..., K+) define:
tj,k =
P (rj,k = 1|Y ,−)
P (rj,k = 0|Y ,−)
=
P (Y |rj,k = 1,−)
P (Y |rj,k = 0,−)
P (rj,k = 1)
P (rj,k = 0)
(3.29)
P (Y |rj,k = 1,−)
P (Y |rj,k = 0,−) =
√
γk
γ
exp
(
1
2
γµ2
)
(3.30)
P (rj,k = 1)
P (rj,k = 0)
=
m−j,k
p−m−j,k + 1 (3.31)
where γ = ω′kωk + γk, µ =
1
γ
ω′kEˆj, Eˆj = xj − (rj  λj)Ω + αj setting λj,k = 0,
and m−j,k = −rj,k +
p∑
h=1
rh,k. Let
pr=1 =
tj,k
1 + tj,k
9See Paisley and Carin (2009) for more info on the details of this step. For the purposes of roll
call scaling, the number of dimensions is expected to be low and much less than 100. As such, I
choose to set the initial number of dimensions to 100. This gets the correct number of dimensions
in simulations.
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then sample P (rj,k|−) ∼ Bern(pr=1). If rj,k = 1, then sample P (λj,k|−) ∼
N (µ, γ−1). Otherwise, set λj,k = 0.
3. Sample Ω. For each i ∈ (1, ..., N), let µi be a K+-column vector including
the cluster means for gi and Σi a K
+ × K+ diagonal covariance matrix with
the variances for gi. Sample ωi from:
ωi|− ∼ NK+(mi, Vi) (3.32)
where:
Vi =
(
Λ′Λ + Σ−1i
)−1
mi = Vi
(
Λ′(xi +α) + µ′iΣ
−1
i
)
4. Remove Inactive Features, Normalize Λ and Ω. For each k ∈ (1, ..., K+),
if rj,k = 0 ∀ (1, ..., P ), remove k from the analysis. Recalculate K+.
Post-process Λ to normalize the variance. For each j ∈ (1, ..., P ) and k ∈
(1, ..., K+) set λj,k:
λj,k =
λj,k√
1 +
K+∑
h=1
λ2j,h
(3.33)
Post process Ω to normalize location and variance. For each k ∈ 1 ≤ k ≤ K+,
set ωi,k:
ωk =
ωk − ω¯k
sd(ωk)
(3.34)
5. Sample Latent Groups, G. At each iteration, let G+ be the current set of
active clusters. Shuffle the order of observations. For each i ∈ (1, ..., N), find
the probability that ωi ∈ g ∀ (1, ..., G+). For each existing cluster, calculate
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P (gi = g|ω−i,g) where:
P (gi = g|g−i) ∝
∫
ωi
∫
µg
∫
Σg
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi−α,IP )TK+;2αg
(
µg,
βg(κg + 1)
αgκg
)
dωi
(3.35)
One method of solution is outlined in 3.4.2.
Determine the probability that observation i belongs in a new cluster:
P (gi = gnew) ∝
∞∫
−∞
Np(xi ; (ΛR)ωi −α,IP )Nk(ωi; 0,IK+)dωi (3.36)
This method is also outlined in 3.4.2.
Draw gi from:
P (gi|−) ∼ Cat(nhP (gi = h|g−i) ∀ h ∈ (1, ..., G+) , βP (gi = gnew)) (3.37)
If gi = gnew, update G
+ and include the new cluster in proceeding iterations.
If there are zero observations in an existing group, update G+ and remove that
cluster from the analysis.
6. Sample β. Sample β from:
β|− ∼ Gamma(G+, γc log(N)) (3.38)
where γc is Euler’s number.
7. Sample µg and Σg for all clusters. For each cluster g ∈ (1, ..., G+), sample
the mean, µg, and covariance, Σg, for each Gaussian cluster. Σg is assumed to
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be a diagonal covariance matrix. Let Ωg be the collection of latent variables
that are currently placed in cluster g. For each k ∈ (1, ..., K+), draw:
µg,k ∼ T2αg
(
ω¯g,k,
βg
αgκg
)
(3.39)
Σg,k ∼ IG(αg, βg) (3.40)
8. Sample Item Level Intercepts, α. For each j ∈ (1, ...p), sample the item
level intercept from:
P (αj|−) ∼ N
(
µ¯j,
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(µi,j − µ¯j)2
)
(3.41)
where µi,j = λ
′
jωi − xi,j and µ¯j = 1N
N∑
i=1
µi,j.
9. Sample Factor Precisions, γk. For each k ∈ 1 ≤ k ≤ K+, sample γk from:
P (γk|−) ∼ Gamma
(
c+
mk
2
, d+
p∑
j=1
λ2j,k
)
(3.42)
where mk is the number of sources for which feature k is active.
10. Sample d. Sample d from:
d|− ∼ Gamma
(
c0 + cK
+, d0 +
K+∑
k=1
γk
)
(3.43)
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CHAPTER IV
Interval Estimation on the Marginal Likelihood
4.1 Introduction
Model selection is an important step for statistical modeling, particularly in the so-
cial sciences. Often, models are derived from theories that are developed leveraging
previous research and other information gathered in the scientific process (Raftery,
1995). The goal of the model selection step is to determine which of a number of
possible candidate models best fit the data. While many information criteria and fit
statistics exist for this task, they are rife with weaknesses and frequently lead to over-
fit or underfit models due to improper handling of uncertainty about the locations of
model parameters (Raftery, 1995; Gelman et al., 2014).
The Bayesian approach to model comparison presents a model selection criteria that
inherently accounts for model complexity due to the introduction of priors - inte-
grating the joint posterior distribution over the priors gives a measure of the model
evidence. This metric of model evidence, called the marginal likelihood, represents
the probability that the data was generated under the specified model taking into ac-
count the prior information. Under relatively accurate priors or with large amounts
of data, comparing marginal likelihoods across models accurately selects the cor-
rect model in many cases where other fit statistics do not (Zellner, 1971; Fong and
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Holmes, 2019). Since many models used in the social sciences have meaningful and
widely used Bayesian versions, model comparison via the marginal likelihood is a
routine that will accurately distinguish between and select the best models and their
corresponding underlying theories.1
A problem that arises is that an analytical expression for the marginal likelihood
can only be derived for a small number of restrictive examples. While methods ex-
ist for taking samples from an posterior distribution when analytic evaluation of the
marginal likelihood is intractable, explicit computation of the marginal likelihood is
often seen as a secondary task and other methods for assessing overall model fit are
used.2 In spite of the benefits that marginal likelihoods bring to model compari-
son, the desire to use other criteria stems from the computational burden required to
compute the marginal likelihood using Monte Carlo draws from the joint posterior dis-
tribution. When the chosen model has a simple sampling scheme, the gold-standard
Candidate’s estimator can be used to compute the marginal likelihood to an arbitrary
desired accuracy (Chib, 1995; Chib and Jeliazkov, 2001). However, the Candidate’s
estimator is not easily computed for most models of interest.
To overcome the computational problem, several Monte Carlo sampling methods have
been proposed to approximate the marginal likelihood (Hammersley and Handscomb,
1964; Raftery and Banfield, 1991; Gamerman and Lopes, 2006; Newton and Raftery,
1Bayesian model selection typically falls into two classes: model averaging and best model se-
lection (Zellner, 1971). The model averaging approach uses the marginal likelihood to derive a
probability distribution over all candidate models and averages the parameters values using these
posterior probabilities. On the other hand, best model selection seeks to find the best model over a
set of candidate models - the model with the highest marginal likelihood is selected. In this paper,
I present methods for assessing the marginal likelihood with the goal of choosing a single best fit
model. However, the marginal likelihood estimation approaches outlined are applicable to the model
averaging approach with minor changes.
2Samples from a joint posterior distribution can be taken in a variety of ways that have been
studied and discussed extensively. See Betancourt (2017) for an excellent overview of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo, sequential Monte Carlo, and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo methods. Information criteria
are often used as substitutes for the marginal likelihood and assess both within model and predictive
ability. See Gelman et al. (2014) for an overview of existing information criteria.
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1994; Meng and Wong, 1996; Gronau et al., 2017). Theoretically, Monte Carlo ap-
proaches seek to find a point estimate to the marginal likelihood where the asymptotic
variance of the estimator disappears as the number of samples taken from the pos-
terior distribution approaches infinity. The bridge sampling estimator of Meng and
Wong (1996) and Gronau et al. (2017) represents a state of the art application of this
approach. Monte carlo estimators have a general “one-size-fits-all” computational
recipe, but require specifying a distribution with known form that approximates the
observed joint posterior. While these approaches sometimes compare favorably to the
Candidate’s estimator, work has shown that point estimates of the marginal likelihood
from Monte Carlo approaches suffer when the posterior is not approximately normal
and the approximation does not match the high density points of the posterior. This
is of particular concern since the quality of the point estimates depend on assump-
tions of asymptotic consistency and negligible approximation error (Meng and Wong,
1996; Gelman and Meng, 1998). Algorithms have been proposed to normalize pos-
terior draws via warping, but these approaches are often even more computationally
expensive than estimation via the Candidate’s estimator (Wang and Meng, 2016).
Another approach that attempts to solve the marginal likelihood problem is varia-
tional Bayesian inference, which seeks to find an approximation of a convenient form
to the true joint posterior that maximizes the evidence lower bound on the marginal
likelihood (Jordan et al., 1999; Jordan, 2004). Typically, this approach is used to
estimate a posterior using a Bayesian expectation maximization approach, but ev-
idence lower bound is often used as a proxy for the marginal likelihood. However,
model comparison using this quantity alone unfairly favors models that have low
posterior variance (Che´rief-Abdellatif, 2019). Ji et al. (2010) propose a correspond-
ing evidence upper bound that leverages Monte Carlo sampling and demonstrates
that the two quantities sandwich the true marginal likelihood. The interval implied
by this inequality shares many of the same theoretical underpinnings as the Monte
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Carlo approaches to estimating the marginal likelihood (Pradier et al., 2019; Dieng
et al., 2017). Unlike Monte Carlo approaches, variational bounds make no assump-
tions about approximation error, but no work has been done to show how the bounds
shrink as a function of approximation quality.
In this paper, I bridge the gap between variational methods of estimating the marginal
likelihood and Monte Carlo approaches. I show that the marginal likelihood can be
treated as a random variable and a posterior distribution with corresponding intervals
can be derived. These intervals share many of the same qualities as the Monte Carlo
estimators, but approximation error does not disappear as the number of posterior
samples approaches infinity. This allows the width of the intervals to adjust to the
quality of the approximation - good approximations have smaller intervals while bad
approximations result in less certainty about the location of the marginal likelihood.
The concepts of intervals on the marginal likelihood has been presented, but little
work has been done to compare the interval estimates to known marginal likelihoods
and have mostly been explored in the setting of variational minimization problems
(Grosse et al., 2015; Dieng et al., 2017; Pradier et al., 2019).
I derive two sets of intervals. The first set, called JSW bounds, directly leverage the
variational inequalities from Ji et al. (2010). In simulations where the true marginal
likelihood is known, I show that these inequalities consistently surround the true
marginal likelihood while the bridge sampling estimator is often incorrect. However,
JSW bounds are wide and cover the marginal likelihood 100% of the time. I show
that the interval implied by the evidence upper and lower bounds includes values that
cannot exist due to the relationship between forward and reverse Kullback-Leibler
divergences. I then propose a new inequality on the ratio of the forward and reverse
KL divergences that allows for a finer tuned interval on the marginal likelihood,
called kappa bounds. I derive a computationally efficient estimation procedure for
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these bounds and demonstrate that kappa bounds improve on JSW bounds and the
bridge sampling estimator. I show the flexibility and accuracy of kappa bounds in
both simulated and real-world data using both linear regression models and more
complicated ordered factor analysis models.
4.2 Computing the Marginal Likelihood
For a specified model with parameters θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θK} ∈ Θ and prior density,
pi(θ), a common goal in Bayesian inference is to learn a posterior distribution for
each of the parameters from observed data, X = {x1, x2, ..., xn}. By Bayes rule, the
posterior can be defined as:
P(θ|X ) = P(X|θ)pi(θ)P(X ) (4.1)
where P(X|θ) is the likelihood of the data given the model’s parameters. For ease
of exposition, P(X|θ)pi(θ) = P(X ,θ) is referred to as the complete data likelihood
which captures the combined likelihood of θ with respect to the data and the prior.
While P(θ|X ) can be difficult to estimate directly, various Monte Carlo methods can
be used to take a set of draws from the posterior.3
P(X ) is referred to as the marginal likelihood or model evidence and dictates the
probability that the data is observed conditional on the model parameters averaged
over the prior. The marginal likelihood is defined as:
P(X ) =
∫
Θ
P(X ,θ)dθ =
∫
Θ
P(X|θ)pi(θ)dθ (4.2)
The marginal likelihood can be seen as a measure of model fit and is frequently
3Throughout this paper, let P() refer to the density associated with the true posterior, let Q()
refer to the density associated with an approximation to the posterior, let pi() be a generic prior
density, and let P() refer to a generic probability function.
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used to choose a model that best fits the data across a variety of candidate models.
Recent research has also shown that marginal likelihood are a limiting case for leave-
p-out and k-fold cross validation, showing that marginal likelihoods can supplant
the need for computationally intensive validation checks (Fong and Holmes, 2019).
For a number of simple problems, this integral can be evaluated analytically. How-
ever, the vast majority of interesting models require integration that is analytically
intractable. As such, computational integration methods are used. The following
standard approaches are of interest.
4.2.1 Candidate’s Estimator
Often considered the gold standard for marginal likelihood computation, the Candi-
date’s estimator (Besag, 1989; Chib, 1995) leverages the fact that:
P(X ) = P(X ,θ)P(θ|X ) (4.3)
by Bayes’ Theorem. Choosing a meaningful set of plugin estimates, θ∗, the Candi-
date’s estimator is:
Pˆ(X ) = P(X ,θ
∗)
P(θ∗|X ) (4.4)
For models that are specified with a set of conjugate priors and known posterior
forms, this estimate can be evaluated analytically. For any steps that are not easily
solved, further Monte Carlo estimates can be drawn allowing for evaluation of any
intermediate parameter values as a function of the plugin estimates. For models
that are not fully conjugate and use Metropolis-Hastings steps, a similar method is
proposed by Chib and Jeliazkov (2001).
The Candidate’s estimator is known to produce estimates that are arbitrarily close
to the true marginal likelihood in the number of draws taken from the true posterior.
While the estimate is accurate, the method is computationally demanding - any
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quantities that cannot be analytically derived require more simulation following the
initial simulations that lead to draws from the true posterior. The amount of added
computation increases as a function of the complexity of the model making this
approach too costly in most applied situations. However, this method, when possible,
can provide an exact estimate of the marginal likelihood.
4.2.2 Naive Monte Carlo Estimator
A simple method for estimating the marginal likelihood that requires no additional
significant computation uses a simple Monte Carlo integral approximation (Hammer-
sley and Handscomb, 1964; Raftery and Banfield, 1991). Using the identity:
P(X ) =
∫
Θ
P(X ,θ)dθ = Epi(θ)[P(θ|X )] (4.5)
Monte Carlo integration can be used to assess the marginal likelihood. A naive Monte
Carlo estimate of the marginal likelihood is given by:
Pˆ(X ) = 1
W
W∑
w=1
P(X|θ∗w) ; θ∗w ∼ pi(θ) (4.6)
Note that no posterior draws are needed to assess the marginal likelihood with this
estimator. The naive Monte Carlo estimate works well if the prior and the poste-
rior have a similar shape and have significant overlap. However, the Monte Carlo
approach works poorly when the posterior is more concentrated than the initial prior
(Gamerman and Lopes, 2006). As the majority of the mass from the prior maps to
likelihoods close to zero, the naive Monte Carlo estimate oversamples unimportant
regions of the posterior and the estimate of the marginal likelihood is dominated by
values close to zero. As such, the naive Monte Carlo estimator works, but requires
so many posterior draws, especially with high dimensional posteriors, that getting an
accurate estimate is computationally infeasible.
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4.2.3 Importance Sampling Estimators
An improved Monte Carlo estimator is presented by Newton and Raftery (1994). The
harmonic mean estimator observes that importance sampling methods can improve on
the uniform search over the parameter space given by simple Monte Carlo methods.
Using a similar identity for the marginal likelihood:
P(X ) =
∫
Θ
P(X|θ)−1P(θ|X )dθ (4.7)
the harmonic mean estimator is:
Pˆ(X )−1 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
P(X|θ∗i )−1 ; θ∗i ∼ P(θ|X ) (4.8)
Newton and Raftery (1994) show that the harmonic mean estimator arises as a con-
sequence of using importance sampling defining the importance distribution as the
true posterior. The harmonic mean estimate of the marginal likelihood is widely
used as an approximation to the marginal likelihood, but has been shown to perform
poorly in many cases where the complete data likelihood is low - the harmonic mean
is known to be dominated by relatively low values. This leads to an estimator that
can have infinite variance and is, therefore, unsuitable for most applications.
Following the work in Newton and Raftery (1994), the harmonic mean estimator can
be improved by more accurately making assessments of the complete data likelihood
in the posterior parameter space while also using an importance sampling approach
to stabilize the variance of the estimator. In particular, by using an importance
sampling density that avoids likelihoods close to zero while also allowing for draws
that are not necessarily near the regions of highest mass in the posterior, the variance
of the resulting estimator becomes finite and allows for consistent estimation of the
marginal likelihood (Pajor, 2016; Neal, 2001).
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Let Q(θ|γ) be a distribution over θ parameterized by γ that closely approximates
the posterior density. The importance sampling estimator stems from the identity:
P(X ) =
∫
Θ
P(θ,X )
Q(θ|γ) Q(θ|γ)dθ = EQ(θ|γ)
[P(θ,X )
Q(θ|γ)
]
(4.9)
This yields the importance sampling estimator:
Pˆ(X ) =
M∑
j=1
P(θ∗j ,X )
Q(θ∗j |γ)
; θ∗j ∼ Q(θ|γ) (4.10)
where M draws are taken from the approximating importance density. Rather than
directly performing numerical integration on the posterior draws, the importance
density is used to stabilize the complete data likelihood assessments, ensuring that
the majority of draws come from regions of the posterior with high density while also
allowing assessments outside of the posterior regions of highest mass.
A suitable importance density should (1) be easy to evaluate; (2) have the same
domain as the posterior distribution; (3) closely resemble the posterior distribution;
and (4) have fatter tails than the posterior distribution (Neal, 2001; Vandekerckhove
et al., 2015). The final condition ensures that the estimator is not dominated by the
tails of the distribution like the naive Monte Carlo estimator and the harmonic mean
estimator (Neal, 2001).
Similar to the improvement on the Monte Carlo estimator by the harmonic mean
estimator, a harmonic mean importance density estimator has been proposed (Gelfand
and Dey, 1994):
Pˆ(X ) =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Q(θ∗i |γ)
P(θ∗i ,X )
)−1
; θ∗i ∼ P(θ|X ) (4.11)
Like the harmonic mean estimator, the proposal density is the true posterior. How-
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ever, the improvement comes from assessing the complete data likelihood under the
stabilization of an approximating importance density. Like the importance sampling
estimator, the harmonic mean importance density estimator performs better than its
non-stabilized counterpart. However, there is a requirement that the tails of the im-
portance density are thinner than the posterior distribution (Gelfand and Dey, 1994;
Newton and Raftery, 1994; DiCiccio et al., 1997).
4.2.4 Bridge Sampling Estimator
Both the importance sampling estimator and the generalized harmonic mean estima-
tor impose strong constraints on the tail behavior of the importance density relative
to the posterior distribution to guarantee a stable estimator. Such requirements
can make it difficult to find a suitable importance density, especially when a high-
dimensional posterior is considered. The bridge sampler, on the other hand, allevi-
ates such requirements (Fruhwirth-Schnatter, 2004). Originally, bridge sampling was
developed to directly estimate the Bayes factor, that is, the ratio of the marginal
likelihoods of two models (Kass and Raftery, 1995). However, the bridge sampling
estimator can be used to estimate the marginal likelihood of individual models (Over-
stall and Forster, 2010; Gronau et al., 2017).
The bridge sampling estimator presented by Meng and Wong (1996) leverages the
identity:
P(X ) =
∫
Θ
P(θ,X )Q(θ|γ)h(θ)dθ∫
Θ
P(θ|X )Q(θ|γ)h(θ)dθ =
EQ(θ|γ) [P(θ,X )h(θ)]
EP(θ|X ) [Q(θ|γ)h(θ)] (4.12)
where h(θ) is a bridge function that is used to induce desirable properties on the
corresponding estimator. This admits an estimator:
Pˆ(X ) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
P(θ∗j ,X )h(θ∗j )
1
N
N∑
i=1
Q(θ∗i |γ)h(θ∗i )
; θ∗i ∼ P(θ|X ) ; θ∗j ∼ Q(θ|γ) (4.13)
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The bridge sampling estimator can be seen as a middle point between the harmonic
mean estimator and the importance sampling estimator - as discussed previously,
taking taking the expectation with respect to the approximation requires thick tails
while the expectation with respect to the posterior requires thin tails. Combining
these two elements creates an estimator that minimizes the influence of approximation
choice on the resulting estimate.
Meng and Wong (1996) show that there exists an optimal choice for h(θ). Specifically:
h(θ) = C ·
[
N
N +M
P(θ,X ) + M
N +M
P(X )Q(θ|γ)
]−1
(4.14)
where C is an arbitrary constant. This choice of bridge function is optimal in the
sense that it induces an estimator that minimizes the relative mean squared error of
all possible estimators with respect to the true marginal likelihood (Meng and Wong,
1996). Note that this proof requires the assumption that bridge sampling estimator
is asymptotically unbiased and is independent of the choice of approximation. The
optimal bridge function depends on the marginal likelihood which is the very entity
we want to approximate. This issue can be resolved by applying an iterative scheme
that updates an initial guess of the marginal likelihood until the estimate of the
marginal likelihood has converged according to a predefined tolerance level (Gronau
et al., 2017).
The bridge sampling estimator has been shown to perform well in a variety of complex
applied Bayesian models where the Candidate’s estimator cannot be easily computed
(Lopes et al., 2003; Gronau et al., 2017). A particular benefit of this approach is that
the same computational recipe can be used in many settings:
1. Samples are taken from the true posterior, P(θ|X ).
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2. Moments of the joint posterior are estimated and a corresponding multivariate
normal distribution is specified, Q(θ|γ).
3. Some large number of samples are taken from Q(θ|γ).
4. The iterative scheme outlined in (Gronau et al., 2017) is used to estimate the
marginal likelihood.
Recent work on the bridge sampling estimator has discussed the role of choice of
approximation. While the optimal bridge sampling estimator does not rely on choice
of approximation, better approximations lead to better estimates. In high dimensions,
multivariate normal approximations might produce unstable estimates in case of high-
dimensional posterior distributions that clearly do not follow a multivariate normal
distribution. In such a situation, it might be advisable to consider more sophisticated
versions of bridge sampling (Fruhwirth-Schnatter, 2004; Meng and Schilling, 2002;
Wang and Meng, 2016).
4.2.5 Laplace-Metropolis Estimator
Perhaps the most commonly used approach to estimating the marginal likelihood,
the Laplace-Metropolis estimator extends traditional Laplace asymptotics to usage
with posterior samples (Tierney and Kadane, 1986). Described in Lewis and Raftery
(1997), the Laplace-Metropolis estimator for the marginal likelihood is:
Pˆ(X ) = (2pi)K2 |Σ| 12P(θ˜,X ) (4.15)
where K is the dimensionality of the posterior, Σ is an estimate of the inverse Hes-
sian, and θ˜ = argmax
θ
P(θ,X ) is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) value of θ. Lewis
and Raftery (1997) suggests estimating Σ as the covariance matrix of the poste-
rior samples and letting θ˜ be the value from the posterior Monte Carlo draws with
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the maximum complete data likelihood. More modern approaches to computing the
Laplace-Metropolis approximation feed the posterior samples to an iterative quadra-
ture approach that simultaneously estimates the MAP value of θ and the correspond-
ing Hessian.
The Laplace-Metropolis estimator is an application of the well-known Laplace approx-
imation to integrals of a specific form. However, this estimator is also an example of
approximating the marginal likelihood by specifying a known distributional form that
approximates the posterior. In this case, the posterior is assumed to be approximately
normally distributed with moments that match those displayed by the posterior sam-
ples. Frequently, the normal approximation is sufficient - under certain conditions
and low prior influence, the posterior converges to a normal distribution (Eberly and
Casella, 2003). However, in cases where the posterior is skewed or has fatter tails
than the normal distribution, the Laplace-Metropolis estimator will overestimate the
fit of the data given the model and reward specifications that induce sharp-peaked
posteriors.
4.2.6 Bounds on the Marginal Likelihood via Variational Approaches
Mean-field variational methods, initially developed in statistical physics and exten-
sively studied by machine learning and Bayesian learning communities for determin-
istic approximation of marginal distributions (MacKay, 1995; Jordan et al., 1999;
Jaakkola and Jordan, 2000; Humphreys and Titterington, 2000; Ueda and Ghahra-
mani, 2002; Jordan, 2004), have been implemented in the model selection context
(Corduneanu and Bishop, 2001; Beal, 2003). A core identity for variational methods
is the evidence lower bound (ELBO):
logP(X ) ≥
∫
Θ
Q(θ|γ) [logP (θ,X )− logQ(θ|γ)] dθ (4.16)
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or stated a different way:
logP(X ) =
∫
Θ
Q(θ|γ) [logP (θ,X )− logQ(θ|γ)] dθ+
∫
Θ
Q(θ|γ) [logP(θ|X )− logQ(θ|γ)] dθ
(4.17)
where
∫
Θ
Q(θ|γ) [logP(θ|X )− logQ(θ|γ)] dθ is the Kullback-Leibler divergence from
the true posterior, P(θ|X ), to an approximate posterior, Q(θ|γ), KL(Q||P). By
Gibbs’ inequality, KL(Q||P) ≥ 0, leading to the equivalence of these two statements.
While the ELBO is most frequently used in variational estimation strategies, Ji et al.
(2010) present a similar inequality that brackets the marginal likelihood from above.
Specifically:
logP(X ) ≤
∫
Θ
P(θ|X ) [logP (θ,X )− logQ(θ|γ)] dθ (4.18)
or stated a different way:
logP(X ) =
∫
Θ
P(θ|X ) [logP (θ,X )− logQ(θ|γ)] dθ−
∫
Θ
P(θ|X ) [logQ(θ|γ)− logP(θ|X )] dθ
(4.19)
where
∫
Θ
P(θ|X ) [logQ(θ|γ)− logP(θ|X )] dθ is the Kullback-Leibler divergence from
the approximate posterior, Q(θ|γ), to the true posterior, P(θ|X ), KL(P||Q). This
upper bound, often referred to as the EUBO, has received significant attention in
recent machine learning literature as an alternative approach to fitting variational
models on the ELBO (Dieng et al., 2017; Pradier et al., 2019).
Taken together with the ELBO, these two identities sandwich the true log marginal
likelihood. Previous work has used these bounds separately as fitting criteria - given
a choice of approximating distributions, typically in the exponential family, find the
parameters, γ, that minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the posterior
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and the approximation. The resulting expectation-maximization fitting scheme is less
computationally costly than corresponding Monte Carlo approaches, but there have
been significant questions about the accuracy of variational approaches (Wang and
Blei, 2019). However, the identities that are key to variational estimation provide a
method for bounding the marginal likelihood and, when properly used in conjunction
with a method that is guaranteed to sample from the true posterior, can provide
powerful bounding equations for model comparison.
4.3 Estimators, Bounds, and Divergence
Aside from the variational bounding method, all of the commonly used methods for
estimating the marginal likelihood of a model present a single point estimate. Unlike
posterior summary statistics, which are point estimates that encompass the shape and
location of the full posterior distribution, the marginal likelihood is an integral that
has a single constant value. Hence, in the case where the posterior form is known, the
correct constant value of the marginal likelihood can be derived exactly. However,
as previously discussed, most interesting models do not admit a simple analytical
evaluation of the model evidence.
Posterior approximation is the most common method for achieving reliable estimates
of the marginal likelihood. Bridge sampling, in particular, is a cutting-edge approach
which has recently seen a resurgence as a one-size-fits-all approach to approximating
the marginal likelihood, particularly with a renewed interest in posterior warping
to create posterior approximations that better fit non-normal posterior distributions
(Gronau et al., 2017; Wang and Meng, 2016). Bridge sampling can be seen as a
general importance sampling approach that contains many other marginal likelihood
estimation methods as special cases, including the Candidate’s estimator (Mira and
Nicholls, 2004).
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While point estimates of the marginal likelihood can be close to the true marginal like-
lihood, methods that use a posterior approximation introduce approximation error.
In the case of bridge sampling, Meng and Wong (1996) demonstrate that under a set
of restrictive assumptions, the bridge sampling estimator is the mean-squared error
minimizing estimator of the marginal likelihood. More importantly, Meng and Wong
(1996) derive the asymptotic variance associated with the bridge sampling estimator
as a function of approximation error:
lim
N,M→∞
V[Pˆ(X )] =
(
1
N
+
1
M
)(
(1−HA(P ,Q))−1 − 1
)
+O
(
1
N +M
)
(4.20)
where HA(P ,Q) is the harmonic divergence between the true posterior and the ap-
proximation. This equation demonstrates that the approximation error disappears as
N and M get large. Similarly, assuming unbiasedness, the bridge sampling estimator
is a maximum likelihood estimate of the true marginal likelihood (Wang and Meng,
2016). However, the rate at which influence of divergence between the posterior and
approximation disappears as the number of posterior samples increases is ill-defined
and these problems are much more apparent in high dimensional posteriors. While
work has shown that these assumptions are met when the posterior approximation
is essentially the same as the true posterior, it is worthwhile to explore the realistic
scenario where the posterior and approximation are not perfectly aligned. Notions
of bias are mentioned and a solution is proposed in the form of posterior warping to
increase overlap between the approximation and true posterior (Meng and Schilling,
2002; Wang and Meng, 2016). However, these works provide no exploration of how
the standard bridge sampling estimator performs under less-than-ideal assumptions.
An asymptotically biased estimator of the marginal likelihood is of particular concern
since skewness in the posterior can lead to mismatched modes between the posterior
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and approximation. 4
In order to explore the accuracy of the bridge sampling estimator, I use a series of
simulated data sets for a Bayesian linear regression model with a fixed error variance
component. In particular, I seek to explore the performance of the bridge sampling
estimator as a function of two attributes - the dimensionality of the posterior and the
quality of the approximation to the posterior. Bayesian linear regression is an ideal
model for this kind of exploration since the resulting posterior is exactly multivari-
ate normal and the Candidate’s estimator exactly computes the marginal likelihood
with enough posterior samples. I simulated 500 data sets with 1000 observations and
25, 100, 250, or 500 covariates and produced 10,000 posterior draws from the cor-
responding linear regression posteriors. For each of these data sets, I computed the
Candidate’s estimator of the marginal likelihood and the bridge sampling estimator
for the corresponding linear regression model under the true posterior. To assess
performance with a somewhat inaccurate approximation, I induced positive skewness
without changing the area under the true posterior using the warping method pre-
sented by Meng and Schilling (2002). Following the work of Gronau et al. (2017), I
used multivariate normal approximations fit with moment matching for all posteriors
and take 10,000 draws from the approximation. In order to assess the estimator’s
variance, I replicated the MCMC procedure 100 times for a number of the simula-
tions to get a bootstrap estimate of the variance associated with the bridge sampling
estimator.5
4As a quick point of clarification, the variance for the point estimate of the marginal likelihood
is generally very small since the marginal likelihood is bounded between zero and one and generally
very close to zero. However, marginal likelihoods on this scale are rarely useful since the difference
between values that are close to zero are difficult to detect. For this reason, the logarithm of the
marginal likelihood is the preferred quantity. For the rest of this paper, any estimates of the marginal
likelihood will be presented and discussed on the natural logarithm scale.
5The initial intention was to bootstrap the estimator’s variance for all simulations. However,
after a few pilot runs, it became increasingly apparent that no more simulations were needed and
the results from Meng and Wong (1996) and Wang and Meng (2016) hold.
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FIGURE 4.1. Density plots of 500 simulated bridge sampling estimates com-
pared to the true marginal likelihood.
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Note: Dotted lines show the mean of the 500 estimates. Skewness is induced using
posterior warping techniques from Meng and Schilling (2002).
In line with the findings of Meng and Wong (1996), the simulations show that the
bootstrap variance quickly shrinks to zero when the number of draws taken from the
true posterior and the approximation is large. Asymptotically incorrect estimates, on
the other hand, appear to be a problem. Figure 4.1 shows the results of these sim-
ulations and assesses the incorrectness of the estimator across all simulated models.
In the case where the posterior and approximation are both essentially multivariate
normal, the bridge sampling estimator performs very well - the bridge sampling es-
timator is generally accurate and any errors are generally quite small. Things are
not quite as neat when the approximation to the posterior is further from the truth.
When the posterior has low amounts of skew, the modal bridge sampling estimator is
generally close to the true value. However, the distribution of values is not symmetric;
164
the distribution is left-skewed and the bulk of estimates overestimate the true value
of the marginal likelihood. When the posterior exhibits high amounts of skew, the
same pattern is seen, but the modal estimate is no longer close to the true marginal
likelihood and the left tail is even more extreme. These effects become even more
pronounced when the dimensionality of the posterior increases. Interestingly, across
all simulations, the mean of the estimates is quite close to zero. This implies that over
a large number of models, the bridge sampling estimator is unbiased. Individual runs
of the bridge sampling procedure, though, lead to estimates that are asymptotically
incorrect due to approximation error.
These simulations show that the relative divergence between the approximation and
the true posterior has an influence on the quality of the bridge sampling estimate of
the marginal likelihood. In the typical high-dimensional case where the approximation
is chosen to be a multivariate elliptical distribution, moment matching is used to find
an approximation which matches the posterior draws. However, moment matching
leads to a mismatch of high density regions when the true posterior is skewed in a
non-elliptical way. By choosing an approximation that incorrectly assigns mass to
low-density regions of the posterior, the bridge sampling estimator can vary widely
and, potentially, lead to incorrect inference about the relative quality of multiple
models.
One approach which seeks to address these issues is to allow for more flexible methods
for choosing a posterior approximation. Choosing an approximation which matches
all of the quirks of the posterior will almost certainly lead to a bridge sampling es-
timate that is very close to the truth. To this end, posterior warping methods that
seek to augment the posterior without changing the normalizing constant provide
an approach to creating better approximations and, in turn, better estimates of the
marginal likelihood (Meng and Schilling, 2002; Wang and Meng, 2016). While this
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method corrects for skewness, multimodality, and other irregularities in the posterior,
it still has a few weaknesses. First, posterior warping relies on automatic differenti-
ation to get estimates of the Jacobian and Hessian associated with the posterior. In
high-dimensional posteriors, this leads to significant computational strain that makes
the numerical calculation prohibitively difficult for most standard workstations. Sec-
ond, posterior warping works best when the form of the posterior is close to elliptical.
For many models where skewness is expected (e.g. partial identification of parame-
ters, strong prior influence, parameter values close to bounds on the domain, small
sample size, etc.) or the sampling scheme does not guarantee draws that accurately
represent a smooth posterior (e.g. discrete posterior margins, Metropolis-Hastings
draws with poor mixing, etc.), there is no reason to expect that the posterior will
have a smooth, elliptical form. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the method
still only produces a single point estimate that does not encode any sense of accuracy
or uncertainty.
4.4 An Interval Estimate for the Marginal Likelihood
Addressing distributional complexity in a point estimator is a difficult problem. While
a first instinct is to place confidence intervals on the bridge sampling estimator,
the previous simulations show that the variance of the estimator quickly shrinks to
zero, even when the estimate is incorrect. From the simulations, it seems that the
magnitude of the incorrectness grows as a function of the quality of the approximation.
Thus, it seems prudent to attempt to build an interval that takes this aspect of the
problem into account.
Variational methods for Bayesian inference seek to fit models by creating an approxi-
mation of a known form to a model’s posterior that minimizes the difference between
the true posterior and the approximation. At the core of this approach are identities
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that bound the marginal likelihood of the model and approximations can be chosen
that minimize the divergence between the posterior and approximation. For the pur-
poses of defining an interval estimate for the marginal likelihood, these variational
identities provide a framework for creating intervals where poor approximations result
in larger interval widths.
I begin with the core identities of variational Bayesian inference: the evidence lower
bound, L, and evidence upper bound, U (Ji et al., 2010; Jordan et al., 1999).
Definition 4.4.1. Let P(θ|X ) be the true posterior distribution conditional on some
data, X . Let P(θ,X ) be the complete data likelihood of X given some prior on
θ, pi(θ). As with importance sampling methods, let Q(θ|γ) be any proper density
function that shares the same support as the true posterior parameterized by γ =
{γ1, γ2, ..., γk} ∈ Γ. Then:
L+KL(Q||P) = logP(X ) = U −KL(P||Q) (4.21)
where:
L =
∫
Θ
Q(θ|γ)[logP(θ,X )− logQ(θ|γ)]dθ
U =
∫
Θ
P(θ|X )[logP(θ,X )− logQ(θ|γ)]dθ
KL(Q||P) =
∫
Θ
Q(θ|γ)[logQ(θ|γ)− logP(θ|X )]dθ
KL(P||Q) =
∫
Θ
P(θ|X )[logP(θ|X )− logQ(θ|γ)]dθ
(4.22)
KL(P||Q) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the approximation Q(θ|γ) to
P(θ|X ), or the expected density ratio of P(θ|X ) to Q(θ|γ) taken with respect to
the true posterior. As the KL divergence is not a symmetric measure of distance,
the reverse divergence, KL(Q||P), is a separate and unequal measure of divergence.
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Directly applying Gibbs’ inequality, Definition 4.4.1 shows that L ≤ logP(X ) ≤ U .
This result is key for the usage of variational methods.
These identities are typically used to fit models with respect to one of the conditions.
Using the lower bounds, various mean field approximation can be used to derive
the approximation that minimizes KL(Q||P) from the true posterior without ever
needing to take draws from the true posterior (Jordan et al., 1999; Jordan, 2004).
While this procedure can be much quicker than standard Monte Carlo techniques,
there are questions about the inferential properties of variational posteriors and the
inherent model selection procedure which is central to variational methods (Zhang
et al., 2018).
Addressing some of these concerns, Ji et al. (2010) discuss model fitting using the
upper bound and a pseudo-lower bound. While standard variational methods seek
to sit an approximation that minimizes KL(Q||P), Ji et al. (2010) propose first run-
ning a Monte Carlo simulation to produce draws from the true posterior, then using
these draws to derive an approximation which allows for a sandwiching interval that
encompasses the true marginal likelihood. While Ji et al. (2010) use these identities
to create schemes for deriving approximate posterior distributions that minimize the
evidence upper bound, I use the identities derived in this paper as a starting point
for a set of intervals on the model evidence.
Definition 4.4.2. For a specified model with parameters θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θk} ∈ Θ and
prior density, pi(θ), assume that N iid draws from P(θ|X ), θ∗ = (θ∗1, θ∗2, ..., θ∗N) ∈ Θ
are taken. Given θ∗, an approximate posterior, Q(θ|γ) is fit and M independent and
identically distributed draws are taken, ω∗ = (ω∗1, ω
∗
1, ..., ω
∗
M) ∈ Θ. For all θ∗ and ω∗,
assume that P(θ∗i ,X ) and P(ω∗j ,X ) can be assessed. Similarly, assume that Q(θ∗|γ)
and Q(ω∗|γ) can be assessed.
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Define estimators of U and L as:
U0 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
[logP(θ∗i ,X )− logQ(θ∗i |γ)]
L0 = 1
M
M∑
j=1
[logP(ω∗j ,X )− logQ(ω∗j |γ)]
(4.23)
respectively. By the law of large numbers, these two estimators converge almost
surely to the evidence upper bound and evidence lower bound, respectively. Note
that these two estimators arise as solutions from Monte Carlo integration of U and
L - recognizing that U and L are expectations with respect to the posterior and
approximations, respectively, Monte Carlo integration can performed with θ∗ and
ω∗.
Appealing to central limit theorem:
U0 d→ N
(
U , σ
2
U
N
)
L0 d→ N
(
L, σ
2
L
M
)
Assuming flat priors on U and L:
P(U|θ∗) ∼ N (U0, σ2U)
P(L|ω∗) ∼ N (L0, σ2L) (4.24)
where σ2U =
σˆ2U
N
, σ2L =
σˆ2L
M
, and σˆ2U and σˆ
2
L are unbiased estimators of the sample
variance of logP(θ∗,X )− logQ(θ∗|γ) and logP(ω∗,X )− logQ(ω∗|γ), respectively.6
Definition 4.4.2 shows that evidence upper and lower bounds can be expressed as ran-
dom variables with moments that can be modeled from samples of the true posterior
6N (µ, σ2) is the normal density parameterized by mean µ and variance σ2.
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and samples from the chosen approximation. With a light assumption, this can be
extended to treat the marginal likelihood as a random variable, itself.
Definition 4.4.3. Let ∆ = logP(X ). Given values for the evidence upper and lower
bounds and assuming that the marginal likelihood between the bounds follows a four-
parameter beta distribution, a conditional posterior for the marginal likelihood can
be derived:
P(∆|a, b,U ,L) = (∆− L)
a−1 (U −∆)b−1
B(a, b) (U − L)a+b−1 (4.25)
where a and b are shape parameters as in the standard beta distribution and B(a, b)
is the standard Beta function with inputs a and b.
Integrating over all possible values of U and L, the marginal posterior takes the form:
P(∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗) =
∫ ∫
(∆− L)a−1 (U −∆)b−1
B(a, b) (U − L)a+b−1 P(U|θ
∗)P(L|ω∗)dUdL (4.26)
Definition 4.4.3 establishes a random variable representation of the marginal likeli-
hood. Unlike point estimators which produce a single value for the marginal likeli-
hood, treating the marginal likelihood as a random variable allows for incorporation
of approximation error into the computed value and, in turn, credible intervals that
should surround the true marginal likelihood. While the posterior for the marginal
likelihood does not have a convenient, closed-form representation, asymptotic mo-
ments can be examined to give intuition about the role that approximation error
plays in the posterior.
Lemma 4.4.1. Let α ∼ Beta(a, b) be a beta distributed random variable that ranges
between zero and one. The asymptotic expectation and variance of P(∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗)
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can be defined as:
E[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = E[(1− α)]U0 + E[α]L0
V[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = (U0 − L0)2V[α]
(4.27)
where E[α] = a
a+b
, E[1− α] = b
a+b
, and V[α] = ab
(a+b)2(a+b+1)
.
Proof. The proof for this statement can be found in Appendix A.
The posterior variance for the marginal likelihood random variable illuminates how
this approach differs from the bridge sampling approach. While the components of
the estimators are the same, beginning with Equation 4.22 and deriving bounds incor-
porates the divergence between the approximation and the posterior in the variance
of the resulting distribution. Similarly, this approach leads to a posterior variance
which can be easily computed from the sample, which is an important step when
deriving intervals. Equation 4.20 shows that the bridge sampling estimator has a
variance which shrinks to zero as the number of draws from the true posterior and
approximation get large, ignoring the divergence term included in the variance. Since
there is evidence that the bridge sampling estimator is asymptotically incorrect, this
induces poor behavior of the resulting estimator when the approximation does not
perfectly fit the true posterior. The bounds derived from the identities in Ji et al.
(2010) (JSW Bounds), move the divergence term outside such that the variance does
not approach zero asymptotically. This aspect of JSW bounds allows the interval to
hedge against uncertainty due to approximation error.
4.4.1 Estimation and Performance of JSW Bounds
Much like the bridge sampling scheme, estimation of JSW bounds follows a simple
computational scheme:
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1. Draw N posterior samples from the true posterior distribution, P(θ|X ), θ∗ =
(θ∗1, θ
∗
2, ..., θ
∗
N).
2. Fit an approximation to the posterior distribution.
3. Draws M samples from the approximation, Q(θ|γ), ω∗ = (ω∗1, ω∗1, ..., ω∗M).
4. Assess P(θ∗,X ), P(ω∗,X ), Q(θ∗|γ), and Q(ω∗|γ).
5. Compute U0, L0, σ2U , and σ2L.
6. Given choices for the prior hyperparameters, a and b, use a bootstrap scheme
to get B Monte Carlo draws from the posterior on the marginal likelihood:
ub ∼ N (U0, σ2U)
lb ∼ N (L0, σ2L)
αb ∼ Beta(a, b)
∆∗b = ub − αb(ub − lb)
7. Compute highest posterior density intervals for ∆∗ at the desired width.
While the posterior variance of the marginal likelihood is known, its form is not. Un-
der extremely restrictive assumptions, symmetry around the optimal point estimator
can be imposed. However, initial work shows that the resulting posterior is not gen-
erally symmetric. As such, JSW bounds use a Monte Carlo simulation framework to
simulate draws from the resulting posterior and compute credible intervals.
One point worth noting is that JSW bounds, like most marginal likelihood estimation
approaches, assume that N independent and identically distributed draws are taken
from the posterior. While some Monte Carlo approaches explicitly correct draws to
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ensure that draws are iid, the majority of simulation strategies suffer from autocor-
relation across draws, leading to a violation of the assumption. Without correction,
it should be expected that any empirical results will underestimate any variances of
interest. For this reason, I follow the suggestions of Gronau et al. (2017) and set
N equal to the effective sample size of the complete data likelihood of the posterior
draws (Geyer, 2011). This approach shrinks the sample size in accordance with the
level of autocorrelation among draws and provides a reasonable approximation to an
equivalent number of independent and identically distributed draws achieved by the
Monte Carlo procedure.
To assess the performance of JSW bounds, I use the same simulations done previ-
ously. As before, all approximations are multivariate normal with moments chosen
by matching the moments of the joint posterior. For each linear regression data set
with differing numbers of covariates and levels of posterior skewness, I compute the
true marginal likelihood using the Candidate’s estimator, the bridge sampling esti-
mator, and 95% JSW intervals with a Beta(0, 0) prior (to induce the maximum width
on the JSW interval estimates). Specifically, I explore the coverage of the JSW in-
tervals. Coverage explores two of the biggest concerns with JSW intervals. First,
coverage demonstrates how frequently JSW intervals include the true marginal like-
lihood value. Second, coverage demonstrates the specificity of JSW intervals. While
the true value may be included in the interval, short intervals are preferred to wide
ones and over-encompassing intervals make model comparison extremely difficult. It
is also worth exploring how the chosen level for the JSW interval influences the true
probability of including the true value.
Figure 4.2 compares the bridge sampling estimator and the corresponding JSW inter-
vals to the true marginal likelihood. A first observation is that the bridge sampling
estimator and JSW bounds are generally computing similar values. In fact, over all
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FIGURE 4.2. Bridge sampling estimator and JSW intervals for 500 randomly
generated linear regression data sets with varying numbers of covariates and
amounts of posterior skew.
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Note: Data are generated from a linear regression model with a known error variance.
Skewness is induced using posterior warping techniques from Meng and Schilling
(2002). 95% HDP intervals are shown for JSW intervals. Percentages are computed
with respect to the Candidate’s estimator to the marginal likelihood for each model.
Bayesian linear regression posterior samples and Candidate’s estimator were computed
using MCMCregress from MCMCpack in R (Martin et al., 2011).
simulations, the JSW bounds include the bridge sampling estimator approximately
90% of the time. In the case of low skew, the intervals almost always include the
bridge sampling estimator while high skew posteriors lead to fewer intervals including
the estimate. The most stark conclusion from these simulations is that the 95% JSW
bounds always include the true value of the marginal likelihood. While 100% coverage
is not always a bad thing, it comes at cost of specificity in JSW Bounds. When there
is no skew in the posterior, the width of the JSW bounds are generally small. On
the other hand, skewness in the posterior frequently leads JSW bounds to be quite
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wide, often on the order of 20% above and below the true value. This width leads
to problems when comparing models - if the goal is to use posterior intervals to say
that one model fits the data better than another, wide bounds make it more difficult
to distinguish between models.
4.5 Refinements to the JSW Interval
JSW bounds have widths that grow in accordance with the distance between the
approximation and the true posterior. Lemma 4.4.1 shows that the posterior variance
that dictates the interval length grows as the distance between the evidence upper
bound and evidence lower bound increases. Using the key variational identities, this
distance can be shown to be a direct consequence of the forward and reverse KL
divergence between the true posterior and approximation:
U − L = KL(P||Q) +KL(Q||P) ; L ≤ logP(X ) ≤ U (4.28)
While this identity defines the range of possible values, it gives no information about
where in the interval the true marginal likelihood exists. To address this concern,
JSW bounds treat the marginal likelihood as a random variable. With known U and
L, Definition 4.4.2 formalizes this random variable as:
logP(X ) = U − α(U − L)
α ∼ Beta(a, b)
α(U − L) = KL(P||Q) ; (1− α)(U − L) = KL(Q||P)
(4.29)
KL(P||Q) + KL(Q||P), often referred to as Jeffreys’ divergence, is a symmetric
measure of distance that encodes the KL divergence in both the forward and reverse
directions. As defined above, α encodes the proportion of the Jeffreys’ divergence
that can be attributed to KL(P||Q). This construction then admits a set of possible
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values ranging from L to U .
While the variational identities dictate that Equation 4.28 is the minimum width
bound on the marginal likelihood, the bound edges represent a a combination of
forward and reverse KL divergences that cannot, by definition, occur together. To
see this, assume that KL(Q||P) = U − L and KL(P||Q) = 0. If KL(P||Q) = 0,
then P(θ|X ) = Q(θ|γ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ and KL(Q||P) = 0, which contradicts the initial
conditions. Logically, this notion extends to values close to zero - KL(P||Q) =  and
KL(Q||P) much larger than  occurs occurs when P(θ|X ) is small for all θ ∈ Θ while
there are regions of high density in Q(θ|γ). If the goal of the approximation is to
best match the true posterior, then these cases should arise infrequently. As such, it
makes sense that there is a relationship between KL(P||Q) and KL(Q||P) - knowing
KL(P||Q) should reasonably bound KL(Q||P).
This notion can be formalized by exploring the ratio of the two KL divergences,
KL(P||Q)
KL(Q||P) . Specifically, I show that this ratio is bounded due to the fact that it is a
ratio of two f -divergences:
Theorem 4.5.1. Let P(θ|X ) and Q(θ|γ) be two proper density functions that share
common support (i.e. P(θ = θ|X ) = 0 ⇐⇒ Q(θ = θ|γ) = 0). Further assume that
P(θ|X ) is absolutely continuous with respect to Q(θ|γ) and vice versa, P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ). Then the ratio of the forward and reverse KL divergences is bounded such
that:
κ(β2) ≤ KL(P||Q)
KL(Q||P) ≤ κ(β1) (4.30)
where β1 = sup
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ) , β2 = infθ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ) , and κ(t) =
1+t log t−t
t−log t−1 .
Proof. The proof for this theorem can be found in Appendix B.
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4.5.1 Kappa Bounds on the Marginal Likelihood
Using Theorem 4.5.1, I propose a refined set of bounds, called kappa bounds, on the
marginal likelihood:
Theorem 4.5.2. Let P(θ|X ) be a proper probability density function with marginal
likelihood P(X ). Let Q(θ|γ) be an approximation to P(θ|X ) that shares the same
domain. Then:
L+ (U − L)
1 + κ(β1)
≤ logP (X ) ≤ U − κ(β2)(U − L)
1 + κ(β2)
(4.31)
Proof. Given P(θ|X ) and Q(θ|γ), recall that:
U −KL(P||Q) = L+KL(Q||P) = logP(X )
This can be rearranged such that:
U − α(U − L) = logP(X ) = L+ (1− α)(U − L)
where:
α =
KL(P||Q)
KL(P||Q) +KL(Q||P)
Define ρ as:
ρ =
KL(P||Q)
KL(Q||P)
Then α can be rewritten as:
α =
ρ
1 + ρ
By Theorem B.1 and letting t = P(θ|X )Q(θ|γ) , ρ is bounded such that:
κ(β2) ≤ ρ ≤ κ(β1)
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Applying to α:
κ(β2)
1 + κ(β2)
≤ α ≤ κ(β1)
1 + κ(β1)
Which implies a maximum width bound on logP(X ):
L+ (U − L)
1 + κ(β1)
≤ logP(X ) ≤ U − κ(β2)(U − L)
1 + κ(β2)
since β2 < 1 and β1 > 1.
Theorem 4.5.2 demonstrates that JSW bounds often include values that are not pos-
sible given the relationship between KL(P||Q) and KL(Q||P). While JSW bounds
rely wholly on the expectation of the density ratio to create bounds, kappa bounds
leverage both the expectation and extrema conditions to further shrink the bounds on
the marginal likelihood. In words, kappa bounds leverage the fact that if the true pos-
terior and approximation are never that far apart, then the forward and reverse KL
divergences cannot be that far apart. In a case where the approximation is carefully
chosen to match moments and areas of high mass in the posterior, the approximation
should never have areas of mass that do not match areas of mass in the posterior.
Even when the choice of approximation is not perfect, there are significant portions
of JSW bounds that can be ruled out as inadmissible.
The improvement in bound width given by kappa bounds compared to JSW bounds
is:
1− κ(β2)
1 + κ(β2)
− 1
1 + κ(β1)
(4.32)
Improvement is guaranteed when the approximation and posterior share common
support - the width of kappa bounds is equal to JSW bounds only when the maxi-
mum density ratio is infinite and the minimum density ratio is zero. Because of the
logarithmic scale of κ(t), kappa bounds provide a significant improvement over JSW
bounds in all but the most extreme cases.
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FIGURE 4.3. Shrinkage provided by Kappa Bounds compared to JSW Bounds.
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θ
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Figure 4.3 shows the proportional improvement over JSW bounds at a number of
minimum and maximum density ratios. A first observation is that even at the most
extreme density ratios plotted, inf
θ
log P(θ|X )Q(θ|γ) =
1
1000
and sup
θ
log P(θ|X )Q(θ|γ) = 1000, the
improvement over JSW bounds is roughly 15%. Taken together, this shows that even
if the magnitude of the minimum and maximum density ratios is in the thousands,
kappa bounds provide roughly a 30% improvement over JSW bounds. Decreasing the
order to the minimum and maximum increases the improvement. On the other side,
looking at an approximation where the maximum and minimum density ratios are 2
and 1
2
shows massive improvement, ruling out around 90% of the JSW interval.
This result directly addresses the large width and 100% coverage of JSW intervals.
Under a reasonably diffuse prior on the marginal likelihood, especially under the least
favorable prior, some portion of the JSW interval gives values that cannot exist. Since
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these values are at the end of the interval and are almost surely covered, JSW intervals
will always include all of the possible values that the marginal likelihood can viably
take. Kappa bounds correct for this problem and presents shorter intervals that only
include values that can possibly exist, leading to shorter intervals and more accurate
coverage.
4.5.2 Estimation of Kappa Bounds
The inequality in Theorem 4.5.2 implies a range on the log marginal likelihood, but
gives no information about where in the range it may be. As in Definition 4.4.3,
treating the log marginal likelihood as a random variable allows for specification of a
conditional posterior:
P(∆|a, b,U ,L, κ(β1), κ(β2),θ∗,ω∗) =
(
∆− L− (U−L)
1+κ(β1)
)a−1 (
U − κ(β2)(U−L)
1+κ(β2)
−∆
)b−1
B(a, b)
(
(U − L)
(
1− κ(β2)
1+κ(β2)
− 1
1+κ(β1)
))a+b−1
(4.33)
Given this prior construction, the distribution of interest is a posterior over the pos-
sible values of logP(X ):
P(∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗) =
0∫
−∞
0∫
−∞
1∫
0
∞∫
1
P(∆|a, b,U ,L, κ(β1), κ(β2),θ∗,ω∗)
P(U ,L, κ(β1), κ(β2)|θ∗,ω∗)dκ(β1)dκ(β2)dLdU
(4.34)
where θ∗ and ω∗ are a set of N draws from the true posterior and M draws from the
approximation, respectively. Note that a and b are hyperparameters which influence
the shape of the final distribution. Further, assuming that U ⊥ L ⊥ β1 ⊥ β2
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conditional on θ∗ and ω∗:
P(∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗) =
0∫
−∞
0∫
−∞
1∫
0
∞∫
1
P(∆|a, b,U ,L, κ(β1), κ(β2),θ∗,ω∗)P(U|θ∗)P(L|ω∗)
P(κ(β1)|θ∗,ω∗)P(κ(β2)|θ∗,ω∗)dκ(β1)dκ(β2)dLdU
(4.35)
The posterior distribution for the log marginal likelihood has no convenient form.
Like Lemma 4.4.1, an asymptotic posterior expectation and variance can be defined.
Lemma 4.5.1. Let α ∼ Beta(a, b) be a beta distributed random variable that ranges
between zero and one. Also, let K1 =
1
1+κ(β1)
and K2 =
κ(β2)
1+κ(β2)
. Assuming that V[K1]
and V[K2] go to zero as N and M get large, the asymptotic expectation and variance
of P(∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗) can be defined as:
E[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = E[(1− α)] (U0 − (U0 − L0)E[K1]) + E[α] (L0 + (U0 − L0)E[K2])
V[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = (U0 − L0)2(1− E[K1]− E[K2])2V[α]
(4.36)
where E[α] = a
a+b
, E[1− α] = b
a+b
, and V[α] = ab
(a+b)2(a+b+1)
.
Proof. The proof follows Lemma 4.4.1 and leverages the assumption that κ(β1) ⊥
κ(β2) ⊥ U ⊥ L. The result follows this assumption trivially.
Compared to Lemma 4.4.1, it is easy to see that the variance of the posterior shrinks
in accordance with the amount of information gained from the extrema of the density
ratio. As with JSW bounds, the variance is a function of the evidence upper and
lower bounds and a prior belief about the location of the log marginal likelihood.
Kappa bounds introduce the extrema conditions and show that the variance of the
posterior can shrink in accordance with how good the approximation performs - an
181
approximation that fits well everywhere can reduce the variance to essentially zero
even if there is distance between the evidence upper and lower bounds.
Estimating kappa bounds first requires estimating the evidence lower and upper
bounds and their corresponding variances. Definition 4.4.2 can be leveraged to get
these values. Kappa bounds also require estimation of the relative extrema of the
density ratio of the posterior and the approximation. In order to estimate the full
posterior, it is necessary to estimate a random variable representation of these values.
Recall that:
κ(β1) = κ
(
sup
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
)
κ(β2) = κ
(
inf
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
)
where κ(t) = 1+t log t−t
t−log t−1 . Estimating these two quantities requires estimating the den-
sity ratio of P(θ|X ) to Q(θ|γ). Density ratio estimation can be done in a variety of
ways and one accurate and computationally viable approach leverages the duality of
classification and density ratios.
Definition 4.5.1. Assume that we have N samples from P(θ|X ) and M samples
from Q(θ|γ). Let Y be a vector of labels that encodes the distribution from which
each sample was drawn and let F be the collection of samples:
Y = {1, 1, 1, ...︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, 0, 0, 0, ...︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
} = {y1, y2, ..., yN+M}
F = {θ∗1, θ∗2, ..., θN︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(θ|X )
, ω∗N+1, ω
∗
N+2, ..., ω
∗
N+M︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q(θ|γ)
} = {f1, f2, ..., fN+M}
Applying Bayes rule:
P(fi|X )
Q(fi|γ) =
P(yi = 1|fi)P(fi)
P(yi = 1)
(
P(yi = 0|fi)P(fi)
P(yi = 0)
)−1
=
P(yi = 1|fi)
P(yi = 0|fi)
P(yi = 0)
P(yi = 1)
Assuming that the prior probability of classification is proportional to the sample
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sizes:
P(fi|X )
Q(fi|γ) =
P(yi = 1|fi)
P(yi = 0|fi)
M
N
Finally, recognizing this as a two class problem:
P(fi|X )
Q(fi|γ) =
P(yi = 1|fi)
1− P(yi = 1|fi)
M
N
(4.37)
This classification approach provides a viable way to estimate the density ratio for
any point fi ∈ Θ from samples. At its core, the classification method is estimating a
function with inputs from the set of all possible parameters that outputs the density
ratio at that point. A variety of classification approaches exist and provide varying
types of classifiers. Any classification method used for estimating density ratios should
exhibit a few properties and operate under a few assumptions:
1. The method should provide class probabilities. Further, the class probabilities
should be asymptotically consistent to the true class probabilities.
2. P(yi = 1|fi) should be smooth and nonlinear in f . For the vast majority of
distributions, there should be no expectation that the likelihood ratio monoton-
ically increases or decreases in the feature space. As such, the classifier should
uncover a smooth, but nonlinear, function of f for the probability that the value
comes from P(θ|X ).
3. Related to nonlinearity, the class probability for values outside of the observed
range should approach equality. Specifically, assume that P(θ|X ) and Q(θ|γ)
are probability distributions that share a common domain over all dimensions.
Let R ⊆ Θ be the convex hull dictated by F . For any η 6∈ R, P(η|X )Q(η|γ) = 1.
Using a classification approach that meets these requirements, the class probabilities
can be used to estimate posterior distributions for κ(β1) and κ(β2) that converge, in
expectation, to their true values:
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Lemma 4.5.2. Let φ(f) = P(y = 1|f ∈ R,F ) be the true probability that f comes
from P(θ|X ). Given T = N + M samples from the posterior and approximation,
fi ∈ (f1, f2, ..., fT ), let φˆ(fi) = P(y = 1|f = fi) be the individual class probability
estimates. Assuming that φˆ(fi)
p→ φ(f), the individual class probability estimates
can be used to derive an estimate for κ(β1) and κ(β2) such that:
g
(
{φˆ(f1), φˆ(f2), ..., φˆ(fT )}
)
p→ κ(β1)
h
(
{φˆ(f1), φˆ(f2), ..., φˆ(fT )}
)
p→ κ(β2)
(4.38)
where g() and h() are functions of estimated class probabilities of the samples. In
turn, there exist posterior distributions for κ(β1) and κ(β2) such that:
E[κ(β1)|F ] = g
(
{φˆ(f1), φˆ(f2), ..., φˆ(fT )}
)
E[κ(β2)|F ] = h
(
{φˆ(f1), φˆ(f2), ..., φˆ(fT )}
) (4.39)
Proof. A proof for this statement can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.5.2 shows that tractably estimating a posterior distribution for κ(β1) and
κ(β2) only requires estimating the class probabilities given by a probabilistic clas-
sification approach and accepting a few asymptotic assumptions. As long as the
probabilistic classification method used gives consistent estimates of the class prob-
abilities for each of the samples in the training set, the distribution function for the
maximum and minimum density ratios can be estimated.
A nonlinear classification approach that meets the necessary conditions is the classi-
fication random forest and corresponding nonparametric probability machine (Mal-
ley et al., 2012; Wright and Ziegler, 2015). Using this approach for classification, a
method for estimating the posterior distributions for P(κ(β1)|θ∗,ω∗) and P(κ(β2)|θ∗,ω∗)
has the following structure:
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1. Consider a T × K matrix of training data, F , that includes N samples from
P(θ|X ) and M samples from Q(θ|γ).
2. A bootstrap sample with replacement of size T is taken from the training set.
The samples left out due to the bootstrap procedure are called the out-of-bag
(OOB) samples.
3. A classification tree is grown using the bootstrap data set. The tree is con-
structed by recursively splitting data into distinct subsets so that one parent
node leaves two child nodes. For splitting data, all splits of a random subset of
features are considered. The optimal split of a feature is the one minimizing the
value of some dichotomous purity measure, such as the Gini index or deviance.
4. The tree is grown to the greatest extent possible but requiring a minimum
nodesize of 10% of the sample. No pruning is performed. The final nodes in a
tree are called terminal nodes. Note that this step is somewhat different than
the standard random forest algorithm.
5. Class probabilities for each OOB sample are computed by dropping the observa-
tion down the tree to its terminal node and computing the proportion of in-bag
samples belonging to each class at that node.
6. Steps 2-5 are repeated B times to grow B classification trees.
7. Across the B trees, let φˆ(fi) be the set of Si class probabilities dictating P(y =
1|fi,F ) computed when observation i ∈ (1, ..., T ) is OOB. Given that the boot-
strap with replacement includes, on average, 63.2% of the data, E[Si] = .368B.
Define the sample means and variances as:
φ¯Si(fi) =
1
Si
Si∑
s=1
φˆ(fsi)
σˆ2φ(fsi) =
1
Si − 1
Si∑
s=1
(φˆ(fsi)− φ¯Si(fi))2
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and define the sampling distribution for P(y = 1|fi,F ) as:
N
(
φ¯Si(fi),
σˆ2φ(fsi)
Si
)
8. Use empirical evaluation methods to construct the CDF of the minimum and
maximum class probabilities. For a large number of points g ∈ (0, 1):
P(maxφ(f) < g) =
T∏
i=1
g∫
0
N
(
x ; φ¯Si(fi),
σˆ2φ(fsi)
Si
)
dx
P(minφ(f) < g) =
T∏
i=1
1∫
g
N
(
x ; φ¯Si(fi),
σˆ2φ(fsi)
Si
)
dx
9. Transform g such that:
u(y) =
My
N(1− y) ; v(y) =
1 + y log y − y
y − log y − 1 ; g
∗ = v(u(g))
10. Given the distribution functions for the minimum and maximum, random draws
can be taken from each distribution by passing a uniform random variate to the
inverse distribution functions. Draws taken in this way are equivalent to draws
taken from P(κ(β1)|θ∗,ω∗) and P(κ(β2)|θ∗,ω∗).
JSW bounds represent a limiting case of kappa bounds; when samples from the pos-
terior and approximation are associated with class probabilities that are essentially
zero or one, kappa bounds are exactly the same as JSW bounds. In cases where the
approximation and posterior are truly far apart, this is the desired behavior. How-
ever, random forest classification algorithms seek to draw sharp boundaries between
classes and unbalanced gaps that exist between the posterior and approximations
samples can lead the algorithm to estimate class probabilities that are much closer to
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zero or one than they truthfully are. This can be prevented by drawing many samples
from both the posterior and approximation, so it is of utmost importance that a large
number of samples is taken from each distributions. This is even more important
for high dimensional posteriors due to the curse of dimensionality. Similarly, it is
important that the number of trees that are grown in the random forest algorithm
is large enough that each observation is OOB enough times such that the normality
assumption is not egregiously violated. A general rule of thumb that leads to good
performance is to set N and M equal to at least two times the number of dimensions
in the posterior. Similarly, growing at least 3680 trees for the random forest classifier
leads to each observation being OOB 1000 times, in expectation. These values show
good performance in tests and bootstrapping shows that these values allow the as-
sumptions made above to hold. New implementations of the random forest algorithm
allow for quick and efficient training of classifiers, even on large and high-dimensional
data sets, so computation time is of little concern.
Using this algorithm to estimate the distribution of κ(β1) and κ(β2), a full algorithm
for estimating kappa bounds has the following scheme:
1. Given a model with parameters θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θk} ∈ Θ, prior density, pi(θ),
and observed data, X , use simulation methods to get N draws from P(θ|X ),
θ∗ = (θ∗1, θ
∗
2, ..., θ
∗
N) ∈ Θ.
2. For each θ∗i ∈ θ∗, compute the complete data likelihood, P(θ∗i ,X ).
3. Given θ∗, choose an approximate posterior, Q(θ|γ).
4. Assess the density of each θ∗i ∈ θ∗ with respect to Q, Q(θ∗i |γ).
5. Take M independent and identically distributed draws from Q(θ|γ), ω∗ =
(ω∗1, ω
∗
2, ..., ω
∗
M) ∈ Θ.
187
6. For each ω∗j ∈ ω∗, compute the complete data likelihood P(ω∗j ,X ) and assess
the density with respect to Q, Q(ω∗j |γ).
7. Compute the parameters for the posterior distributions of U and L in Defi-
nition 4.4.2. Similarly, compute the empirical approximation to the posterior
distributions of κ(β1) and κ(β2) in Definition 4.5.2 outlined above.
8. Given the set of posteriors, take a large number of draws from P(U|θ∗), P(L|ω∗),
P(κ(β1)|θ∗,ω∗), and P(κ(β2)|θ∗,ω∗). Given the prior parameters a and b, plug
these values into the four-parameter beta distribution and take draws from the
posterior. This creates a large number of draws from the posterior for the
marginal likelihood. Posterior intervals can be calculated using these Monte
Carlo samples.
4.5.3 Performance of Kappa Bounds
Like JSW bounds, empirical estimates of kappa bounds on the marginal likelihood
should surround the true marginal likelihood. As with the bridge sampling estimator
and JSW intervals, this can be assessed directly in a situation where the true marginal
likelihood is known. Unlike JSW intervals, however, kappa bounds should not always
include the true value of the marginal likelihood - since kappa bounds limit the width
of the interval to only include marginal likelihood values that are possible given the
ELBO and EUBO, Again, this is best explored by simulating the coverage of kappa
bounds and comparing their width to JSW intervals.
Using the running linear regression example, I compare the bridge sampling estimator,
JSW intervals, and kappa intervals to the true log marginal likelihood calculated by
the Candidate’s estimator. After the true model is estimated under varying numbers
of covariates, posterior warping is used to induce skewness. The posteriors are ap-
proximated by multivariate normal distributions that are fit using a moment-matching
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FIGURE 4.4. Bridge sampling estimator, JSW intervals, and Kappa intervals
for 500 randomly generated linear regression data sets with varying numbers
of covariates and amounts of posterior skew.
500 Covs. − No Skew 500 Covs. − High Skew
25 Covs. − No Skew 25 Covs. − High Skew
−1 0 1 −50 −25 0 25
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Bridge Est. JSW 95% Bounds Kappa 95% Bounds
Marginal Likelihood Estimates and Bounds
Take note of the extremely different scales on each x−axis!
Note: Data are generated from a linear regression model with a known error variance.
Skewness is induced using posterior warping techniques from Meng and Schilling
(2002). 95% HDP intervals are shown for JSW and Kappa intervals. Percentages are
computed with respect to the Candidate’s estimator to the marginal likelihood for each
model. Bayesian linear regression posterior samples and Candidate’s estimator were
computed using MCMCregress from MCMCpack in R (Martin et al., 2011).
technique. As with JSW intervals, kappa bounds are estimated using a maximum-
width Beta(0, 0) prior. The location of kappa intervals is compared to the location of
JSW intervals and the bridge sampling point estimator. Coverage of JSW intervals
and kappa bounds are computed and compared. Since 95% intervals are computed,
an ideal interval would show that roughly 95% of the 500 intervals estimated in this
simulation scheme cover the true log marginal likelihood value.
Figure 4.4 shows the results of these simulations. A first glance shows that the
location of kappa bounds and JSW bounds are generally similar and cover the true
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log marginal likelihood. Compared to the bridge sampling estimator, the interval
estimates perform favorably - true values are covered even when the bridge sampling
estimator is far away from the true value. There is a strong correlation between the
magnitude of the incorrectness of the bridge sampling estimator and the width of the
intervals. In many ways, this is a desirable result; since the underlying machinery of
the bridge sampling estimator and intervals are similar, it is expected that they share
similar locations. However, the fact that the intervals cover the true value make model
comparison under the interval estimators superior to the bridge sampling estimator.
JSW intervals are overly wide and have 100% coverage of the true log marginal likeli-
hood value. Figure 4.4 shows that the theoretical improvements of the kappa intervals
are carried to estimation and the expected shrinkage of the JSW interval occurs. For
the posteriors with no skew, the kappa interval is, on average, 63% smaller. This
corresponds to an average maximum log density ratio of the posterior to the ap-
proximation of approximately 3 and a minimum of -3. For posteriors with skew, the
improvement is roughly 51%, on average, corresponding to maximum and minimum
log density ratios of approximately 5 and -5. Under skewness in the posterior, mul-
tivariate normality is no longer approximately correct. However, these simulations
show that even a rough approximation demonstrates significant improvement.
A second consideration is the interval coverage. In the case of no skewness, across
different dimensionalities of the posterior, 95% kappa intervals have roughly 95%
coverage (95.2% for 25 covariates and 94.8% for 500 covariates). In the case of skew-
ness, the coverage is lower (91.4% for 25 covariates and 89.6% for 500 covariates),
but still reasonable. The decreased coverage is likely explained by violations of the
independence assumption, specifically U − L ⊥ κ(β1), κ(β2). U − L encodes one
sense of closeness of the posterior and approximation, the average density ratio, while
κ(β1) and κ(β2) encode a notion of absolute closeness similar to the total variation
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distance. Pinsker’s inequality proves these two quantites are related and, for finite
sample spaces, the KL divergence is bounded by the total variation distance (Basu
and Ho, 2006). As such, it is reasonable to expect that there is some correlation
between U − L and κ(β1), κ(β2). While the extent of this effect is not explicitly ad-
dressed in this simulation, the coverage is not wildly off from the expected coverage
and further simulations show that this effect does not seem to have an impact in
realistic model evaluation settings. Thus, corrections for this correlation are left to
further work.
Taken as a whole, these simulations show that kappa bounds provide a superior
approach to estimating the log marginal likelihood over JSW bounds and the bridge
sampling estimator. Even accounting for the low additional computational overhead,
kappa bounds provide a fast and flexible approach to estimating the log marginal
likelihood that can be applied to a wide variety of Bayesian models.
4.6 Application of Kappa Bounds to Ordered Factor Analy-
sis Models
4.6.1 Kappa Bounds Applied to Simulated Data
The previous simulations demonstrate the accuracy and coverage of kappa bounds
in a situation where the log marginal likelihood is known. While this was important
for comparison and assessment of quality, kappa bounds are most useful in situa-
tions where the marginal likelihood is difficult to calculate and current methods of
approximation work poorly. One such model is the ordered factor analysis model.
Let X be a data set of Q observations of P ordered discrete items. Ordered factor
analysis seeks to find sources of shared covariance among the items. Specifically, the
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P items associated with observation q ∈ (1, ..., Q) have the following model:
X ∗q = α+ Λωq + σq (4.40)
where X ∗q is a P -vector of continuous latent variable representations of the observed
discrete outcomes, α is a P -vector of intercepts, ωq is a K-vector of factor scores asso-
ciated with each observation, Λ is a P×K matrix of factor loadings, and σq is P -vector
of idiosyncratic noise that follows a P -dimensional multivariate standard normal dis-
tribution with diagonal covariance. In order to effectively model the discrete nature
of the outcomes, X ∗j ∀ j ∈ (1, ..., P ), define a set of Cj + 1 ordered cut points for each
item, γj,k ∈ (γj,1, ..., γj,Cj+1) where γj,1 = −∞ < γj,2 = 0 < ... < γj,C < γj,C+1 = ∞
where Cj is the number of possible values that an observations take on item j. As-
suming that X ∗ follows a normal distribution, each discrete value can be modeled
as:
P (Yq,j = c ∈ (1, ..., Cj)|−) =
γj,c+1∫
γj,c
N (x;X ∗qj, 1)dx (4.41)
Under a Bayesian specification, model estimation can be done using MCMC methods
(see Martin et al. (2011) for details on model fitting). Conjugate priors exist for all
parameters except for the cutpoints, which are modeled using a normal distribution.
Ordered factor analysis is often used as a tool for testing theories of relationships
between covariates and model comparison between competing models is a key step for
using this model. There are two related choices that the researcher must make in order
to specify and identify factor analysis models. First, the dimensionality of the latent
scores is undefined and must be chosen by the researcher. For identification purposes,
K must be less than P , but any other possible specification is a viable choice. Theory
may dictate how many dimensions should exist. However, the dimensionality of the
latent space is often related to the main question being answered by the ordered
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factor analysis model and testing is needed to choose between a number of competing
theories.
Second, ordered factor analysis is often used to test direct relationships between
items and this requires fitting models with a number of constraints in the loadings
matrix (see Joreskog (1969) for a more thorough discussion of confirmatory factor
analysis methods). While a few constraints in the loadings matrix are required for
model identification due to the factor analysis model’s inherent rotational invariance
(Geweke and Zhou, 1996), most constraints are placed to correspond with a specific
measurement construct that matches a theory. These constraints have wide-reaching
implications for research questions and can be used to empirically codify different
theories. Choosing between competing theories, then, requires comparing numerous
models that have different constraints.
As with any factor analysis model (and structural equation models, more generally),
model comparison is a key step for theory testing in ordered factor analysis models.
A number of approaches exist for comparing factor analysis models, but most of these
approaches are theoretically deficient and result in comparisons that are known to
unduly favor overly parsimonious models due to strong normality assumptions in the
observed data (Forero et al., 2009). This problem is even further exacerbated when
using discrete factor analysis models since the observed outcomes are, by definition,
not normally distributed.
Many of these problems are addressed for the continuous factor analysis by estimating
the model under a Bayesian specification and computing the marginal likelihood for
each competing model. Lopes and West (2004) explore a number of approaches for
estimating the marginal likelihood of continuous factor analysis models and show that
the bridge sampling estimator provides an accurate approximation to the value of in-
terest, performing better than approximations to the Candidate’s estimator, Laplace
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approximation, various factor analysis fitting criteria, and even their own reversible-
jump MCMC method when attempting to select the correct model. While this work
only seeks to determine dimensionality, the results show that marginal likelihood esti-
mation is an ideal approach to comparing factor analysis models due to its inherently
balanced overfitting and underfitting penalties.
Lopes and West (2004) only make comparisons for exploratory factor analysis mod-
els with continuous and approximately normal observed outcomes. From previous
simulations, it is reasonable to believe that the bridge sampling estimator suffers in
less ideal conditions; particularly those that are presented by the posterior from the
ordered factor analysis model. First, continuous factor analysis essentially guaran-
tees that the resulting posteriors will be approximately multivariate normal due to
its strong conjugate normal-normal structure and this structure can be further en-
sured by marginalizing over the factor scores. Ordered factor analysis, on the other
hand, is known to produce posteriors for the loadings that are skewed when the
number of observations associated with each possible outcome are unbalanced and
marginalization over the factor scores is computationally infeasible, leading to a high
dimensional posterior.7 Second, Lopes and West (2004) do not consider the ability of
various marginal likelihood approximation methods to discriminate between models
with various constraints. Dealing with constraints is often more tedious than adding
or subtracting whole dimensions from the latent space, and can lead to models where
factor loadings are only barely identified and present wide, skewed posteriors (Ghosh
and Dunson, 2009). Finally, from a computational standpoint, ordered factor analysis
often exhibits high autocorrelation and poor mixing in MCMC chains due to difficulty
identifying and estimating cutpoints, especially as the number of dimensions and con-
7PK−P +QK+
P∑
j=1
Cj dimensions in an ordered factor analysis posterior compared to PK+2P
in the reduced form continuous factor analysis posterior, to be exact, minus any fixed values within
the factor loadings matrix.
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straints increases. While this can be partially addressed by long burnin periods and
heavy thinning, the various quirks that exist in the posterior could lead to trouble
for the bridge sampling estimator.
Ordered factor analysis is an ideal application for interval estimates of the marginal
likelihood, specifically kappa bounds. While the posterior under a well-identified
model is expected to be approximately normal, there is little reason to believe that
posteriors are approximately symmetric in less well-behaved scenarios. Assuming
standard conjugate priors, uniform priors on the cutpoints, and treating α as a stan-
dard intercept, the complete data likelihood is easily computed for each posterior
draw from an ordered factor analysis model:
P(X ,θ) =
(
Q∏
q=1
P∏
j=1
P(Yq,j = Xq,j|−)
)(
P∏
j=1
K+1∏
k=1
N (λj,k;λ0, σ2λ0)
)(
Q∏
q=1
K∏
k=1
N (ωq,k; 0, 1)
)
(4.42)
It is similarly easy to take a set of draws from an approximation to the posterior
and compute the associated complete data likelihood values. Thus, the algorithm
for kappa bounds is easily implemented on posterior draws from an ordered factor
analysis model.
To demonstrate the efficacy of kappa bounds on a more complicated model, I use
simulation to show the quality of kappa bounds in estimating reasonable interval
estimates of the marginal likelihood of ordered factor analysis models specifically for
the purpose of model selection. I compare kappa bounds to the bridge sampling
estimator and JSW bounds. Specifically, I generate 500 data sets of 500 observations
over 10 discrete, ordered items that have between 3 and 7 unique responses from a
known set of loadings, constraints, and factor scores. Using the ordered factor analysis
implementation from MCMCpack in R, MCMCordfactanal, I generate samples from the
resulting posterior distributions of 5 potential models shown in Table 4.1 (Martin
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TABLE 4.1. Factor loading constraints matrix for each model compared on
simulated data.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
+


+ 0
0
0
0
0
0 +
0
0
0
0


+ 0
0
0
0
0
+


+ 0
+


+ 0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
+

Note: 0 indicates that the loading is fixed to zero. + indicates that the loading is
constrained to be positive. Note that M3 is the correct model for the simulated data.
et al., 2011). These models range from the minimally constrained one dimensional
model to a three dimensional model that is close to the true model. Constraints
associated with each model can be seen in Table 4.1 and the simulated data was
generated using M3. Diffuse N (0, 100) priors are used for the factor loadings in each
model. For each data set, I ran the MCMC algorithm for 20,000 burnin iterations and
kept 10,000 posterior draws that were thinned every 5 iterations. For the cutpoints
that are drawn via a Metropolis-Hastings step, the width of the normal proposal
distribution was tuned for all parameters such that the acceptance ratio was as close
to 25% as possible. Monte Carlo standard errors were used to monitor convergence
of each run and there were no indications of convergence issues for the structural
parameters. The effective sample size of the complete data likelihood was used as the
number of posterior samples.8
8Effective sample size was monitored for all parameters. However, it is difficult to use this much
information to make an informed choice on stopping the chain. As such, I monitored the ESS
on the complete data log likelihood for each iteration. Over all 500 replicated data sets, the ESS
ranged between roughly 3,500 and 7,200. In the worst case, the ESS was roughly two times the
number of parameters being monitored. In practice, this appears to be more than enough draws to
establish consistent estimates for the bridge sampling estimator, JSW bounds, and kappa bounds.
As a sanity check, I ran multiple chains for a number of the models and these estimates of the log
marginal likelihood remained relatively constant. This work leaves little reason to believe that the
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For each model, a multivariate normal distribution was used for the approximation to
the posterior and maximum likelihood estimates for the mean and covariance matrix
was used to parameterize the approximation. Note that the dimensionality of the
multivariate normal distribution varied widely depending on the model, ranging 530
dimensions in the smallest model to 1564 dimensions in the largest, with the bulk
of the parameters being the factor scores for the 500 observations across 1, 2, or 3
dimensions. For elements of the factor loadings matrix that were constrained to be
positive, the approximation was truncated at 0. Posteriors for the cutpoints were also
included in the approximation and were truncated at zero.9 For each model, I took
10,000 i.i.d. draws from the multivariate normal approximation.
When computing kappa bounds, I used the probability classification random forest
algorithm from the ranger package in R. For each model, I used 6 CPU cores at 3.7
GHz to compute 3,680 trees to learn the classification probabilities and correspond-
ing standard errors. This took 45 seconds per model, on average. For the interval
estimators, I used a Beta(0, 0) priors on the log marginal likelihood and took 100,000
Monte Carlo draws from the empirical posteriors of U , L, κ(β1), κ(β2) which resulted
in 100,000 draws from the posterior on the marginal likelihood. 95% highest poste-
rior density intervals were derived for the interval estimates using these draws. For
the bridge sampling estimator, the iterative scheme was run until the difference in
iterations was less than .0001 on the log scale.10
results are a function of having too few draws from the posterior.
9The strict ordering constraint of the cutpoints presents a challenge when defining an approx-
imation. Since there is no easy way to guarantee that the approximation draws follow the strict
ordering on their own, I ensured that draws taken from the approximation for the cutpoints obeyed
the necessary inequalities by ex-post truncating the draws in order from lowest to highest. I also
tried to ensure this ordering by only accepting draws from the approximation that had the correct
ordering, which proved to be computationally expensive. Both methods yielded similar results, so I
went with the less costly approach.
10A single run for each model including the MCMC, draws from approximation, computation of
the complete data log likelihood for both the posterior and approximation draws, computation of
density with respect to the approximation, random forest, and Monte Carlo draws from the various
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FIGURE 4.5. Comparison of marginal likelihood estimates for ordered factor
analysis models.
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Note: Bars denote the 95% HPD implied by 100,000 Monte Carlo samples for JSW
and Kappa bounds. Note that M3 is the model from which the data was generated..
TABLE 4.2. Probability each ordered factor analysis model best fits the data.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Bridge.Est. 0.4472 0.5527 .0001 0 0
JSW Bounds 0.1833 0.0338 0.7364 0.0465 0
[0,1] [0,0.5128] [0,1] [0,0.9434] [0,0]
Kappa Bounds 0 .0004 0.9996 0 0
[0,.0006] [0,0.0019] [0.9978,1] [0,0] [0,0]
Note: 95% intervals are presented for JSW Bounds and Kappa Bounds. Probabilities
are calculated as the probability each marginal likelihood is greater than all other
models’ marginal likelihood. 10,000 Monte Carlo samples are used to compute this
probability.
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Figure 4.5 shows the results for each marginal likelihood estimation method for the
first data replicate. Table 4.3 shows the probability that each model is considered the
best model under each marginal likelihood estimation technique and presents 95%
intervals on this quantity for the interval estimates. Given that M3 is the correct
model, it is easy to see that the bridge sampling estimator unduly favors the lower
dimensional model (M1) and the overconstrained model (M2). Exploring the poste-
riors that result from this model demonstrate that the same effects seen in previous
simulations hold true: under skewness, the bridge sampling estimator is produces
precise but incorrect estimates. In all cases, even the one dimensional model, there
is significant skew in the factor loading posteriors and multimodality in the cutpoint
posteriors. Beyond favoring the incorrect models, the bridge sampling estimator does
a poor job of specifically choosing the best model; M1, M2, and M3 all have essen-
tially the same estimate for the marginal likelihood. In some sense, this is desirable
since it is selecting the wrong model, but incorrect is incorrect. JSW intervals fair
better as the midpoint of each interval is in an approximately correct order. However,
the wide bounds on each interval make choosing a best model impossible since they
all include log marginal likelihood estimates around -690. This is reflected in Table
4.3 since the 95% intervals for three separate models essentially cover the entire unit
interval.
Kappa bounds provide the correct answer in this specific example. While kappa
bounds cannot discriminate between certain models, it does select the correct model
under the 95% intervals. Perhaps just as interesting, kappa bounds significantly
improve on the JSW intervals in all cases, reducing the width by at least 50% across
all models. Even under a truly skewed posterior with incorrect assignment of high
posterior took 2 minutes, on average. All in, this entire simulation took roughly 4 days to complete.
This simulation, along with the many other computational strains that were given in pursuit of this
topic, also took the life of two sticks of RAM that had served me well for a little over a year. You
are gone but not forgotten.
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TABLE 4.3. Proportion of times over 500 data replicates that each ordered
factor analysis model best fits the data.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Bridge Est. .384 .364 .252 0 0
JSW Bounds 0 0 .028 0 0
Kappa Bounds 0 .002 .976 0 0
Note: For interval estimates, 95% intervals are estimated and a winner is only declared
if the highest marginal likelihood interval does not cross any other interval. This leads
to less than 500 unique winners.
density areas in the posterior, the kappa bounds eliminate a large portion of the JSW
bounds that represent impossible combinations of KL(P||Q) and KL(Q||P). Looking
at Table 4.3, it is clear that kappa bounds pick the correct winner almost 100% of
the time. When compared to the other two approaches, kappa bounds provide the
only marginal likelihood estimates that confidently select the correct model.
To ensure that this result holds over many different data sets, I computed the number
of times that each estimation approach distinctly selected each model over the 500
data replicates. For the bridge sampling estimator, this simply requires selecting the
model for each data set that has the highest marginal likelihood estimate. For JSW
bounds and kappa bounds, this required determining if the lower bound on the highest
95% interval estimate is greater than all other models. This led to a situations where
there were not 500 unique winners for the intervals. Table 4.3 shows these results and
demonstrates that the single example is generally indicative of the behavior for each
method. Bridge sampling presents a tossup between M1, M2, and M3 while JSW
bounds almost never pick a winner. However, kappa bounds select the appropriate
model 97.6% of the time. This difference makes it clear that kappa bounds are a
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superior approach for estimating the marginal likelihood of ordered factor analysis
models. Generally, this simulation demonstrates the promise of this approach for
marginal likelihood estimation in high dimensional non-normal settings.
4.6.2 Kappa Bounds Applied to Racial Resentment in the U.S.
Comparison of ordered factor analysis models is a central task in the social sciences,
frequently used when analyzing political beliefs and behavior through survey data.
Common survey items ask respondents to agree of disagree, rating their opinion on
an ordered scale, with statements related to concepts of interest. Factor analysis
methods are then used to model common covariance sources and to map questions
to latent constructs of interest (Joreskog, 1967, 1969). While ordered factor analysis
implementations are widely available, many scholars still use the standard factor
analysis toolkit when analyzing ordered discrete survey data. A large reason that
this is the case is that there are few model comparison tools available for the ordered
factor analysis toolkit. Kappa bounds provide a reliable option for doing just this.
I choose to demonstrate the practical usage of kappa bounds by exploring the racial
resentment scale developed by Kinder et al. (1996). The racial resentment scale uses a
carefully designed battery of questions asked in the 1986 American National Election
study to explore attitudes of “symbolic racism” in the American public. Kinder et al.
(1996) argue that this racial resentment measure acts as a unique combination of
traditional racism and old-fashioned American individualism and explains much of the
resistance from white Americans to racial policies. Kinder et al. (1996) show evidence
for this theory through a series of confirmatory factor analyses that demonstrate
that the racial resentment battery explains much of the correlation to attitudes on
affirmative action and other racial policies where traditional racism and individualism
items do not.
This theory has received numerous criticisms in the political science and sociology
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literatures since its conception, specifically regarding attitudes towards black Amer-
icans. Most of this criticism stems from the fact that the racial resentment measure
is confounded with the outcome that it attempts to measure - racial policy atti-
tudes. This has led to numerous studies, Carmines et al. (2011), Feldman and Huddy
(2005), and Roos et al. (2019) just to name a few, which have shown that the racial
resentment measure explains little variation that standard survey items related to
traditional racism and individualism do not.
Since one aspect of this issue related to comparison of factor analysis models, kappa
bounds applied to ordered factor analysis provides a new and reliable approach to
comparing various models related to racial resentment measure. I use kappa bound
estimates for the marginal likelihood to explore the relationship between the racial
resentment, individualism, and traditional racism batteries in the 1986 ANES and
explore whether there is evidence that the racial resentment battery explains variation
in American attitudes that is unexplained by individualism and traditional racist
attitudes through simple model comparison.11
I used the 1986 ANES data used in Kinder et al. (1996) and Carmines et al. (2011) to
perform this exercise. I included three separate survey question batteries: 6 questions
related to racial resentment, 5 related to individualism, and 4 related to traditional
racist attitudes. Each of these questions asked respondents to rate their agreement or
disagreement with a statement on a scale of strongly disagree to strongly agree, coded
as a 5-point Likert scale. Of the 2,176 respondents included in the 1986 ANES, half
were assigned to the survey group that responded to these questions. I further chose
to only keep respondents that chose to respond to at least 12 of the 15 question (i.e.
11Note that this exercise is simply empirical. I do not purport that this work confirms or denies
any existing theories of how or why attitudes have changed towards racial policies in the U.S. For
a more thorough discussion on mechanisms and theories, see Carmines et al. (2011), Feldman and
Huddy (2005), Roos et al. (2019), and the many other great works that are cited by these authors.
202
those that provided an explicit agreement rating to at least 12 out of 15 questions).
This led to a final sample size of 1,042 respondents over 15 items.
To explore the relationship between these three survey batteries, I specified a number
of confirmatory ordered factor analysis models having between 1 and 3 dimensions,
ensuring that each model had enough constraints on the factor loadings matrix to
ensure identifiability of the resulting structural estimates.12 These models tested
numerous viable theories related to the racial resentment measure ranging from a
simple one dimensional model to more complex factor patterns that imply a range of
conditional independence structures between the three survey batteries.
I present results showing model comparison metrics for 8 of these models. A summary
of the constraint specifications for each of these eight models can be seen in Table
4.4. Each ordered factor analysis model was run using the same choices for number
of draws, thinning intervals, etc. from the previous section. An important note
was that for some models, particularly those with poor choices of constraints, model
convergence for the structural parameters was more of a problem. This is generally
an indication of a poorly fitting model. For the purposes of providing meaningful
estimates for each model, any convergence problems were addressed by doubling the
number of burnins and the thinning interval.
Figure 4.6 shows kappa bounds and bridge sampling estimates to the marginal likeli-
hood for each of these eight models. The fit of these models varies widely and depends
12I followed the identification structure presented by Geweke and Zhou (1996). This amounts to
choosing one positivity constraint on each dimensions and ensuring that enough structural zeros are
added to the loadings matrix such that each matrix could be expressed in a lower block triangular
structure with positive elements on the diagonal and zeros above the main diagonal. Directional
constraints were chosen after an initial pilot run for each model without constraints to ensure that the
resulting posteriors were sufficiently far away from zero. Zero constraints where added in accordance
to numerous constructs being measured or to preserve battery structure in the case of models testing
theories with a minimal number of constraints.
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TABLE 4.4. Loadings Matrix Constraint Specification for Models of Racial
Resentment (RR), Individualism (I), and Traditional Racism (TR) Survey Bat-
teries from 1986 ANES.
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 7 7
I 3 7 7
TR 3 7 7
(a) M1
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 7 7
I 7 3 7
TR 7 3 7
(b) M2
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 7 7
I 7 3 7
TR 3 7 7
(c) M3
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 7 7
I 3 7 7
TR 7 3 7
(d) M4
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 7 7
I 7 3 7
TR 7 7 3
(e) M5
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 3 7
I 3 3 7
TR 3 3 7
(f) M6
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 3 3
I 3 3 3
TR 3 3 3
(g) M7
Battery
Dims.
D1 D2 D3
RR 3 3 3/7
I 3 3 7
TR 3 7 3
(h) M8
Note: 3indicates that the battery was included on a dimension while 7indicates it was not
included (i.e. the loading was restricted to be exactly equal to zero). 3/7indicates that the
questions were split according to information gained from previous models. Specific details
are given for M8 in the text. All specifications and code can be found in this paper’s
supplemental files and any clarification can be given by the author (i.e. me) on request.
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FIGURE 4.6. Comparison of marginal likelihood estimates given by kappa
bounds and bridge sampling for an ordered factor analysis model applied to
questions related to racial resentment in the 1986 ANES.
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Note: Bars denote the 95% HPD implied by 100,000 Monte Carlo samples. Specific
model specifications can be found in Table 4.4.
heavily on how constraints are applied to the data. Interestingly, the worst perform-
ing model in both bridge sampling and kappa bounds is M5, which assumes that
the racial resentment, individualism, and traditional racism batteries are condition-
ally independent of one another. While both estimates provide marginal likelihood
estimates on the same scale as the kappa bounds, using bridge sampling to select a
best model leads to a different conclusion that kappa bounds. Bridge sampling se-
lects M3 as the best model, which implies that the racial resentment and traditional
racism batteries belong on the same single dimension while the individualism battery
is conditionally independent of these concepts. On the other hand, kappa bounds
select M8, a more nuanced three dimensional model with specific zero constraints
on the racial resentment battery. As simulations show that kappa bounds perform
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better in the ordered factor analysis scenario, there is reason to trust that M8 is the
true best-fitting model. This situation shows how the choice of marginal likelihood
approximation technique can have large implications for model selection problems.
The two best performing models according to kappa bounds are the unconstrained
dimensional model and a three dimensional model with carefully selected constraints
informed by numerous exploratory factor analysis models. This points to a conclusion
that there is a statistical relationship between traditional racist attitudes, individual-
ism, and the racial resentment battery beyond a simple one or two dimensional model;
rather, the model evidence points to a complex three-way relationship between these
concepts that has been noted in numerous studies. However, kappa bounds are able
to distinguish between two models that only differ in a few constraints and is able to
distinguish that more constraints are needed to improve on the unconstrained three
dimensional model. Substantively, the improvement of M8 over M7 leads to two key
insights: 1) When controlling for common covariance across all three batteries, there
is little evidence that individualism and traditional racism include more shared co-
variance and 2) three questions from the racial resentment battery have additional
sources of covariance that are explained by traditional racist attitudes. These findings
echo those found by Carmines et al. (2011) and demonstrate that the survey batteries
frequently used to measure racial resentment should be subject to more scrutiny.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a new approach for estimating intervals on the marginal
likelihood. Where previous methods of marginal likelihood estimation come with no
information about the quality of the estimate, the new interval estimation method ex-
plicitly bakes quality into the interval width - low quality estimates have larger widths
while high quality estimates provide narrow intervals and high certainty about the
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value of the marginal likelihood. Intervals derived from the key variational inequali-
ties show good behavior, but include a wide set of values that cannot possibly exist
because of the relationship between forward and reverse KL divergences. I derive a
new bounding inequality on the ratio of these two quantities and use this to derive
kappa bounds, a state-of-the-art interval on the marginal likelihood that is narrow and
has good coverage properties on the true marginal likelihood. Compared to Monte
Carlo estimation approaches, I demonstrate the ease of estimation and superiority
of estimates given by kappa bounds in a number of simulated and real-world data
settings.
Extensions to kappa bounds are numerous. A first extension uses kappa bounds to
handle situations where exact draws from the joint posterior require prohibitively ex-
pensive computation. While the derivations in this paper assume that P(θ|X ) can be
known exactly, Grosse et al. (2015) present a novel bidirectional Monte Carlo scheme
that combines the computational efficiency of variational approaches with a slightly
more expensive sequential Monte Carlo scheme to model departures from the initial
variational approximations. Where this approach seeks to sequentially maximize the
ELBO and then minimize the EUBO, kappa bounds provide an approach fitting cri-
teria can be conditioned on the sequence of kappa bounds across observations. With
light changes, the refined variational inequalities presented in this paper can be used
to estimate the marginal likelihood which can then be used as a fitting criteria - the
algorithm can find the minimum width set of kappa bounds over all possible joint
posteriors. This kappa criteria provides a novel fitting criteria that would seek to
improve variational Bayesian estimation procedures.
A second extension adds the advancements in choosing approximations presented by
Wang and Meng (2016). Throughout this paper, simple multivariate normal approx-
imations are used. While kappa bounds perform better than other approaches using
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this approximation, the width of kappa bounds can be further reduced by increasing
the quality of the approximation. More computationally efficient implementations
of the posterior warping algorithms from Wang and Meng (2016) are one way that
approximations can be improved. However, advancements in high dimensional ker-
nel density estimation have made estimation of nonparametric densities in otherwise
impossible settings more viable. Combined with advancements in estimation of high
dimensional copula to handle complex dependency patterns between parameters in
a model, the kernel density estimation approach can make approximation methods
more accurate and, in turn, return better estimates of the marginal likelihood. The
width of kappa bounds signifies the quality of the approximation, so kappa bounds
can be used to assess whether or not these approaches are providing meaningfully
better results than the parametric counterparts.
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A Proof for Lemma 4.4.1
By the law of iterated expectations and α ⊥⊥ U ⊥⊥ L:
E[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = Eα[(1− α)U + αL] = E[(1− α)]U + E[α]L
Leveraging the same independence:
E[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = E[(1− α)]U0 + E[α]L0
is an unbiased estimator for the posterior mean.
By the law of total variance:
V[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = Vα[(1− α)U + αL] + Eα[(1− α)2σ2u + α2σ2l ]
where:
Eα[((1− α)U + αL)2] = U2 + (2UL − 2U2)E[α] + (U2 − 2UL+ L2)E[α2]
Eα[(1− α)U + αL]2 = U2 + (2UL − 2U2)E[α] + (U2 − 2UL+ L2)E[α]2
Eα[(1− α)2σ2U + α2σ2L] = E[(1− α)2]σ2U + E[α2]σ2L
This gives a posterior variance of:
V[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = ((U − L)2 + σ2U + σ2L)V[α] + σ2UE[(1− α)]2 + σ2LE[α]2
In order to work with this value, we need a sample statistic for (U−L)2. A reasonable
option is the asymptotically unbiased and consistent estimator:
σ2U + σ
2
L + (U0 − L0)2 p→ (U − L)2
214
Then, the posterior variance is:
V[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = (2σ2U + 2σ2L + (U0 − L0)2)V[α] + σ2UE[(1− α)]2 + σ2LE[α]2
Assuming that N and M are large, the variance on the expectation of U and L can
be dropped leading to:
V[∆|a, b,θ∗,ω∗] = (U0 − L0)2V[α]
B Proof for Theorem 4.5.1
I begin by formally defining an f -divergence:
Definition B.1. Let f(t) : t ∈ (0,∞)→ R+ be a convex function such that f(1) = 0.
Further assume that f(t) is twice differentiable and that f ′(1) = 0. Let P and Q be
two proper probability distribution functions defined over the measurable space, Ω.
Then, the f -divergence from P to Q as:
Df (P ||Q) =
∫
Ω
f
(
dP
dQ
)
dQ (4.43)
Forward and reverse KL divergence can be expressed as an f -divergence:
Definition B.2. Let ff (t) = 1 + t log t− t. Then:
∫
Ω
ff
(
dP
dQ
)
dQ = KL(P||Q) (4.44)
Let fr(t) = t− log t− 1. Then:
∫
Ω
fr
(
dP
dQ
)
dQ = KL(Q||P) (4.45)
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f -divergences represent a useful class of functions that formalize a notion of difference
between two distributions. Most importantly, f -divergences are convex transforma-
tions of the density ratio of two distributions and a number of inequalities can be
derived due to this convexity. One useful consequence of this convexity is a result of
function domination (Sason and Verdu, 2016):
Lemma B.1. Let f(t) and g(t) be two convex functions as in Definition B.1. Let P
and Q be two proper density functions that are absolutely continuous with respect to
a common measurable space. If there exists some ν > 0 such that f(t) ≤ νg(t)∀t > 0,
then:
Df (P ||Q) ≤ νDg(P ||Q) (4.46)
Similarly, if there exists some ν > 0 such that νf(t) ≤ g(t)∀t > 0, then:
νDf (P ||Q) ≤ Dg(P ||Q) (4.47)
Proof. Since f(t) is a strictly positive convex function, any integral of f(t) is also
convex. Therefore, the f -divergence is a convex function in t = dP
dQ . This also applies
to g(t). Since f(t) and g(t) are positive with only t = 1→ 0, Df (P ||Q) and Dg(P ||Q)
must also be positive.
Let ν > 0 be a value such that:
f
(
dP
dQ
)
≤ νg
(
dP
dQ
)
Because ν is independent of P and Q and by the convexity of f(t) and g(t):
∫
f
(
dP
dQ
)
dQ ≤ ν
∫
g
(
dP
dQ
)
dQ
The opposite condition is proven in the same way.
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This inequality gives rise to an important result:
Lemma B.2. Assume P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q and vice versa.
Further, to avoid the trivial case of equality, assume P 6= Q. Let f(t) and g(t) be
two convex functions as in Definition B.1. Further, assume that f(t), g(t) > 0 ∀ t ∈
(0, 1)∪ (1,∞) and f(1), g(1) = 1 by left and right limits. Let κ(t) : t ∈ (0,∞)→ R+:
κ(t) =
f(t)
g(t)
be a continuous function in t. Define κ¯:
κ¯ = sup
f
(
dP
dQ
)
g
(
dP
dQ
)
Then:
Df (P||Q) ≤ κ¯Dg(P||Q) (4.48)
Similarly, define κ:
κ = inf
f
(
dP
dQ
)
g
(
dP
dQ
)
Then:
κDg(P||Q) ≤ Df (P||Q) (4.49)
This leads to a sandwiching inequality:
κ ≤ Df (P||Q)
Dg(P||Q) ≤ κ¯ (4.50)
Proof. Let t = dP
dQ . By definition:
f
(
dP
dQ
)
g
(
dP
dQ
) ≤ κ¯
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By Lemma B.1:
Df (P||Q) ≤ κ¯Dg(P||Q)
κDg(P||Q) ≤ Df (P||Q) is shown in a similar way. Since P  Q and by the
continuity of f(t) and g(t), the ratio is defined for all finite, positive values. Thus,
dividing each side of the inequality by Dg(P||Q) is admissible.
Definition B.3. Assume P(θ|X ) Q(θ|γ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ. To avoid the trivial case of
equality, further assume that P(θ|X ) 6= Q(θ|γ). Define the relative extrema for the
likelihood ratio of P to Q as:
β1 = sup
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ) =
(
inf
θ
Q(θ|γ)
P(θ|X )
)−1
β2 = inf
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ) =
(
sup
θ
Q(θ|γ)
P(θ|X )
)−1
(4.51)
where the inversion holds due to absolute continuity between P and Q.
β1 and β2 are bounded. Specifically, 0 < β2 < 1 and 1 < β1 < ∞. By the shared
domain requirement and absolute continuity of P(θ|X ) and Q(θ|γ), β1, β2 > 0. If
P(θ|X ) and Q(θ|γ) are proper density functions, then inf
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ) must be less than 1
since P(θ|X ) 6= Q(θ|γ). The same logic holds to show that sup
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ) > 1.
This definition gives rise to a sandwiching inequality for the ratio of two f -divergences:
Lemma B.3. Assume P(θ|X )  Q(θ|γ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ. Assume that β1 and β2 are
defined. Then:
κ(β2) ≤ Df (P||Q)
Dg(P||Q) ≤ κ(β1) (4.52)
where κ(t) = f(t)
g(t)
is a continuous and monotonically increasing function in t.
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Proof. Define β1 and β2 as shown in Definition B.3:
β1 = ess sup
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
β2 = ess inf
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
By the strict monotonicity of κ(t):
κ(β1) = ess sup
θ
κ
(P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
)
κ(β2) = ess inf
θ
κ
(P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
)
which meets the extremum conditions outlined in Lemma B.2. Therefore, κ(β1) and
κ(β2) sandwich the ratio of corresponding f -divergences.
Finally, show Theorem 4.5.1:
Theorem B.1. Assume P(θ|X ) Q(θ|γ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ. Let t = P(θ|X )Q(θ|γ) and define:
f (t) = t log t+ (1− t)
g(t) = − log t+ (t− 1)
(4.53)
where f(t) and g(t) are f -generators for forward and reverse KL divergence, respec-
tively.
Define κ(t) as:
κ(t) =
1 + t log t− t
t− log t− 1 (4.54)
Define the extrema on the ratio of P to Q as:
β1 = ess sup
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
β2 = ess inf
θ
P(θ|X )
Q(θ|γ)
(4.55)
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Then:
κ(β2) ≤ KL(P||Q)
KL(Q||P) ≤ κ(β1) (4.56)
Proof. f(t) and g(t) are convex functions where f(1) = f ′(1) = 0.
The first derivative of κ(t) with respect to t is:
dκ(t)
dt
=
(t− 1)2 − t log2(t)
t(t− log t− 1)2
For t ∈ (0, 1)∪(1,∞), the derivative is always defined and finite since t−log t = 1 ⇐⇒
t = 1. The discontinuity at t = 1 can be ignored since lim
→0
κ(1−) = lim
→0
κ(1+) = 1,
implying that κ(1) is just a pointwise discontinuity that has no real bearing on the
overall behavior of the function. Thus, κ(t) is continuous for all t.
Second, it can be shown that κ(t) is monotonically increasing in t. Here, it is suf-
ficient to show that for all admissible values of t the derivative is always positive.
First, note that the derivative approaches zero as t approaches 1 since the numerator
equals zero when t = 1. Since the numerator and denominator of the derivative are
always positive, this sufficiently demonstrates the function is strictly monotonically
increasing in t.
Since κ(t) meets the conditions of Lemma B.3, the inequality holds and leads to
Equation (4.56).
Theorem B.1 is equivalent to the initial statement.
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C Proof for Lemma 4.5.2
Let T = N + M and let T → ∞ imply N → ∞ and M → ∞ at equal rates. Let
φ(f) = P(y = 1|f ∈ R,F ) be the true probability that f comes from P(θ|X ) given
a T observation feature set, F . Let φˆ(f) = {φˆ1(f), φˆ2(f), ..., φˆS(f)} be a collection
of S estimates of the classification probability and let φ¯S(f) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
φˆs(f). Assume
that this mean is consistent to its true value:
lim
T→∞,S→∞
φ¯S(f) = φ(f)
Appealing to central limit theorem and assuming T is large:
φ¯S(f)
d→ N
(
φ(f),
σ2φ(f)
S
)
where σ2φ(f) is the variance of the estimate. Plugging in optimal estimators and
rearranging:
P(φ(f)|F ) ∼ N
(
φ¯S(f),
σˆ2φ(f)
S
)
where σˆ2φ(f) is an unbiased estimator of the sample variance admitted by the S samples
from φˆ(f).
For any f ∈ R, let ΦS(f, g) be a distribution function in 0 < g < 1 such that:
ΦS(f, g) =
g∫
0
N
(
x ; φ¯S(f),
σˆ2φ(f)
S
)
dx
By convention, assume that ΦS(f, 0) = 0 and ΦS(f, 1) = 1. Then:
P(maxφ(f) < g) =
∏
f∈R
ΦS(f, g)
P(minφ(f) < g) =
∏
f∈R
(1− ΦS(f, g))
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By the well-established consistency of the extreme order statistics, with large S and
T :
∂
∂g
P(maxφ(f) < g)→
p
sup
f
φ(f)
∂
∂g
P(minφ(f) < g)→
p
inf
f
φ(f)
Define two functions:
u(x) =
x
1− x ; v(y) =
1 + y log y − y
y − log y − 1
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y. Define the edge cases such that u(0) = 0, u(1) =
∞, v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1, v(∞) = ∞. Note that u(x) and v(y) are continuous,
monotonically increasing, one-to-one mappings of x and y, respectively. Let f ∗ =
v(u(φ(f))) and g∗ = v(u(g)). By continuous mapping theorem:
∂
∂g∗
P(max f ∗ < g∗)→
p
sup
f
v(u(φ(f))) = κ(β1)
∂
∂g∗
P(min f ∗ < g∗)→
p
inf
f
v(u(φ(f))) = κ(β2)
meaning that ΦS(f, g) = ΦS(f
∗, g∗) and, as a consequence, v
(
u
(
sup
f
φ(f)
))
=
sup
f
v (u (φ(f))).
Assuming flat priors on κ(β1) and κ(β2):
P(κ(β1)|θ∗,ω∗) ∼ ∂
∂g∗
P(max f ∗ < g∗)
P(κ(β2)|θ∗,ω∗) ∼ ∂
∂g∗
P(min f ∗ < g∗)
(4.57)
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